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INTRODUCTION

A professional employed by a trustee or debtor-in-possession in a
reorganization case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' must be free
of any interest adverse to the estate.2 The Bankruptcy Code defines neither

1. II U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. § 327(a) (1994). Although this article concerns conflicts of professionals
employed by the trustee or debtor-in-possession, a brief description of the provisions regulating
employment of professionals by committees seems useful. The Bankruptcy Code disqualifies
attorneys and accountants who represent someone with "an adverse interest in connection with the
case," 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b), but representation of one or more creditors of the same class as
represented by the committee is not per se the representation of an adverse interest. Id. But
another provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows the court to deny compensation to a professional
employed by the committee who is not disinterested as well as one who "represents or holds an
interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional
person is employed." 11 U.S.C. § 328(c). It is implicit in § 328(c) that counsel for the
committee must be disinterested as well as free of adverse interests. The original version of
§ 1103(b) provided that "a person employed to represent a committee appointed under § 1102 of
this title may not, while employed by such committee, represent any other entity in connection
with the case." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Public Law 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. This
precluded a professional from simultaneously representing a committee and anyone else in
connection with the same bankruptcy case. According to the legislative history, it was primarily
designed to avoid the possibility of conflicting demands on counsel when the committee position
differed from that of the other client-party in interest. It did not seek to prevent representational
influences impacting counsels independence otherwise. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
105 (1977). As amended by § 500(a) of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, § 1103(b) no
longer precludes a lawyer or accountant from representing a committee in the case while
simultaneously representing in the case one or more creditors of the same class as the class
represented by the committee. Can a lawyer or accountant represent the committee if the lawyer
or accountant represents a party in interest other than a creditor or a creditor of a different class
than the class represented by the committee? Section 324 of the 1984 amendment also substituted
"attorney or accountant" for "person." This was done to eliminate any inference that a
nonattorney or nonaccountant could represent a committee. Does this mean that the exception
only applies to attorneys and accountants? This article leaves to another occasion a discussion of
the employment of professionals by committees.
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adverse interest nor estate?
The term adverse interest was not used in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898'
until introduced as part of the definition of disinterestedness by the Chandler
Act Amendments of 1938.' Prior to that, the employment of counsel for a
trustee was regulated by General Order 44 which precluded employment of an
attorney representing an interest adverse to the trustee or the estate in the
matters on which the attorney was to be engaged and which required that the
attorney make appropriate disclosures. 6 However, General Order 44 did not
define or elaborate upon what was an interest adverse to the trustee or the
estate. Effective October 1, 1973, General Order 44 was abrogated and
replaced in liquidation cases by Bankruptcy Rule 215(a) which closely tracked

General Order 44 and conditioned employment of an attorney on the attorney
holding no interest adverse to the estate in the matters upon which he was to

3. Bankruptcy Code § 541 is entitled "Property of the Estate," but contains a laundry list of
not only what is but also what is not property of the estate. II U.S.C. § 541. Bankruptcy Code
§ 542 is entitled "Turnover of Property to the Estate," but instead it requires turnover of property
of the estate to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
The identification of the assets subject to the Bankruptcy process
is expressed in the concept of "property of the estate." At the moment the
Bankruptcy petition is filed, under section 541 of the Code, an "estate" is
created automatically (the customary phrase is "by operation of law"). The
Bankruptcy estate is a new legal entity, like a new corporation or trust, able
to own property, to conduct business, and to sue and be sued. This legal
person, the estate, becomes the transferee and new owner of every
conceivable interest that the Debtor may have had in any kind of property
whatsoever at the moment of Bankruptcy, including future interests and
contingent or conditional interests of any kind. This entity has the right to
gather and sell all such property and, from the proceeds, to distribute funds
to creditors according to the statutory priorities. The estate steps into the
shoes of the Debtor, having the same rights against other parties and being
subject to the same defenses and claims. In addition, the estate has the
benefit of the Avoiding Powers, discussed below. In contrast to the
Canadian concept, it is the estate, not the Trustee in Bankruptcy individually,
that is the transferee of title to the assets. The Trustee's powers in the
United States come from being the manager of the estate. By the same
token, the Trustee in the United States is rarely liable personally for postBankruptcy obligations, which are obligations of the estate.
ALI Transnational Insolvency Project (Tentative Draft, April 15, 1997), pp. 25-26.
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
5. Act of July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
6. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY 1543 (James Wm.Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th
ed. 1978).
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be engaged.7 This was a significant change in the conflict standard for
liquidation cases.
The word "estate" has been substituted in lieu of the reference in this
sentence of the general order to "the receiver, trustee, creditors or
stockholders.' The interests of stockholders may not be identical to those
of the receiver, trustee, or creditors, but insofar as the interests of the estate
may not embrace those of stockholders, the substitution of the less
comprehensive term is not objectionable. The representation or holding of
an undisclosed interest in no way adverse to the estate should afford the
court no basis for denying compensation to an attorney ... because the
interest is adverse to the stockholders. Indeed, effective representation of
a trustee or receiver by an attorney seems likely to run counter to the
interests of the stockholders in a considerable number of
cases, and such
8
representation should not be discouraged by these rules.
This animus toward stockholders in liquidation cases was not applicable
to reorganization cases since the liquidation rule of Bankruptcy Rule 215 was
overridden by the disinterestedness standard in Chapter X reorganizations.
That standard was even handed and required that the person to be employed
not have "an interest materially adverse to the interests of the estate or of any
class of creditors or stockholders."9
Since there is no definition of adverse interest in the Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy judges have struggled with its meaning and application. In In re
Roberts,o Judge Glen Clark defined conflict of interest as "representation by
a given attorney or law firm of two or more entities holding or claiming
adverse interests or of an entity holding an interest adverse to that of its
attorney, its attorney's firm or the firm's associates."" This approach is
inadequate since it does not focus on the real issue, the adequacy of the
representation. The case foundered on actual versus potential conflicts and

7. BANKR. R. 215(a) (Law Co-op. 1974).
(a)
ConditionsofEmployment ofAttorneys andAccountants. No attorney
or accountant for the trustee or receiver shall be employed except upon order of the
court.... If the attorney or accountant represents or holds no interest adverse to the
estate in the matters upon which he is to be engaged, and his employment is in the
best interest of the estate, the court may authorize his employment. Notwithstanding
the foregoing sentence, the court may authorize the employment of an attorney or
accountant who has been employed by the bankrupt when such employment is in the
best interest of the estate.
Id.
8. BANR. R. 215, Advisory Committee's Note (Law Co-op. 1974).
9. Chapter X § 158, Collier Bankruptcy Act and Rules, Part 1 (1976), p. 307
10. 46 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), affd in part,75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
11. Id. at 827. See 1WILLIAM J. NORTON, JR., BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 25:3.05
(2d ed. 1996), for additional cases defining the term.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5

4

Smith: Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization C

1997] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONS

797

unnecessarily complicated matters by applying the Model Code's appearance
of impropriety standard. In sharp contrast, in In re Leslie Fay Companies,
Inc., 2 Judge Tina Brozman squarely addressed the issue of adequacy of the
representation by finding an adverse interest "if it is plausible that the
representation of another interest may cause the debtor's attorney to act any
differently than ... without that other representation."13
In In re Kendavis Industries International, Inc., 4 Judge Harold
Abramson also focused on the adequacy of the representation:
This rule requires that an attorney not place him or herself in a position
where he or she may be required to choose between conflicting loyalties.
. . . Representation of a shareholder, officer or director of a debtor
corporation led to a situation in this case where Locke Pumell's ability to
exercise independent judgment on behalf of its client, the Debtors, was
impaired.'5

Judge Abramson disagreed with the concept of "potential conflict,"' 6 but
created a per se rule disqualifying a lawyer from representing a corporation as
a debtor in possession in a bankruptcy case if the lawyer represents a person
in control of a corporate debtor.' 7
Judge Jack Schmetterer in In re American Printers & Lithographers,
Inc., s recognized the logic of rejecting the distinction between potential and
actual conflicts, but found Judge Abramson's approach "contrary to the well
established rule against the formulation of bright-line per se rules of
disqualification." 19 Nonetheless, Judge Schmetterer disqualified the law firm

12. 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
13. Id. at 533.
14. 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
15. Id. at 752-53 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 754. "The concept ofpotential conflicts is a contradiction in terms. Once there is
a conflict, it is actual-notpotential." Id.
17. Id.
To make the Court's holding more concrete, the Court holds that whenever
counsel for a debtor corporation has any agreement, express or implied, with
management or a director of the debtor, or with a shareholder, or with any control
party, to protect the interest of that party, counsel holds a conflict. That conflict is
not potential, it is actual, and it arises the date that representation commences. This
holding would apply equally to partnerships. An attorney who claims to represent a
partnership, but also has some agreement, whether express or implied, with the general
or limited partners, or with any control person, to protect its interest, that attorney has
an actual conflict of interest, and is subject to disqualification and a disallowance of
fees.
Id.
18. 148 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
19. Id. at 866.
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in American Printers since he found there was a high likelihood that the
potential conflict would become an actual conflict and "no compelling reason
which calls for this Court to set aside the general disfavor of authorities toward
employment of professionals with potential conflicts,""0 particularly when "it
has not been shown that the pool of potential counsel available to debtor does
not supply available skilled counsel."'"
However, with an earlier nudge from the District Court, Judge Charles
Matheson rejected the potential conflict concept in In re Amdura Corp.' In
Amdura, Judge Matheson held the representation of a major creditor of Amdura
in unrelated matters was an actual conflict since the relationship of the client
to the lawyer adversely affected the ability of the lawyer to represent the
interests of the debtor-in-possession 3
The Fifth Circuit adopted a per se rule in In re W.F. Development
Corp.,24 holding that one attorney could not represent both limited and general
partners in a bankruptcy case.' The court relied not on Judge Abramson's

20. Id. at 867.
21. Id.
22. 121 B.R. 862, 868 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). In Amdura Judge Matheson referred to the
District Court's opinion in Colorado National Bank v. Ginco, Inc. (In re Ginco, Inc.), 105 B.R.
620 (D. Colo. 1938), which reversed his holding in that case recognizing a distinction between
actual and potential conflicts.
The District Court in Ginco set aside the order of appointment. Citing section
327 of the Code, the court noted the stringent adverse interest test imposed by the
statute when it stated:
An attorney may not "hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate" in
any matter. In the pending state litigation FMTG [the attorney] already
represents Richard Ginder-the principal shareholder, officer and debtguarantor of the corporation. Mr. Ginder may have an equity interest in
Ginco and is a potential target for claims of corporate mismanagement.
Under those circumstances, dual representation by FMTG of the estate and
Mr. Ginder is a sufficient conflict to be an adverse interest under both
subsection (a) and subsection (e). Ibid. at 621.
The court rejected the concept of distinguishing between an actual present conflict and
a potential conflict. The court admonished that the literal language of the Bankruptcy
Code must be respected and followed.
The District Court's opinion in Ginco may have been softened somewhat by the
opinion of Chief Judge Finesilver in the Matter of W.VS. Investment Joint Venture,
Civil Action No. 89-F-331 (D.Colo. January 4, 1990), but only to the extent of saying
that an attorney can represent dual clients where their interests are common in the
matter for which the attorney is retained.
Amdura 121 B.R. at 866.
23. Amdura, 121 B.R. at 869.
24. W.F. Dev. Corp. v. Office of the U.S. Trustee (In re W.F. Dev. Corp.), 905 F.2d 883 (5th
Cir. 1990).
25. Id. at 884.
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analysis in Kendavis, but on Bankruptcy Judge Samuel Bufford's analysis in
26
In re McKinney Ranch Associates.
Because of his fiduciary duties, a general partner of a limited partnership
will always be a potential target of claims by a limited partnership debtor.
A general partner is responsible for the day to day affairs of the business,
and makes the policy decisions that lead to the financial problems that
result in bankruptcy. This may involve a breach of fiduciary duty or
The general partners may have received
securities law violations.
preferential or fraudulent transfers, or have received property of the estate.
In addition, a general partner may have given a guaranty of the partnership
debts. Counsel for the debtor will likely be required to examine the
relations between the partnership and its general partners for possible claims
against them. Thus the potential conflict in the representation of a general
partner of a limited partnership will always disqualify an attorney from
simultaneously representing the limited partnership as a debtor in possession
27
or from representing the trustee of a limited partnership.
The Bankruptcy Code also requires that professionals be disinterested.
This standard precludes employment of professionals who hold or represent
certain interests. This approach to independence originated with the work of
the Protective Committee Study and then Securities and Exchange

Commissioner William 0. Douglas's revisions to the Chandler Act
Amendments.28 The key reform urged by the Securities and Exchange
Commission was the appointment of a disinterested trustee. The Protective
Committee Study delved deeply into the techniques of protective committees
and conflicts of interest in reorganization cases. 29 Those conducting the
investigation concluded that the objectives of management and underwriters
were alien to matters of fairness and instead introduced "in every large situation
of management and underwriters, with objectives, among others, of continued control,
affiliation, and perpetuation in office, and the preservation of common stock interests.
3
... [T]hese forces have tended to make irrelevant the other considerations" of

26. 62 B.R. 249 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986), cited in W.F. Dev. Corp., 905 F.2d at 884.
27. McKinney, 62 B.R. at 255-256. Judge Bufford apparently was not troubled by the fact
that the general partner managed the partnership and controlled the work performed by counsel.
28. Act of July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
29. See SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES,

PERSONNEL

AND FUNCTIONS

COMMrlTEES PARTS I & 1 (1937).
30. SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N,
WORK, ACTIVITIES,

PERSONNEL

OF PROTECTIVE

AND REORGANIZATION

REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION

AND FUNCTIONS

OF PROTECTIVE

OF THE

AND REORGANIZATION

COMMITrEES PART VIII 8 (1940). One of the criticisms leveled at section 77B was its failure to
require "complete disinterestedness," id. at 104, on the part ofa trustee. Anotherwas that in most
cases initiated under section 77B in 1936 the debtor continued in possession and management of
the corporation. The Report pointed out that this was anomalous; "in ordinary bankruptcy...
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soundness of corporate structure and fairness. With the advent of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, Congress increasedthe powers and privileges of management
many fold, and scrapped the independent trustee, the assurance of a fair
reorganization, in most cases.
Because of the continuance of the debtor or its prepetition management in
control in most cases, the requirement that the lawyer representing the
interested debtor be disinterested is anomalous. This caused the Professional
Ethics in Bankruptcy Cases Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association ("Business
Bankruptcy Ethics Committee")3 2 to seek a resolution of the American Bar
Association supporting an amendment to the -Bankruptcy Code to apply state
ethical rules to the employment of counsel for the debtor-in-possession rather
than the disinterestedness standard. In 1991, the American Bar Association
House of Delegates passed such a resolution."
Although a matter of
importance, the propriety of the application of the disinterestedness standard to
counsel for the debtor-in-possession is not the subject of this article.3

[a trustee] was mandatory," id., and "in equity proceedings a receivership without a receiver would
have been an anomaly." Id. at 104-05. In commenting on the qualification of trustees in
bankruptcy cases, the Report stated that:
[T]he federal courts in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings frequently have withheld their
approval of the trustees elected by creditors because of the trustees' lack of
disinterestedness-a lack attributable to the trustees' affiliation with persons having
interests adverse to those of the estate. Although the rule in bankruptcy has not been
inflexible, a conflicting interest or association sufficient to impel judicial disapproval
of the trustee elected by creditors has been found in a direct or indirect connection
with the bankrupt, the receiver of the bankrupt, the bankrupt's assignee for the benefit
of creditors, and creditors whose claims are in dispute.
Id. at 105.
31. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1107 (1994).
32.The Committee was initially
a Task Force created by the Chair of the Business
Bankruptcy Committee, Nathan B. Feinstein, who has had a longtime interest in ethics and ethics
in bankruptcy cases in particular. The original officers of the Business Bankruptcy Ethics
Committee were Gerald K. Smith, Chair, Myer ("Mike") 0. Sigal, Vice-Chair and Susan M.
Freeman, Reporter. Myron ("Mickey") M. Sheinfeld succeeded Mr. Sigal as Vice-Chair. The
Task Force became a permanent subcommittee and its name was changed to that indicated in the
text, but the officers remained the same until 1996 when Ms. Freeman replaced Gerald K. Smith
as Chair and Mitchell Seider replaced Mr. Sheinfeld as Vice Chair. The members of the
Committee are knowledgeable and interested lawyers skilled in all phases of bankruptcy cases,
both large and small. A substantial number of working papers were prepared by members of the
Committee over the last decade. The papers and the discussion generated thereby have
contributed to the awareness of ethical issues in bankruptcy cases.
33. American Bar Association House of Delegates Res. 119A (Aug. 1991) (enacted). As
indicated in the text, the initial work of the committee led to a resolution of the American Bar
Association House of Delegates recommending the abandonment of the disinterestedness
requirement for counsel for the debtor-in-possession.
34. Bankruptcy courts have interpreted the requirement that counsel for a trustee be
disinterested and not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate (Bankruptcy
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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Most of the attention of judges and practitioners has been on the
disinterestedness and no adverse interest requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code. 5 However, several bankruptcy courts have considered disqualifying
conflicts under state Rules of Professional Conduct. 6 Nonetheless, how state
Code § 327) to apply to counsel for a debtor-in-possession (Bankruptcy Code § 1107).
The definition of disinterested entails, among other things, not being a creditor, not
being an officer or director of the debtor within two years of the bankruptcy petition
filing date, and not having an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate
or any class of creditors or equity security holders by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in the debtor (Bankruptcy Code
§ 101(14)).
Courts have divided with respect to whether the fact that an attorney in the
prospective debtor-in-possession counsel's law firm holds a minor equity interest in
the debtor or holds a non-management officership (such as assistant secretary), or the
law firm is owed for prepetition attorneys' fees disqualifies the attorney under the
disinterestedness test. This subcommittee and the ABA Business Bankruptcy
Committee and ABA House of Delegates have urged Congress to amend the
Bankruptcy Code to provide that counsel for a debtor-in-possession need not be
disinterested, but should be judged by otherwise applicable conflict of interest rules.
Apart from the issue of disinterestedness, the subcommittee proposes a specific
comment to Restatement § 206 to address its applicability to a lawyer's connections
to a debtor-in-possession.
The committee urges that whether a lawyer's claim for attorneys' fees or equity
interest will result in a substantial risk of materially, adversely affecting the lawyer's
representation depends on the size of the claim or stake in the bankruptcy case,
measured from the perspective of both the debtor and the creditor law firm, and the
intended treatment of the claim or equity stake, if known. Further, unless the lawyer
knows ofpotential claims against officers, service as a non-management officer should
not entail such a risk.
ABA Business Bankruptcy Law Committee, Bankruptcy Ethics Subcommittee, Restatementof the
Law, The Law GoverningLawyers,BankruptcyIssuesPanelPaper Presented at the American Law
Institute Conference in Orlando, Florida 5-6 (1993).
35. Two additional conflict of interest rules in the Bankruptcy Code preclude an examiner
from becoming a trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (1994), or being employed by a trustee, II U.S.C.
§ 327(f) (1994). The Bankruptcy Rules regulate the procedural aspects of employment.
Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) requires an application to employ and the accompanying verified
statement, to disclose as to the person to be employed all of such person's connections with the
United States Trustee or any person employed in the Office of the United States Trustee. The
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2014 states that the 1991 Amendment introducing such
disclosure requirement
is not intended to prohibit the employment of such persons in all cases or to enlarge
the definition of "disinterested person" in [§ 101(14)] of the Code. However, the
court may consider a connection with the United States trustee's office as a factor
when exercising its discretion. Also, this information should be revealed in the
interest of full disclosure and confidence in the bankruptcy system, especially since
the United States trustee monitors and may be heard on applications for compensation
and reimbursement of professionals employed under this rule.
BANKR. R. 2014(a), Advisory CommitteeNote (Supp. 1997). Another conflict provision is found
in Bankruptcy Rule 5004 and concerns judges.
36. E.g., In re Spivy Chevrolet, Inc., 30 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCH) 116 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996)
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conflict rules apply to bankruptcy cases is largely unexplored. This is
especially true as to conflicts arising due to simultaneous representation. This
type of conflict has been referred to '37
by Professor Nathan M. Crystal as an
"unrelated matter conflict of interest.
With one exception, treatises on ethics for lawyers do not address ethical
issues in bankruptcy cases; as to the important subject of disqualification at the
request of a client represented in an unrelated matter who is a party in interest
in a bankruptcy case, or what will be referred to hereafter as a simultaneous
representation conflict, there is no coverage. The bankruptcy treatises also

overlook simultaneous representation conflicts.39 Over the last fifteen years
(trustee and principal of debtor sought to disqualify counsel for creditor on the basis of conflict
of interest in a chapter 7 case).
37. Nathan M. Crystal, DisqualificationofCounselfor UnrelatedMatterConflictsofInterest,
4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 273, 274 (1990).
This form of conflict occurs when a lawyer represents one client while that lawyer or
another member ofher firm is simultaneously representing that client's adversary, not
directly against the first client, but in an unrelated matter. For instance, a firm may
represent client A in litigation against B, while simultaneously representing B in an
unrelated matter.
Id.
38. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AsS'N & THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 51:101 (1997) (discussing simultaneous representation
of adverse interest); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WiLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2d ed. 1997) (no illustrative
bankruptcy cases cited in the volume let alone in connection with simultaneous representation
conflicts); RONALD E. MALLEN & RONALD E. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 19:11-:15 (3d ed.
1989) (discussing "bankruptcy and debtor-creditor relationship" law, with the most detailed
discussion found in the ethics treatises); NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY (1996) (discussing state court interpretations and opinions of state
bar but not discussing any bankruptcy cases); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
§ 7.3.2 (1986) (discussing simultaneous representation conflicts but not discussing or citing any
bankruptcy cases).
Based on my familiarity with bankruptcy cases and secondary authorities, I had assumed
there was a void. I wish to thank Christina M. Entrekin, a third-year student of law at Arizona
State University, for carefully reviewing the secondary materials. The results confirmed my
assumption.
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1994)
(discusses the representation of multiple, affiliated entities in bankruptcy cases, but does not
discuss simultaneous representation conflicts); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 327 (Lawrence W.
King, ed., 15th ed. 1996). Chapter 327 of Collier on Bankruptcy, entitled "employment of
professional persons," follows the provisions of § 327 of the Bankruptcy Code in discussing the
employment of professionals, but its focus is on adversity of interest to the estate or
disinterestedness, not simultaneous representation conflicts. However, § 327.04(5) does discuss
whether concurrent representation is a per se violation of the Bankruptcy Code where the
representation concurrent to that in the bankruptcy case is on an entirely unrelated matter. There
is also a discussion of multi-debtor representation which focuses on large multi-debtor
reorganization cases where it is commonplace for one law firm, or a group of law firms, to
represent all of the debtor entities.
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or so there have been a handful of law review articles discussing simultaneous
representation conflicts, and a few actually discuss such conflicts in the context
of bankruptcy."
State Rules of Professional Responsibility preclude a lawyer from suing
a client represented in an unrelated matter." The application of this rule in
federal bankruptcy cases raises two issues. The first is one of federal-state
relations or preemption briefly discussed in an interesting Arizona case. In In
re Breen,42 Breen represented Hubbell and negotiated a loan from Hubbell to
Macy secured by real property. Macy defaulted and Hubbell foreclosed. Breen
no longer represented Hubbell and did not handle the foreclosure. Shortly
before the foreclosure sale, Breen filed a Chapter 11 case for Macy without
obtaining Hubbell's consent or informing Hubbell of the intended action. The
Disciplinary Committee had given short thrift to the defense that § 327(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code preempts the state rule.43 Section 327(c) provides:

40. See, e.g., Neal Batson, Conflicts, Privileges and Sanctions in Bankruptcy Cases and
Proceedings: An Outline, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 245 (William L. Norton,
Jr., ed., 1987); Crystal, supra note 37; Regina S. Kelbon et al., Conflicts, the Appointment of
"Professionals,"and FiduciaryDuties of Major Partiesin Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 349
(1991);RobertP. Lawry, The MeaningofLoyalty, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1089 (1990); Richard Lieb,
Sections 330,331, 503(b), 506(b)-Attorney Compensation, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 427, 445-50 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1987); Richard Lieb, Sections 329-331-Attorney
Compensation, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 329,335-338 (William L. Norton, Jr.,
ed., 1986);Kevin McMunigal, RethinkingAttorney Conflict ofInterestDoctrine,5 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 823 (1992); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A ProposedSolution to the Current Confusion and Controversy,61 TEX. L.
REV. 211 (1982); Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, I J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL
ETHics 87 (1996); David A. Rosenzweig, Sections 327-331-AttorneyCompensation, in Annual
Survey of Bankruptcy Law 297, 301-312, 399-409 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1994-95); David
A. Rosenzweig, Sections327-331-AttorneyCompensation,in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 377, 382-398 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1990); Gerald K. Smith, Disinterestedness,in
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 639, 855, 860-879 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed. 1995-96);
R. Craig Smith, Conflicts of Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposalto Increase
Confidence in the Bankruptcy System, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1045 (1995).
There have been several additional articles discussing ethics in the bankruptcy context.
Professor Jack Ayer wrote an insightful article on the general subject. See John D. Ayer, How
to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355 (1986). Mr. Kent Meyers wrote an
article discussing multiple representation conflicts in the bankruptcy context. See D. Kent Meyers,
Ethical Considerationsin the Representation of Multiple CreditorsAgainst a Single Debtor, 51
AM. BANKR. L.J. 19 (1977). Susan M. Freeman has written two articles on the subject of
bankruptcy ethics. See Susan M. Freeman, Qualificationto Serve as DIP Counsel-The Recent
Cases, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 139 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1990); Susan
M. Freeman, EthicalGuidelinesfor RepresentingDebtorsand Debtors-in-Possession,inANNUAL
SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 205 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1987).
41. Infra, Parts 1(C) and (D).
42. 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992).
43. Id. at 464.
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[I]n a case under chapter 7, 12, or 11 of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such
person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there
is objection by another creditor or the United States trustee, in which
case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual
conflict of interest.'
The Committee stated that "the bankruptcy code does not release an attorney
from his or her duties under the Arizona ethical regulations." 5 The Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed the Disciplinary Committee's finding that the filing
of the Chapter 11 was "an action directly adverse" 46 to Hubbell, and the
finding that there were differing interests between Hubbell and Macy." The
Supreme Court finessed the preemption issue, stating that "the claim that the
bankruptcy code insulated Respondent from his ethical duties is simply
wrong. 48
The second issue is more subtle. It is whether the bankruptcy case as a
whole is civil litigation, thereby implicating the state rule precluding a lawyer
from suing one client on behalf of another.4 9
It is clear that a reorganization case is different than "bilateral" civil
litigation. This was pointed out in the Protective Committee Study nearly sixty
*years ago. The Report observed that "[t]he reorganization of corporations is
primarily an exercise in corporate finance and management. Only incidentally
are reorganization proceedings law suits; and they are never law suits in the
ordinary sense
of procedures designed to settle simple issues between individual
50
litigants.5

44. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (1994).
45. Breen, 830 P.2d at 464.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 465.
48. Id. The court relied on In re GreaterPottstown Community Church of the Evangelical
CongregationalChurch, 80 B.R. 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
49. Infra, Part II(D), Part ImI(D), and Part IV.
50. SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE

WORK, ACTrnvfEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
CoMMInrrmS PART VIII 1 (1940)
The Protective Committee Study observed that "[t]his is equally true of proceedings under
Sections 77 and 77B, and Chapter X, of the Bankruptcy Act, and of proceedings in equity
receiverships." Id. at I n.l. The Report quoted from a 1934 district court opinion, Lincoln
PrintingCo. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 6 F. Supp. 663, 682-83 (N.D. I1. 1934), as follows:
The conduct of any equity receivership is of necessity largely administrative; it
involves more than a decision of "yes" or "no" upon a single issue or a multiple of
single issues presented by appropriate pleadings. It involves decisions on matters of
policy with nice gradations of refined reasoning and conservative judgment... often
...questions of policies or courses of conduct concerning which two apparently
equally consistent views may be taken. Such questions and situations constantly recur
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The Protective Committee Study also observed that "[i]t is only after these
broader economic and business issues are decided that attention should properly
be given to questions concerning the extent of the participations to be allocated
among former security holders, the problem of the 'fair plan' as traditionally
understood." 5 '
It is also true that a reorganization is largely consensual. Equity and debt
securities are often altered in both form and substance. The reorganized debtor
is often different than the original debtor. However, although the mechanism
exists to "cramdown" a reorganization, generally speaking affected classes will
consent by the requisite majority. Indeed, one of the functions of committees
is to assist in obtaining the requisite consents to the plan.
But even though a reorganization case differs in important respects from
bilateral, civil litigation, this is not dispositive. The question remains whether
the rule precluding a lawyer from suing a client in an unrelated matter
precludes a lawyer from filing a reorganization case or representing a trustee
or debtor-in-possession in a reorganization case if a party in interest is a client
in an unrelated matter.
The Bankruptcy Code's adverse interest rule and state disqualification rules
as to simultaneous representation are related but different-like the opposite
sides of a coin. An example may make this clear. Take the common situation
of counsel for a bank in matters not involving a particular debtor. Bank
counsel may be asked by the debtor to file a Chapter 11 case and represent the
debtor-in-possession after the case has been filed. Depending on counsel's
relationship with the bank, the representation of the bank in unrelated matters

in the conduct of an equity receivership, giving to it a character requiring the exercise
of administrative jurisdiction, as distinguished from decision of controverted or
litigated issues.
SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVEsTIGATION OF THE VORK,

AcTIvITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMIrEEs
PART VIII 1 n.1 (1940).
The ProtectiveCommittee Study delineated "the most important aspects of reorganization.'
id. at 2.
Reorganization involves all the problems of corporate finance and management:
it requires an inquiry into the causes of the financial collapse of the corporation; and
into its worth if salvaged as a going concern; and, if reorganization instead of
liquidation is determined upon, how this can best be accomplished upon a basis not
only fair but economically sound. The answers to these questions will necessitate
inquiry among other things into general economic factors, competitive conditions in
the industry, its trend of demand, and its price policies, as well as inquiry into more
immediate questions such as the quality of the debtor's management. More narrowly,
there will have to be inquiry into earnings in the past and the prediction of future
earnings, and chiefly on the latter basis, a determination of what would constitute a
sound capitalization and financial structure.
Id. at 1-2.
51. Id. at 2.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:793

may constitute an adverse interest under the Bankruptcy Code which will
prevent counsel from representing the debtor-in-possession. 2 And even if
counsel clears this hurdle, the other side of the coin must be considered and
absent appropriate consent state rules may disqualify counsel from representing
the debtor-in-possession on the basis that this would result in a conflict of
interest.53
Conflict rules are unclear as to their application to collective proceedings,
such as a bankruptcy case or equity receivership.54 It is also uncertain which
conflict rules apply.5 The Bankruptcy Code provisions are also difficult to
apply. The disinterested standard formulated in the 1930s was to assure the
independence of trustees in major reorganization cases.56 But we now have
management continued in control, and the disinterestedness standard is the
wrong size shoe for counsel for management.
These uncertainties contribute to the occurrence of periodic scandals57
which generate disrespect for the judicial system, and lead to sanctions"8 and
breach of fiduciary duty claims.59 The conflict rules of the twentieth century
52. In re Amdura Corp., 121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). "The Court questions whether
counsel can be said to be disinterested when they acknowledge their inability to take a position
contrary to Continental because, at least as to W & S, it is unwilling to offend the 'hand that
feeds."' Id. at 867.
The question of whether F & W is "disinterested" within the meaning of section
327 of the Code is really one that only F & W can answer. In the Court's view, the
firm's past representation of that bank does not create a conflict within the meaning
of 327, or otherwise make F & W not disinterested, unless that law firm, for whatever
reason, believes that it would not be able to diligently and zealously represent the
debtors on issues concerning the Continental loan. If the Continental is not the "hand
that feeds" F & W, and if the firm is not otherwise inhibited, then past representation
of the Continental on matters not relating to these debtors would not serve to
disqualify F & W from acting as counsel for the fiduciary in these cases.
As to W & S, the same analysis must apply. That firm, however, has openly
declared its inability or, at least, unwillingness to joust with the bank. It appears to
the Court, as concluded in the Order, that issues surrounding the Continental Bank are
so pervasive, and the Bank's status as a multimillion-dollar-a-year client of W & S
is so significant, that it is difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to reach the
conclusion that W & S is "disinterested."
Id. at 871.
53. Infra, Part III(D) and Part IV.
54. Infra, Part reI(D) and Part IV.
55. Infra, Part 1(B).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 1409, at 38 (1937).
57. E.g., Laurence Zuckerman, Judgment Day for a Legal Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES,
September 25, 1994, § 3, at 1.
58. In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCII) 99 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996); In re
Leslie Fay Co., Inc., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 147 B.R.
803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988).
59. See generallyJohn F. Sutton, Jr., The Lawyer'sFiduciaryLiabilitiesto Third Parties,37
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need to be improved. Recent developments give some cause for optimism that
we can develop rules for the twenty-first century, but it is not an easy task.
In 1986, the American Law Institute took on the task of restating the Law
Governing Lawyers. 0 Chapter 8 of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers ("Restatement') concerns conflicts of interest. The Restatement's
definition of conflict of interest is a significant improvement over existing
formulations. "A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the
lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the
lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former
client, or a third person."'" But this formulation only addresses one side of the

coin, like the Bankruptcy Code adverse interest standard.62 The other side of
the coin is partially addressed by additional, specific rules.63 These rules are
helpful, but the Reporters intentionally eschew efforts to create separate conflict
rules for bankruptcy, insolvency and other collective proceedings.
A Commission was established by Congress in October of 1994 to review
the bankruptcy law.' It is a nine member Commission. The members were
selected by the President, Chief Justice and Congressional leadership of both
parties.65 Its charter is:
(1) to investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11,
United States Code (commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code");
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements
with respect to such issues and problems;

S. TEx. L. REv. 1033, 1035-1042 (1996). Professor Sutton states that "[c]ourts are adamant in
requiring that a lawyer's loyalty to each client be unswayed by the lawyer's self-interest or other
extraneous influences." Id. at 1035. Sutton distinguishes between between an action for
malpractice and an action for breach of fiduciary duty. The malpractice claim involving violation
of a standard of care while a breach of fiduciary duty involves violation of a standard of conduct.
Id. at 1042. See also Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a claim
against a former lawyer who represents an adverse party in a substantially related matter).
60. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 195, 198-200 (1987).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAvYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
62. See Moore, supra note 40.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 209, 211,212 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
64. Section 602 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
65. Its members are Brady C. Williamson, Esq. (Chairman), Hon. Robert E. Ginsberg (ViceChairman), Jay Alix, M. Caldwell Butler, Jr., Esq., M. Babette A. Ceccotti, Esq., John A. Gose,
Esq., Jeffrey J. Hartley, Esq., Hon. Edith Hollan Jones and James I. Shepard, Esq. Its Reporter
is Professor Elizabeth Warren. Professor Lawrence P. King and Stephen H. Case, Esq. are
Advisors. Its staff includes Elizabeth I. Holland, Esq., Melissa Jacoby, Esq. and George Singer,
Esq.
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(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief Justice, and the
President a report in accordance with section 608; and
(4) to solicit divergent views of all parties concerned with the operation
of the bankruptcy system.6
The Commission established a Working Group on Service and Ethics. The
Working Group was asked to make recommendations as far as standards for
employment of professionals, a national rule governing the admission to
practice in bankruptcy courts and multiple party representation.67
Another development was triggered by the controversial Reno
Regulations68 and the uncertainty as to the ethical rules applicable in federal
cases. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States ("Standing Committee") directed its Reporter,
Professor Daniel R. Coquillette, of Boston College Law School, to review
federal local rules governing attorney conduct. Professor Coquillette's Report
describes the sensitive nature of the project and the magnitude of the problem:
No area of local rulemaking has been more fragmented than local rules
governing attorney conduct. This difficult subject was first raised at the
outset of the Local Rules Project in 1988, and was then discussed
extensively by the Standing Committee at a Special Conference on Local
Rules, convened by the Committee at Boston College on November 14,
1988. Many of the goals of the Local Rules Project, including uniform
numbering, were relatively uncontroversial, but review of local rules
governing attorney conduct proved to be highly contentious. Rather than

66. Section 603 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
67. The Working Group is under the guidance of Commission Advisor Professor Lawrence
P. King who is ably assisted by Staff Attorney Elizabeth I. Holland. The Group includes
Commissioners M. Caldwell Butler, Esq. and Hon. Robert E. Ginsberg, and Participants, Donald
S. Bernstein, Michael A. Bloom, Bernard Shapiro, Gerald K. Smith and Professor Charles P.
Wolfram.
68. The states, through their bar associations, have long had primary responsibility for
regulating the ethical conduct of lawyers. Despite the history of state control over
ethical standards, on August 4, 1994, the Department of Justice (Department), under
Attorney General Janet Reno, adopted a regulation known as the "Reno Rule." The
Reno Rule purports to exempt federal prosecutors from the "no-contact" rules of the
states in which they are licensed to practice law.
Todd S. Schulman, Wisdom Without Power: The Department of Justice'sAttempt to Exempt
Federal ProsecutorsFrom State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067 (1996). Mr.
Schulman asserts that inconsistent interpretations of the no-contact rule by state courts and state
disciplinary bodies has resulted in uncertainty which has had an adverse imlact on the
performance of federal prosecutors. Id. The author makes a persuasive argument in support of
federal preemption.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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jeopardize the early progress of the Local Rules Project, it was decided to
defer this divisive issue to a later date.
Since that time, the "balkanization" of local rules governing attorney
conduct appears to have grown worse . . . . [There are now seven
fundamentally different approaches, and even within these "groups" there
are great variations. The most common approach, local rules that
incorporate the relevant standards of the state in which the district is
located, actually divides federal districts because of the many differing state
rles.... The Department of Justice, other major federal agencies, and
many national legal organizations, including civil rights groups, national
corporations, financial networks, large law firms, and groups facing multidistrict litigation have been severely inconvenienced.... Further, the rise
of legal malpractice actions has led to subsidiary dispute about choice of
law-often of mind numbing complexity. This situation has led some major
governmental agencies, including the Department of Justice, to consider
adopting their own professional standards. The Department of Justice has
now actually done so with regard to communications with represented
parties, promulgating new Department regulations that differ significantly
from most state standards and the standards adopted by local rule in most
Districts and Circuits .... This adds further to the number and variation of
the rules.69
After considering the Report, the Standing Committee voted to hold a
special study conference and the Chair of the Standing Committee, Honorable
Alice-Marie Stotler, directed Professor Coquillette to determine the frequency
with which ethical issues arise in reported federal cases. This led to an
additional report to the Standing Committee.7"

The Special Study Group considered the two Reports at two sessionsone in January, 1996 in California and one in June, 1996 in Washington, D.C.
At the conclusion of the second session, a substantial majority of the Study
Group favored the drafting of a model local rule, but did not favor a uniform
rule promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act. A majority concluded that

additional empirical data should be gathered as to (1) the experience in districts
that had adopted the earlier model rule, (2) the experience in districts that

handle attorney discipline matters, (3) the experience with attorney discipline
in the courts of appeal, and (4) the federal decisional law involving discipline

of attorneys. 7'
Yet another development was the creation of a Disclosure Subcommittee

in 1995, by Bankruptcy Judge Paul Mannes, then Chairman of the Advisory

69. DANIEL R. COQUILLETrE, REPORT ON LoCAL RULES
1-2 (July 5, 1995) [hereinafter COQUILLETrE REPORT].

REGULATING ATTIORNEY CONDUCT

70. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, STUDY OF RECENT FEDERAL CASES (1990-1995) INVOLVING
RULES OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT (December 1, 1995) [hereinafter COQuILLETrE STUDY].

71. Judicial Conference of the United States, Standing Committee, June 1996 Minutes.
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Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Its purpose is to review and make
recommendations as to the rules regulating employment of professionals and
disclosures. While the Rules Committee may have a limited charter, it surely
is empowered to promulgate rules affecting the practice before the Bankruptcy
Courts, including procedural aspects of employment, required disclosures and
conflict checks, admission to practice before the bankruptcy courts and
applicable rules of professional conduct.72
This article explores conflicts in workouts and reorganization cases.
Common situations are analyzed under the conflict rules of the Bankruptcy
Code, ABA rules applicable in most bankruptcy courts and the current drafts
of the Restatement. This article also chronicles recent developments and
concludes with several recommendations.
II.

CONFLICT RULES FOR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

Conflict rules are essential for a variety of reasons, including the assurance
of adequate representation, preservation of confidences and maintaining the
integrity of our adversary system." Conflict rules also preserve the intangible

72. For example, it might consider promulgating a rule that regulates bankruptcy courts. A
rule might be considered that admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of
being admitted to practice in the relevant United States District Court, entities an attorney, on
presentation of a certificate of admission and good standing in a bankruptcy court, to appear in
any other bankruptcy court in the United States. More importantly, the Committee should address
the conflict rules and necessary disclosures. The Office of the U.S. Trustee is another possible
source of reform. It has not yet stepped into the fray other than to police disclosures and conflicts
in specific cases as required by 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(H). This is useful, but less effective than
guidelines.
See Letter from Jerry Patchan, Director of the Executive Office for United States Trustees
to Mr. Bradley C. Williamson, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (May
14, 1997) (on file with author). "Our activity in this area, reflected in a number of significant
decisions, has contributed to a much stronger awareness of ethical considerations, including
conflict of interest issues, among the bankruptcy bench and bar." Id. at 1. If the U.S. Trustee
has the power to promulgate guidelines regulating private trustees, surely it has the power to do
so as to professionals employed in bankruptcy cases.
73.
The prohibition against lawyer conflicts of interest reflects several
competing concerns....
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the
effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest
undermines the independence of the lawyer's professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the client's behalf, the client's
expectation of effective representation (see § 28) could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have a lawyer safeguard the client's
confidential information (see § 112). Preventinguse ofconfidential clientinformation
against the interests of the client, either to benefit the lawyer's personal interest, in aid
of some other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose is facilitated through
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bond between client and lawyer.74 Call it loyalty, call it what you will, we
perhaps sense it better than we define it. Our reaction to specific situations is
the true litmus test. Perhaps it is our sense of injustice that is involved. The
Twentieth Century Codes do not adequately codify this bond, loyalty or sense
of injustice.
But there is a downside as well. Conflict rules limit the client's choice of
counsel, often at a substantial cost. They also affect lawyers as far as choice
of clients and matters that can be handled.
On the other hand, avoiding conflicts of interest can impose significant
costs on lawyers and clients. Prohibition of conflicts of interest should
therefore be no broader than necessary. First, conflict avoidance can make
representation more expensive. To the extent that conflict of interest rules
prevent multiple clients from being represented by a single lawyer, one or
both clients will be required to find other lawyers. That might entail
uncertainty concerning the successor lawyers' qualifications, usually
additional cost, and the inconvenience of separate representation. In matters
in which individual claims are small, representation of multiple claimants
might be required if the claims are effectively to be considered at all.
Second, limitations imposed by conflicts rules can interfere with client
expectations. At the very least, one of the clients might be deprived of the
services of a lawyer whom the client had a particular reason to retain,
perhaps on the basis of a long-time association with the lawyer. In some
communities or fields of practice there might be no lawyer who is perfectly
conflict-free. Third, obtaining informed consentto conflicted representation
itself might compromise important interests. As discussed in § 202, consent

conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse....
Finally, some conflict of interest rules protect interests of the legal system in
obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for
example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the
process of taking proof and compromising adversary argumentation (see § 209).
RESTATEMENT (THmID) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 201 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
74. The prohibition against lawyer conflicts of interest reflects several competing concerns.
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client
can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself. For example,
the principle underlying the prohibition against a lawyer's filing suit against a present
client in an unrelated matter (see § 209, Comment e) may also extend to situations,
not involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a client's expectation of
the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely. Contentious dealings, for example
involving charges of bad faith against the client whom the lawyer represents in
another matter would raise such a concern. So also would negotiating on behalf of
one client when a large proportion of the lawyer's other client's net worth is at risk.
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to a conflict of interest requires that each affected client give consent based
on adequate information. The process of obtaining informed consent is not
only potentially time-consuming; it might also be impractical because it
would require the disclosure of information that the clients would prefer not
to have disclosed, for example, the subject matter about which they have
consulted the lawyer. Fourth, conflicts prohibitions interfere with lawyers'
own freedom to practice according to their own best judgment of
appropriate professional behavior. It is appropriate to give significant
weight to the freedom and professionalism of lawyers in the formulation of
legal rules governing conflicts.75
A.

Bankruptcy Code Conflict Rules.

The Bankruptcy Code has several provisions regulating the employment
of professionals. '
The primary rules are that a trustee cannot employ a
professional who represents or holds an interest adverse to the estate or is not
disinterested, ' with a modest exception.78
While the phrase "interest
adverse to the estate" is not defined, disinterested person is defined as a person
who "does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate
or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct
or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or [certain
investment bankers];" "is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an
insider;" "is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of
the petition a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of [certain
investment bankers];" "is not and was not an investment banker for any
outstanding security of the debtor," and was not within three years of the
petition "an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for
such an investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a
security of the debtor."79 From a conflict standpoint, the most controversial

75. Id.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), (c), (e) and (f). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 328(c).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 328(c).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14). "[D]isinterested person" means person that (A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(13) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the
debtor;
(C)has not been, within three years before the date of the filing of the petition,
an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an
investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a security of the
debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker
specified in subparagraph (B) or (C)of this paragraph; and
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aspect of the "disinterestedness test" is its frequent disqualification of counsel

for a debtor after the filing of a Chapter 11 case. This often results from the
requirement that the professional not be a creditor, equity security holder,
insider, or officer, director, or employee of the debtor within two years of the
petition, but almost invariably the court finds an actual conflict of interest.80
The only provision of the Bankruptcy Code expressly touching on the
employment of professionals by a debtor-in-possession provides that a
professional is not disqualified from representing a debtor-in-possession simply
because of prebankruptcy employment by or representation of the debtor.8 '
Despite the fact that the reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
did not require that counsel for the debtor-in-possession be disinterested,
bankruptcy courts have generally imposed such a requirement under the
Bankruptcy Code.82
However, courts are reluctant to apply the

(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of
any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker
specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph, or for any other reason.
Id. To fully grasp the prohibited relationships, it is necessary to consider additional definitions
in the Bankruptcy Code including § 101(2) ("affiliate"), § 101(9) ("corporation"), § 101(31)
("insider"), § 101(45) ("relative"), § 101(49) ("security"), § 101(10) ("creditor"), § 101(17)
("equity security holder"); and § 101(41) ("person").
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) and (D).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) ("Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely
because of such person's employment by or representation ofthe debtorbefore the commencement
of the case.")
82. See In re Best W. Heritage Inn Partnership, 79 B.R. 736 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); see
also Gerald K. Smith, Disinterestedness,in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPrCY LAW 639 (William
L. Norton, Jr., ed., 1995-96).
Nowhere in the Code or the legislative history is it expressly provided that
counsel for a debtor in possession must be disinterested. But somewhere along the
way a drafting problem arose. The Senate staff added to the section dealing with the
rights, powers and duties of a debtor in possession subparagraph (b), innocuous in and
of itself, which provided that "[n]otwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person
is not disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in
possession solely because of such person's employment by or representation of the
debtor before the commencement of the case."
In the final debates on the legislation, the Senate staff prevailed as to the new
provision and there was also inserted "a technical amendment contained in the Senate
amendment indicating that an attorney for the debtor in possession is not disqualified
for compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses simply because of prior
representation of the debtor." This was accomplishedby inserting a cross reference
in § 328(c) to § 1107(b). The Joint Legislative Statement did not state or even imply
that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested. Nor did the Joint
Legislative Statement discuss the reason for the inclusion from the Senate Bill ofwhat
became § 1107(b), which provided that a person was not disqualified to represent a
debtor in possession "solely because of such person's employment, by or

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEV

[Vol. 48:793

disinterestedness standard literally. The most common problem is that
proposed counsel for the debtor has a prepetition claim for services leading up
to the filing. Courts generally ignore this problem on the basis that the need
for court approval of the fees avoids prepetition creditor status. 3 This is

representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case."
Until the inclusion of the provision from the Senate Bill, there was no possible
inference that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested. It can be
inferred, however, from § 1107(b) that Congress intended to bring the employment
of counsel for the debtor in possession under § 327. Nonetheless, in light of the prior
practice, a more plausible interpretation is that the amendments were intended to
negate the possibility that prefiling counsel for the debtor might be considered to have
a materially adverse interest and thus be disqualified from acting as counsel for the
debtor in possession. But as a result of the draftsmen carving out one exception, it
can be inferred that the disinterestedness requirement otherwise applies. Such
interpretation ignores the status of the law prior to October 1, 1979, the effective date
of the Bankruptcy Code, and the absence of any express statutory provision overruling
the prior law. There is also a lack of any legislative history suggesting a
disinterestedness requirement for counsel for the debtor in possession. Surely such a
dramatic change would not have been done in such a delicate way. It would have
been controversial and widely discussed. A canon of construction often invoked by
the Supreme Court of the United States is that the rules that were established under
the Bankruptcy Act continue unless explicitly repealed or modified. That is not the
situation as to § 1107(b). Even the legislative history is silent. Nonetheless, the
Bankruptcy Bench assumes that counsel for a debtor in possession must be
disinterested.
Id. at 642-44 (footnotes omitted).
83. See, e.g., In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987). In In re Martin,a husband and wife
consulted counsel as to their precarious financial straits because of a failing restaurant business;
the outcome was the filing of a Chapter 11. Prior to filing the Chapter II, by way of retainer,
counsel received in addition to $500 cash, a note in the amount of$ 100,000 secured by improved
real property "which the debtors did not intend to liquidate in the anticipated course of the
Chapter 11 reorganization." Id. at 176. The bankruptcy court "found that the Mortgage
constituted an interest adverse to the bankrupts' estate." Id. at 177 (citing In re Martin, 59 B.R.
140, 143 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986), affd, 62 B.R. 943 (D. Me. 1986), vacatedand remanded, 817
F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987)). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding. In re
Martin, 62 B.R. 943 (D. Me. 1986), vacated and remanded, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
We turn, then, to a filler consideration of § 327(a). At first blush, this statute
would seem to foreclose the employment of an attorney who is in any respect a
"creditor." But, such a literalistic reading defies common sense and must be discarded
as grossly overbroad. After all, any attorney who may be retained or appointed to
render professional services to a debtor in possession becomes a creditor of the estate
just as soon as any compensable time is spent on account. Thus, to interpret the law
in such an inelastic way would virtually eliminate any possibility of legal assistance
for a debtor in possession, except under a cash-and-carry arrangement or on a pro
bono basis. It stands to reason that the statutory mosaic must, at the least, be read to
exclude as a "creditor" a lawyer, not previously owed back fees or other indebtedness,
who is authorized by the court to represent a debtor in connection with reorganization
proceedings-notwithstanding that the lawyer will almost instantaneously become a
creditor of the estate with regard to the charges endemic to current and future
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nothing but a valiant attempt to make serviceable a flawed rule. Other courts

avoid disqualification if the professional waives the prepetition claim. 4
More radical are cases where the courts have avoided disqualification by
refusing to impute to the law firm the status of one member of the firm, e.g.,
status as a director." Judge Norris on behalf of a panel of the Sixth Circuit

representation.
Martin, 817 F.2d at 180 (footnotes and citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., United States Trustee v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit Corp.), 110 B.R.
284 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (court required law firm partnerto resign as secretary of corporate debtor's
parent corporation as a condition to allowing representation by disinterested attorney); In re Water
Vliet Paper Co., Inc., 111 B.R. 131 (V.D. Mich. 1989) (court required waiver of prepetition claim
as a condition to finding counsel disinterested). But see United States Trustee v. Price
Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994) (waiver of $875,000 prepetition claim did not leave
accounting firm disinterested).
85. See, e.g., Vergos v. Timber Creek, Inc., 200 B.R. 624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996); Capen
Wholesale, Inc. v. Michel (In re Capen Wholesale, Inc.), 184 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995);
In re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc., 139 B.R. 902 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992). This
assumes that there is no involvement in the representation by the personally disqualified lawyer,
although a technical screening is not required. In In re CreativeRestaurantManagement, Inc.,
Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Federman held that the Bankruptcy Code did not disqualify a firm even
if a member of the firm was ineligible to represent a Chapter I1 debtor-in-possession. "Based on
the plain language of the applicable statutes, I find that there is no per se rule. Instead, the
Bankruptcy Court must determine whether such firm has an interest which is materially adverse
to the estate." Id. at 903. A member of the firm representing the debtors, both prepetition and
postpetition in the Chapter 11 case, was an assistant secretary of one of the debtors. Id. at 904.
The application to employ counsel pointed out that the partner had acted as an assistant secretary
of one of the debtors during a period within two years of the filing of the bankruptcy petitions.
Id. at 907. There was an additional problem. Prior to the filing ofthe Chapter 11 cases there was
a dispute as to advice the law firm gave concerning sales taxes. The debtors claimed a loss of
$50,000 due to improper advice. Id. at 905. This was settled by the law firm agreeing to pay
the loss if the debtors continued the employment of the law firm. The law firm agreed to deposit
$50,000 in a trust account to be paid to creditors at such time as a distribution was made to them
in the anticipated bankruptcy cases. The outstanding fees were paid in full immediately prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy cases. Id. at 906.
The United States Trustee objected to employment of the firm on two grounds: (1) that one
of the partners was not disinterested because of his prior service as an officer within two years
of bankruptcy and (2) the prefiling settlement of fees had the appearance of a lack of
disinterestedness or a conflict of interest. Judge Federman allowed the firm to continue
representing the debtor-in-possession under two conditions: (1) no member of the firm who had
served as an officer or director within two years prior to filing could perform any services in the
case on behalf of the debtor and (2) there would be an investigation of the prepetition fee
settlement payment. Id. at 908. The United States Trustee filed a motion for reconsideration.
Before the hearing on the motion the law firm advised its clients that even if ineligible to act as
general counsel, it could be retained as special counsel. Id. at 909.
In this district, as Smith Gill was aware, the U.S. Trustee will withdraw its objection
to retention of counsel if such counsel-as its client-instead agree that counsel will
serve as special counsel to carry out duties as to which it has developed specialized
knowledge. The result is that the debtor then pays two law firms to do work which
could have been done more efficiently by one. In this case, the debtors declined that
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nearly 10 years ago held that screening was an appropriate device to overcome
the presumption that confidences in possession of an attorney will be shared
with other members of the firm. In Manningv. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar &
Allen8" Judge Norris recognized that much has changed in the relationship
between lawyer and client.

option, and instead insisted that Smith Gill continue its representation as general
counsel, so long as this Court allowed it to do so.
Id.
In deciding whether the law firm should represent the Chapter 11 debtor, Judge Federman
applied a two-step analysis. "First, the law firm must determine whether it has a conflict of
interest under applicable ethical rules governing the conduct of attorneys. Then, the Court must
determine whether the Bankruptcy Code makes such firm ineligible due, for example, to its prior
relationship to the debtor." Id.
After reviewing the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Federman concluded that a
law firm is not ineligible just because one of its members acted as assistant secretary within two
years of the petition. The United States Trustee had relied on "a number of cases in which
ineligibility was imputed to a firm based on the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility." Id.
at 911. Judge Federman pointed out that such Code no longer applied, and instead, the Model
Rules governed the conduct of lawyers before the federal courts in the District of Missouri noting
that:
While lawyers should of course strive to avoid even a hint of impropriety, the issue
as to disqualification is no longer whether a law firm "appears" to have a conflict of
interest. Instead, a firm should only be removed if it is in fact not qualified to serve.
Such disqualification must be based on proven conflicts of interest, not supposition.
Otherwise, the interests of a client in retaining counsel of its own choice are to be
respected.
Id. at 912.
Judge Federman pointed out that Rule 1.10 imputes disqualification, not on the basis of an
appearance of impropriety, but on the basis that the client's confidentiality might be compromised
or members of the flrm represent positions adverse to a client. Id. at 912. Judge Federman found
that neither basis of Rule 1.10 applied, id., and that there was no disqualification of the firm under
§ 327 of the Bankruptcy Code. Judge Federman found support for his conclusion in the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
imposes sanctions on the person who signs the pleading in question. The Supreme Court held this
rule applied to the attorney signing and not to the firm. Judge Federman also discussed the
differing treatment of disqualification under Bankruptcy Rules 5002(a) and 5002(b). The former
made it clear that the firm was disqualified as well as the individual, while the latter only
prohibited the employment of the individual. Id. at 913.
In analyzing whether there was a material adverse interest because of the payment of fees
immediately prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 case, Judge Federman concluded that this very
situation was contemplated by Bankruptcy Code § 329 and Bankruptcy Rule 2017. Judge
Federman observed that the United States Trustee routinely objected not only to employment of
attorneys who had unpaid fees at the date of filing, but also, as in this case, to employment of
attorneys whose fees had been paid. Judge Federman believed the Trustee's position to be
contrary to Bankruptcy Code § 1107(b) which allows the debtor to retain its prior counsel and to
Bankruptcy Code § 329 which gives the court the power to review fees. Id. at 916.
86. 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Perhaps these motions have become more numerous simply because the
changing nature of the manner in which legal services are delivered may
present a greater number of potential conflicts. Certainly, the advent of law
firms employing hundreds of lawyers engaging in a plethora of specialties
contrasts starkly with the former preponderance of single practitioners and
small firms engaging in only a few practice specialties. In addition,
lawyers seem to be moving more freely from one association to another,
and law firm mergers have become commonplace. At the same time that
the potential for conflicts of interest has increased as the result of these
phenomena, the availability of competent legal specialists has been
concentrated under fewer roofs.
Consequently, these new realities must be at the core of the balancing
of interests necessarily undertaken when courts consider motions for
vicarious disqualification of counsel.8 7
After discussing Model Rule 1.11 and screening in the instance of lawyers who
leave government service to enter private practice, Judge Norris stated that:
In view of the changing nature of the availability of legal services which
we have noted above, we see no reason why the considerations which led
the American Bar Association to approve appropriate screening for former
government attorneys, should not apply in the case of private attorneys who
change their association.88
Recent bankruptcy court holdings have applied reasoning similar to that
of Judge Norris to avoid disqualifying proposed counsel for a debtor-inpossession. These cases are interesting both from the perspective of the
disinterestedness test and their application of state ethical rules. The courts in
Capen Wholesale, Inc. v. Michel (In re Capen Wholesale, Inc.) 9 and Vergos
v. Timber Creek, Inc.9' concluded that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the
local state ethics rules required imputed disqualification. In Capen the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct were involved. The court found that Rule
1.10(a), which governed imputed disqualification, did so only where the lawyer
associated with the firm "would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7,
1.8(c) or 1.9. " 91 Because these rules involved conflicts, the court found that
the Illinois rule did not require disqualification of the disqualified member's
firm. The court observed that "Congress could easily have provided for
imputed disqualification if it had intended for it, having specifically done so

87. Id. at 224-25.
88. Id. at 226.
89. 184 B.1L at 547.
90. 200 B.R. at 624.

91. Capen Wholesale, 184 B.R. at 551 (quoting 111. Rules of ProfessionalConduct Rule
1.10(a)).
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in Bankruptcy Rule 5002(a)."' Both Timber Creek and Capen relied on In
re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc.93 In each of these cases, Creative
Restaurant, Capen Wholesale and Timber Creek, some sort of screening was
required. 94
These cases are contrary to the generally accepted rule: If one member of
a firm has a financial or other personal interest that would materially and
adversely affect the representation, such lawyer is precluded from representing
the client and the conflict is imputed to the firm. They also expand the use of

92. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 5002(a) reads as follows:
The appointment of an individual as a trustee or examiner pursuant to § 1104 of
the Code shall not be approved by the court if the individual is a relative of the
bankruptcy judge approving the appointment or the United States trustee in the region
in which the case is pending. The employment of an individual as an attorney,
accountant, appraiser, auctioneer, or other professional person pursuant to §§ 327,
1103, or 1114 shall not be approved by the court if the individual is a relative of the
bankruptcy judge approving the employment. The employment of an individual as
attorney, accountant, appraiser, auctioneer, or other professional person pursuant to
§§ 327, 1103, or 1114 may be approved by the court if the individual is a relative of
the United States trustee in the region in which the case is pending, unless the court
finds that the relationship with the United States trustee renders the employment
improper under the circumstances of the case. Whenever under this subdivision an
individual may not be approved for appointment or employment, the individual's firm,
partnership, corporation, or any other form ofbusiness association orrelationship, and
all members, associations and professional employees thereof also may not be
approved for appointment or employment.
BANKR. R. 5002(a). Of course, Congress did not enact Rule 5002(a) in the normal sense. It did
so only indirectly by not exercising its power to reject the rule.
93. See Timber Creek, 200 B.R. at 627 (citing In re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc.,
139 B.R. 902 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992)); Capen Wholesale, 184 B.R. at 551 (citing Creative
Restaurant, 139 B.R. 902).
94. See Timber Creek, 200 B.R. at 630; Capen Wholesale, 184 B.R. at 551; Creative
Restaurant, 139 B.R. at 908.
While the court concludes that screening devices may be employed to guard
against any infiltration of Robinson's personal interests into the firm itself, the
adequacy of those devices must be separately evaluated. As noted, this evaluation
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Although there are many factors that may
be considered, the Tennessee Formal Ethics Opinion previously discussed lists three
minimum requirements for effective screening, including prohibiting discussion of
sensitive matters, limiting the circulation ofsensitive documents, and restricting access
to files. Formal Ethics Op. 89-F- 118 (Mar. 10, 1989), reprinted in Tennessee Ethics
Handbook 171. In the present case, Robinson has agreed to resign from his respective
corporate positions with the debtor and has further agreed to refrain from attending
any meetings of the debtor or in any way participating in these affairs. Additionally,
the bankruptcy court specifically reserved the right to monitor all related professional
fees. Relying upon these measures, the Bankruptcy Court was persuaded that the
debtor and Glankler Brown had erected an appropriate "Chinese Wall." The court
affirms.
Timber Creek, 200 B.R. at 630 (footnotes omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5

26

Smith: Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization C

1997] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONS

819

screening beyond its normal role of preserving confidential information through
the device of a screen.
Bankruptcy courts vary as to what is an adverse interest. Since the
Bankruptcy Code gives little guidance,95 courts often look to the ABA
promulgated rules of professional responsibility. This has added uncertainty
in those instances where the court looked to the Model Code with its
"appearanceof impropriety" standard and concept of a "potential" conflict. For
example, Bankruptcy Judge John Schwartz recently defined "interest adverse
to the estate" as "any economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of
the bankruptcy estate or that could create an actual or potential dispute."96
A leading bankruptcy treatise refers to adverse interest as a "catch-all
clause"97 which "appears broad enough to include anyone who in the slightest
degree might have some interest or relationship that would color the
independent and impartial attitude required by the Code."9" The writer
somewhat softens the absolute language by adding "professional persons
employed by the trustee should be free of any conflicting interest which might
in the view of the trustee or the bankruptcy court affect the performance of
their services or which might impair the high degree of impartiality and
detached judgment expected.""
A more reasonable approach is that of the Third Circuit in In re BH & P
Inc.," ° which considered what test should be applied in determining whether
a single trustee and his counsel could represent a corporation and its two
principals in three related Chapter 7 cases.1 ' The trustee filed claims on
behalf of the corporation in the individual stockholders' cases and also filed
complaints objecting to the dischargeability of these claims in the individual

95. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) ("interest adverse to the estate"); 11 U.S.C. § 327(c)
(simultaneous representation of trustee and creditor does not disqualify professional unless
objection by a creditor or the U.S. Trustee and "an actual conflict of interest"); 11 U.S.C. § 327(e)
("not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter
on which such attorney is to be employed"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) ("interest materially adverse
to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment
banker [for the debtor] or for any other reason"); 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) ("represents or holds an
interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional
person is employed"); 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) ("attorney or accountant employed to represent a
committee... may not, while employed by such committee, represent any other entity having an
adverse interest in connection with the case"); § 1107(b) ("person is not disqualified for
employment... by a debtor in possession solely because of such person's employment by or
representation of the debtor [prepetition]").
96. In re Am. Printers & Lithographers, Inc., 148 B.R. 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
97. 2 COLLER ON BANRPTcg 327.03, at 327-48 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).

98. Id.
99. Id. 327.03, at 327-33.
100. 949 F.2d 1300 (3rd Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 1302.
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cases. 2 The trustee and his counsel filed interim applications for fees in the
corporate case. A secured lender of the corporate debtor objected on the basis
that the trustee and his counsel "were guilty of a conflict of interest. ' '° One
of the bankruptcy court's grounds of disqualification was that the trustee had
to pursue claims of the corporation against the individuals and absent a full
payment of all creditors, doing so was materially adverse to the other
unsecured creditors."°
The Third Circuit disagreed, finding that Section 101(14)(E) mandated
disqualification based on personal status, not because of a representative
capacity.'
The Third Circuit considered the advantages of joint
administration and the use of a single trustee and declined to mandate
disqualification of the trustee in every instance of interdebtor claims.'
The
Third Circuit, with considerable reliance on the First Circuit's decision in In
re Martin, 7 concluded that it was up to the Bankruptcy Court to determine
whether the arrangement carried with it a sufficient threat of material adversity
to justify disqualification." 8 Finding no error in the district court's
affirmance of the bankruptcy court's finding of material adversity, the Third
Circuit affirmed."° As far as the attorneys for the trustee, the Third Circuit
concluded that the 1984 amendment to Section 327(c) of the Code eliminated
any per se disqualification based on the representation of a creditor; rather, the
1984 amendment focused on whether there was an actual conflict of
interest."' The Bankruptcy Court found an actual conflict because there
were assets in the individual estates and because representation of the corporate
trustee in seeking to establish its claims was necessarily in conflict with the
interests of creditors in the individual cases."' The Third Circuit affirmed
this finding." 2
Other than the per se disqualification provisions of the disinterestedness
test, there is little guidance in the Bankruptcy Code as to adverse interests.
The definition of disinterestedness determines adverse interest from the
perspective of the interests of creditors and equity security holders as well as
the "estate,""' 3 while § 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a
professional employed for a special purpose not represent or hold any interest

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id at 1303-04.
Id.at 1304.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id. at 1310-11.

107. 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

BH&
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

P, 949 F.2d at 1313.
1313-14.
1314.
1315.
1317.

113. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
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adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which the
attorney is employed." 4
What does it mean that a professional cannot represent an interest adverse
to the estate? The concept of an estate has little meaning under the Bankruptcy
Code. Since the employment provisions concern employment by a trustee,
creditors committee and debtor-in-possession, do professionals really represent
an estate? It is true that § 541(a) states that the commencement of a case
creates an estate and that the estate is, comprised of property of the debtor." 5
However, with the exception of the title of § 542, the term estate is seldom
used in the Code."'
There have been attempts to define adverse interest or conflict of interest
by the ABA and the courts, but the most instructive formulation is that of the
Restatement. Section 201 defines a conflict of interest as "a substantial risk
that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely
affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another
current client, a former client, or a third person.""
This focuses on the
correct issue, the adequacy of the representation. It is instructive to the courts
and persons to be employed; it also illuminates what is to be disclosed.
Connections or relationships are relevant if they concern or relate to the
lawyer's own interests or duties to others which are logically relevant to
whether the lawyer's proposed representation will be affected. It will then be
up to the court, after considering the disclosed interests and relationships to
determine whether there is a substantial risk of a material and adverse effect
to the proposed representation. Required disclosures encompass those holdings
and representational interests which currently render one not disinterested. But
disclosure should be more extensive and encompass existing and former
representational interests imposing duties on the lawyer, as well as any personal
interests or duties to third parties which may impact on the representation.
It is the scope of the proposed representation which is the lodestar.
Representation of a trustee or debtor-in-possession requires a variety of legal
skills in large cases. Counsel must act not only as a general counsel but also
as a specialist skilled in creditors' and debtors' rights and the Bankruptcy Code.
Because a trustee and debtor-in-possession are fiduciaries, a lawyer representing
any of them must also be knowledgeable as to their duties and be able to
forthrightly advise them as to the performance of those duties during the
pendency of the case.

114. 11 U.S.C. § 327(e).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). For a discussion of the meaning of estate,
see supranote 3.
117. RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE LAW GOVERNiNG LAWYERs § 201 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
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An example is useful to recognizing a conflict in this context. Assume
that a trustee wants to employ a lawyer to represent the trustee generally in a
reorganization case. The lawyer has a current client, a creditor of the Chapter
11 debtor, whom it represents in matters unrelated to the Chapter 11 case, who
is a creditor of the Chapter 11 debtor. Since the lawyer only represents the
creditor, the per se disqualifications of the disinterested test are not involved.
The lawyer can be employed so long as the representation of the creditor in an
unrelated matter does not constitute the representation of an interest adverse to
the estate or "does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the
estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or' interest in, the debtor or
an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph,
or for any other reason.'.. If the creditor client is owed $1,000 for services
furnished the debtor shortly prior to bankruptcy and there is no conceivable
defense to the claim, the mere fact that a client in an unrelated matter is a
creditor should not constitute an interest adverse to the estate.
On the other hand, if the creditor client is a major supplier who has been
paid substantial amounts within ninety days of the filing of the bankruptcy case
and has a contract to supply the debtor's needs, an entirely different situation
is presented. The trustee must exercise judgment in deciding whether the
relationship is essential to the business of the debtor and, if so, whether the
benefit of recovery of preferential payments outweighs the benefit of the
relationship. In deciding how to proceed, the trustee must be advised as to
whether the payments can be recovered and the impact on the ability to assume
the contract. The lawyer will have to exercise judgment in rendering this
advice. Thus, the lawyer and trustee must decide whether the representation
of the creditor in unrelated matters will impact on the representation of the
trustee by the lawyer.
But there is another complication. The lawyer may not be able to advise
the trustee as to these matters since representation of the trustee in connection
with the preferential payments and the assumption of the supply contract may
be directly adverse to the supplier and, absent appropriate consent, is an
impermissible conflict. Thus, the lawyer's representation would be materially
and adversely affected. If the supplier consents and the lawyer and trustee
conclude that the representation of the trustee will not be adversely affected by
the lawyers representation of the supplier, the court nonetheless must be
satisfied that the lawyer's diligence and zeal in representing the trustee will not
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's representation of the
supplier in other matters. Consent by the supplier only avoids disqualification
under the state rules.

118. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E).
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Is the analysis any different if the lawyer to be retained by the trustee also
represents a stockholder, director, officer or employee of the debtor? It would
seem not. The basic question is the same, whether there is a substantial
likelihood that the representation of the trustee will be materially and adversely
affected.
The prior examples concern representational relationships. But the
personal interests of the lawyer may also be disqualifying. If the lawyer is the
owner, general partner, secured creditor, officer or director of the debtor, is the
analysis any different? Logically it should not be; again, we want to assure
zealous and diligent representation.
Difficult problems are encountered in the area of multiple representation,
either before or during the bankruptcy case. Courts often disqualify counsel
for an entity in bankruptcy who also represents those in control prebankruptcy.
Another troublesome issue for the courts is the representation of affiliated
entities. Courts are torn between the undue expense and complication created
by requiring separate counsel for each entity and the appearance of impropriety
and potential conflicts inherent in such multiple representation.
As previously observed, there has been little guidance to bankruptcy courts
and practitioners as to what is a conflict of interest. However, since the 1980s,
the Business Bankruptcy Ethics Committee has focused attention on ethical
issues confronting bankruptcy practitioners.
Its work led to the
recommendations of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
that the per se disqualification rules of the disinterestedness standard be
abandoned as to counsel for the debtor-in-possession and replaced by the
requirement that counsel not hold or represent an interest materially adverse to
the estate and meet the applicable standards of professional responsibility for
the district in which the case is pending. The sole dissenter to the Ethics
Subcommittee recommendations was Judge Bufford who believes that
[T]he debtor needs guidance from counsel who has no commitment to the
prior debtor or to the business as usual prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
case. Bankruptcy puts into jeopardy the very existence of the business
enterprise. At this critical juncture in the life of the business, it is most in
need of disinterested advice by counsel. It would be badly disserved by an
advisor on the labyrinth of bankruptcy law who has a separate interest of
his or her own to protect.
A lawyer who is interested in the outcome of a bankruptcy case is
likely to give some attention, at least, to the protection of the lawyer's own
interest in the outcome of the case, which may be to the detriment of the
debtor's own interests. The avoidance of this potential (if not actual)
conflict of interest is the purpose of the disinterestedness requirement of
section 327.
I think that the balance struck by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code, in
which it decided that a debtor may continue in possession but must be
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represented by disinterested
(and generally new) counsel, is a good balance
19
that should not be upset.
The problem with Judge Bufford's position is that Congress has already
spoken; prior counsel for the debtor is not disqualified. 2 ° Judge Bufford's
dissent is reminiscent of Judge Brandeis' view of his role in the Lennox case.
It has been much discussed and has recently been revisited by Professor
Spillenger.'' Brandeis'conduct in the Lennox case was the basis of one of
the charges against his nomination to the Supreme Court.'2

119. Memorandum from Judge Samuel L. Bufford to Gerald K. Smith 2 (February 1, 1991)
(on file with author) (concerning disinterestedness requirement for Chapter 11 debtor's counsel).
120. Judge Bufford overlooks the real problem, the representation of a debtor with fiduciary
duties. Judge Matheson ably described this in In re Amdura, 121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990) as follows:
Consider the role of the attorney, however. On the one hand, he is admonished
that he must represent no conflicting interests. On the other, the Code itself creates
nearly irreconcilable conflicts.
As noted above, the same attorney can represent both the debtor and the debtorin-possession. It is the debtor which is given the exclusive ability to file a plan" of
reorganization during the first 120 days of the bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121. And the Code clearly contemplates that the debtor can negotiate with the
creditor groups to reduce or reallocate amounts flowing to creditor classes in order to
effect a plan. In doing so, the debtor may even seek to preserve values to equity
security holders when the "fair and equitable rule" would otherwise deny their
participation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Does this not inherently place counsel in the
position of representing conflicting interests? See, e.g., Ayer, How to Think About
Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 355, 391 (1986). One
commentator has stated, in recognizing the inherently conflicting interests counsel is
to represent:
I believe it to be substantially impossible to fully and fairly represent, as
debtor-in-possession, the interests of the estate, the creditors, and the equity
owners. Thus there is an inherent conflict in attempting to fulfill fully the
duties of a trustee as well as the duties of a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession.
While this is not ethically unacceptable, it does seem to require the debtorin-possession (and its counsel) to confront the nature of the tension and to
be fair and open about which side of the line it is coming down on. Sigal,
RepresentationofDebtors-in-possessionandTrustees-Disinterestednessand
Adverse InterestStandards,Publication at the 63rd Annual Meeting of the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, p. 8-27.
Id. at 865.
Judge Matheson focused on a related problem, the difficult position of counsel for the
debtor-in-possession in Amdura: "The Court questions whether counsel can be said to be
disinterested when they acknowledge their inability to take a position contrary to Continental
because, at least as to W & S, it is unwilling to offend the 'hand that feeds."' Id. at 867.
121. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: ReconsideringBrandeisas People'sLawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1502-11 (1996).
122. See John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics ofLouis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 698703 (1965).
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A good share of any embarrassment Brandeis suffered over the Lennox
case is due to his own use of what must have been one of the most
unfortunate phrases he ever casually uttered. Sherman L. Whipple
represented James Lennox in the bankruptcy proceedings. Whipple
reported that when he asked Brandeis for whom the latter was counsel
when he advised the assignment, Brandeis replied, "I should say that I was
counsel for the situation."' 23
What happened in the Lennox case is that Lennox and counsel for a major
creditor of Lennox met with Brandeis to discuss the financial problems of
Lennox. Brandeis did represent in unrelated matters a creditor of Lennox,
although this was unknown to Brandeis at the time of the meeting. During the
course of the meeting, it became apparent to all that Lennox was hopelessly
insolvent, and Brandeis recommended an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Brandeis then inquired as to what Lennox and the lawyer for the
creditor wanted Brandeis's firm to do. Lennox inquired as to whether Brandeis
was to act as his counsel under the plan outlined by Brandeis. Brandeis replied
"Not altogether as your counsel, but as trustee of your property."1 24 Neither
Mr. Frank nor Professor Spillenger conclude that Brandeis was guilty of any
breach of ethics, but rather they conclude that Brandeis had not clearly
communicatedto Lennox what he intended. Professor Spillenger does suggest,
however, that there was an obvious problem as to
the propriety of Brandeis's actions with respect to Lennox in light of the
representation by Brandeis's firm of Weil, Farrell, one of the major
creditors. In terms of the present-day approach represented by Rule 1.7 of
the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, one might give Brandeis the

benefit of the doubt by supposing that both Lennox and Weil, Farrell
waived any objection they might have had to such simultaneous
representation. Of course, this question begs the original one,12which is
whether Brandeis in fact undertook to serve Lennox as counsel. 5
Professor Spillenger went on to compare the views of two sets of writers.
One set expounded the view "that Brandeis's actions were an effort to
harmonize competing interests, to reach an accommodation that preserved a
relationship rather than merely maximizing a private interest."' 26 The other
set viewed Brandeis as someone who encouraged "powerful corporate clients
to comply with, not to undermine, regulations that serve important public
values, and who otherwise urge[d] those clients to behave in socially

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 702.
Id. at 699.
Spillenger, supranote 121, at 1507 n.213.
Id. at 1508.
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responsible though not legally compelled ways.""'2 Under both views, "[t]he
lawyer is thus counsel for a 'situation' formed by the formal client and the
larger public world that gives the client's behavior meaning." 2 '
MNr. Spillenger, on the other hand, did not view Brandeis quite that
sympathetically; instead, he viewed Brandeis as sensing a situation that he
could solve
in the manner of a good Progressive problem-solver--or, in the words of
one of my colleagues a 'one-man New Deal'-and he sought to impose a
solution that made reference less to the expressed desires of the29parties
involved than to a vision nurtured by and known only to himself.1
This interesting episode in the professional life of one of the great lawyers
of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries brings into focus what many
perceive as the role of counsel for the debtor-in-possession-it is as a "counsel
for the situation." It is true that under the ethical rules counsel must take
direction from the client but that does not mean that counsel should not
transcend the parochial interests of the client. Counsel for the situation must
be sensitive to the rights of all parties-in-interest and must seek a fair solution
to the financial problems within the framework of the rights of the parties-ininterest.
The lawyer is thus counsel for a "situation" formed by the formal client and
the larger public world that gives the client's behavior meaning. Perhaps
Brandeis's actions followed this model: his instinct was that Lennox should
not merely maximize his and his company's interests but should do what
was fair to all-in particular, to creditors. No doubt Brandeis would have
argued that a policy of "paying 100 cents on the dollar" would also best
serve Lennox's interest, but the essence of Brandeis's impulse was an
argument from public morality, as he told Lennox at the interview:
My own feeling is that the best thing for you to do is not
to be thinking too much of yourself, but thinking of the best
interests of your creditors. If there is plenty there you have got it
safe; if there is not, you will be in the position of having a fair,
open, and aboveboard compromise; but I feel that it is for your
interests as it is in accordance with good morals that you and your
father should be just as frank and fair in the present situation as it
is possible to be . . .

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1509 (quoting 2 RoyM. MERSKY & J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 794-95
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Other Rules of ProfessionalConduct Applicable in Bankruptcy Courts.

Of considerable importance to lawyers involved in bankruptcy cases in
districts other than those in the state in which they are admitted to practice are
rules governing admission and professional conduct. No national rules
governing admission and professional conduct have been promulgated under
the Rules Enabling Act.' 3' Rules of conduct are governed by local rules of
the bankruptcy courts, to the extent they are governed. The resulting lack of
uniformity is a serious problem.
Patricia Channon of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
reviewed the local rules of the bankruptcy courts and found that most
bankruptcy courts do not have a local rule concerning professional
Bankruptcy courts in thirty-five districts have no rule at
responsibility.'
Bankruptcy courts for twenty-seven districts have adopted the district
all.'
court rule, but provide no text of the adopted rule.'34 Bankruptcy courts for
six districts specify the rules adopted by the highest court of the state in which
the district is located.' 35 Two courts impose standards which vary from those
of the states in which the districts are located, although one of these districts
has also adopted the state standard.' 36 Of the districts that have a rule, one
district requires that attorneys read and become familiar with the state bar's
Rules of Professional Conduct, while another district encourages counsel to be
familiar with the discovery guidelines of the state bar.'37
The recent study by the Federal Judicial Center for the Standing
Committee canvassed the rules governing admission to practice and
professional conduct of lawyers in the federal district courts. 3 The study
established that rules as to bar membership in the district courts vary
significantly among districts.'39 All but four districts allow lawyers admitted

(1977).
131. Rules Enabling Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4648.

132. Letter from Patricia S. Channon, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to
Gerald K. Smith, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules (April 4, 1997) (on file with author).
However, nearly every bankruptcy court has a local rule as to who may practice before the court.
Most of the latter rules required that the individual be admitted to the district court for the
particular district in which the bankruptcy court was located.
133. Id. at 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. Id. at2.
137. Id. at Attachment 5.
138. MARIE CoRDIsco, ELIGIBiLrrY REQUIREMENT FOR, AND RESTRICTIONS ON, PRACTCE
BEFORE THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1995) (unpublished table, on file with the author).
139. Every federal district court has a provision in its local rules listing criteria that an

attorney must possess to be eligible to apply for admission to that court's Bar. Fiftyfive (59%) federal district courts limit membership in its Bar to attorneys who are
members of the bar of the state or territorial possession in which the district court is
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to practice in another federal district court or before a state court to seek
permission to appearpro hac vice. The four districts which do not allow such
appearances have liberal bar membership rules. 4 The majority of districts
allowing 41
pro hac vice appearances require the association of "local
counsel."'
Another recent report by Daniel Coquillette4 4 reviewed the local rules
governing conduct for the ninety-four district courts. Slightly more than half
or forty-eight of these districts "have adopted local rules and incorporate state
standards in states that, in turn, have adopted some version of the ABA Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct (1983)."'"4 Twelve districts or approximately
thirteen percent had rules incorporating state standards from states which had
some version of the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 44 The
Eastern and Southern Districts of California adopted the California Rules of
Professional Conduct. 4 Ten districts adopted rules referring to an ABA
Model, four of which referred to the ABA Code, three to the Model Rules and
one to both. 46 The Districts of Montana and the Southern District of
Georgia even referred to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.'47
48
Ten districts* referred to both an ABA Model and to state standards.
Eleven districts have no local rules governing attorney conduct, but a number
of these districts have standing orders. One district followed neither state
standards nor an ABA Model, but incorporated
its own substantially modified
49
version of the ABA Model Rules.
In a follow-up Study Coquillette discussed the considerable number of
variances in the local rules. Coquillette concluded that a possible approach to
more uniformity among local rules would be to adopt uniform federal rules for
attorney conduct in several key areas, with other areas to be governed by state
standards, was a possible approach to more uniformity. 5 ° "Obvious

located....
Eligibility requirements in the remaining thirty-nine districts vary considerably, but
some of them do fall into a number of patterns, all of which qualify a broader pool
of applicants for admission.
Id. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. at4.
141. Id. at 5.

142.

COQUILLETrE REPORT,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.

supranote 69.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. COQUILLETIE STUDY,supra note 70 at 5. As summarized in its methodology and
finding sections, the initial phase of the Study was the design of a computer search of cases from
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candidates for 'national' treatment would be...: (1) 'Conflict of Interest,' (2)
'Represented Parties,' (3) 'Lawyer as a Witness,' and (4) 'Fees."" 1 If a
choice of law category were added, the Study noted that the proposed uniform
federal rules would then cover the issues in almost ninty percent of all reported
federal cases since 1990.152

In a recent article, Professor Bruce Green demonstrates the need for
certainty as far as the Rules of Professional Conduct to be applied in federal
judicial proceedings.'
His recommendation is that the federal judiciary
"undertake rulemaking to develop a single set of highly detailed rules of
professional conduct."''"

January 1, 1990 forward. Even that limited period led to a large number of cases, some 851.
These cases were analyzed and sorted into 443 cases involving rules governing attorneys and 408
involving issues of attorney conduct in federal courts governed by Rule II and other standards.
The largest category of rules involved were conflict of interest rules. "Rules Analogous to ABA
Model Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11 accounted for forty-six percent of reported federal
disputes, or 204 cases of 443." Of these conflict cases, nearly eighty percent were civil in nature.
Id. at 3-4.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id.
153. Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of ProfessionalConduct Should Govern Lawyers in
Federal Court andHow Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 460 (1996).
Traditionally, courts have been the principal lawmakers for lawyers. Over the
past quarter century, pursuant to their supervisory authority over the legal profession,
courts have filled this role by promulgating and enforcing sets of rules drafted by bar
associations. Thus, in judicial proceedings within a particular state, lawyers' conduct
is typically governed by a set of rules adopted by that state' judiciary based on a
version of either the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ("ABA Model
Rules") or the predecessor ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility("ABA
Model Code").
In federal judicial proceedings, however, the regulation of lawyers has been
characterized by uncertainty and disharmony. The conduct of lawyers in federal
proceedings is governed by the rules of the federal, not state, courts. The federal
district courts, however, do not currently apply a uniform set of professional rules.
Moreover, even rules that are substantially identical have been interpreted in vastly
different ways by courts of different federal districts.
Id. at 462-64 (footnotes omitted).
154. Id. at 460.
In the light of these considerations, the most appropriate process for developing
professional standards for federal practice is the obvious one that has been resisted by
federal courts thus far: federal judicial rulemaking. The federal rulemaking process
has a long history. Since the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the
Supreme Court has promulgated rules ofpractice for federal court, beginning with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedurein 1946. Since 1958, principal responsibility for drafting federal rules of
practice has been vested in the Judicial Conference, which acts through a Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and various advisory committees.
While doubts have been raised about the Supreme Court's authority to adopt
procedural rules pursuant to express federal authority, there would be little question
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Mr. Eli J. Richardson also deplores the present, chaotic situation,'

but

of its authority to adopt rules of professional conduct for lawyers in federal
proceedings. As noted earlier, lower federal courts have done so even in the absence
of explicit legislative authority. The problem, however, is that they have principally
relied on imprecise bar association rules, rather than assuming responsibility for
drafting detailed rules.
Rather than continuing to abdicate responsibility for the content of professional
standards, the federal judiciary should develop independent standards through federal
court rulemaking. Federal rules of professional conduct should apply in all federal
judicial proceedings. These rules should comprehensively address lawyers' conduct
as it relates to litigation. The obvious process for developing such rules would be a
variant of the one by which federal courts promulgate rules of procedure, a process
that has been refined over the course of more than sixty years and has proven
successful.
Id. at 513-14 (footnotes omitted).
155. Eli J. Richardson, Demystifyingthe FederalLawofAttorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REv. 137
(1994).
The federal system is no exception to this unfortunate state of affairs. It is the
position of this Article that the federal law of attorney ethics, as developed and
enforced almost exclusively by the federal courts, is plagued by myriad problems that
prevent the formation of a cohesive and efficient structure of ethical rules. First,
federal courts often fail to follow an identifiable set of attorey-ethics standards.
Second, even if clearly identified, the governing attorney-ethics standards often are not
interpreted properly by federal courts. Third, federal courts have failed to delineate
clearly the proper place of governing attorney-ethics codes in the overall federal
scheme of attorney ethics. Among other things, federal courts have not explained how
and which factors beyond the black-letter rules contained in attorney-ethics codes are
authoritative in resolving ethical dilemmas. Finally, federal courts often bypass
excellent opportunities to issue authoritative ethics pronouncements that would clarify
attorneys' ethical obligations.
The entrenched problems of federal attorney ethics pose more than just a
theoretical quandary. Rather, this Article posits that they cause several undesirable
practical consequences. First, they visit unfairness upon honest attorneys, who truly
wish to comply with required ethical norms but cannot do so because they cannot
determine what those norms are. Second, clients and the public also suffer. Clients
pay for the increased time needed for their lawyers to research and address ethical
issues arising in federal court, and the general public pays because its courts must
spend precious time resolving ethical disputes. Third, these structural problems have
the effect of discouraging scrutiny of the substantive content of both individual
attorney-ethics rules and entire attorey-ethics codes, thus hindering progress toward
the creation of an ideal set of ethical rules that best prescribes what lawyers can and
cannot do.
Id. at 141-142 (footnotes omitted).
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he recommends a district by district "shaping up,"1 56 a solution different from

Green and Coquillette.
The American Bar Association recently amended the Model Rules "in an
attempt to provide clearer guidance to lawyers caught between conflicting
ethical mandates." 5 7 In a recent article, Susanna Felleman makes the case
for further amendment but opts for continued state control.'
In another recent article discussing the "patchwork quilt of ethical
standards within the federal system" created by the United States Supreme
Court treating "standards of professional ethics to be followed in the federal
courts" as a "matter of federal law," the authors conclude that the "solution is
for the United States Supreme Court to promulgate a uniform federal rule
providing that the ethical standards to be followed in any given district will be

the ethical standards adopted by the highest court in the state in which the
district sits, as amended and interpreted by the state court."' 59 The authors
disagree with the Supreme Court's dictum in In re Snider,'60 but point out
that this is of no moment since Congress has expressly empowered
"all federal
' 16
courts... to 'prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. '
The Conference of Chief Justices is a formidable opponent of a code of
federal ethics. The fifty-one Chief Justices comprising The Conference
recently resolved that each state remain exclusively responsible for regulating
the professional conduct of the members of its bar. 62

156. Id. at 143.
[E]ach federal court would (1) identify in its local rules a code containing an exclusive
list of the rules that govern attorneys' conduct in the court; (2) adhere consistently to
that code; (3) interpret that code in light of its variations from different codes and
different versions of the same code; (4) allow attorneys to engage in all conduct not
prohibited by the governing code, but construe the code's more flexible provisions to
prohibit unusual forms of egregious conduct; (5) clarify that attorneys cannot rely on
their good-faith judgment to resolve an ethical dilemma; and (6) invariably resolve
ethical issues raised by motions to disqualify.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
157. Susanna Felleman, Note, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer: A Proposed
Amendment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,95 COLUM.
L. R V. 1500, 1501 (1995).
158. Id. at 1524. Ms. Felleman's concern about a federal code of ethics appears to be based
on the assumption it would "apply to lawyers practicing in both state and federal courts," id. at
1521, and that "state bar associations and state courts would be eliminated from the regulatory
loop." Id.
159. Philip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, ProfessionalResponsibility in Federal Courts,
Consistency is Cloaked in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 74 (1997).
160. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
161. Lyon & Phillips, supra note 159, at 71.
162. COQUILLETTE STUDY, supranote 70 at 33. In Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979), the
Court observed that "[s]ince the founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers
has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective
jurisdictions. The States prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 48:793

C. American Bar Association Rules of ProfessionalConduct.
The American Bar Association has promulgated three codes of ethics this
century. The first, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons"), was
promulgated in 1908. The second, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code"), was promulgated in 1969. The third, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), was promulgated in
1983.
The conflict rules of the Canons are contained in Canon 6.1
Under
Canon 6, a lawyer has a conflict when he has a duty for one client to contend
for something he must oppose for another client. The Canon also precludes
representation adverse to a former client "with respect to which confidence
[was] ... reposed."'"
The Model Code dropped the Canon's former client rule and more clearly
expressed the current client rule. Apparently the ABA thought that the former
client was adequately covered by Canon 4 which requires a lawyer to protect
client confidences'65 and secrets and by Canon 9 which requires a lawyer to
avoid any appearance of impropriety."
As far as the current client rule, Ethical Consideration 5-14 admonishes
that:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a
lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will
adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client.
This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more

of professional conduct." Id. at 442. In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court
observed that a court must be careful not to intrude into the State's proper authority to define and
apply stndards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.
163. It is the duty of the lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the fadts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity ... forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely
affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has [sic] been
reposed.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
164. Id. The current client rule, although seemingly clear, apparently was not understood to
preclude a lawyer suing a current client as an unrelated matter until the Rottner decision in 1964.
165. ANNOTATED CODE OF i'ROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979).
166. Id. at Canon 9.
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clients who may have differing interests, whether such
interests be
167
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) precludes a lawyer from accepting employment if
the "exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered
employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing
interests,"'16 absent appropriate consent.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B)
precludes multiple employment "if the exercise of [the lawyer's] independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by [the lawyer's] representation of another client, or it would be likely
to involve [the lawyer] in representing differing interests."' 69
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct cover the former client rule in
Rule 1.9. "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of
the former client,"' 7 absent appropriate consent. The example given in the
comments relates to a lawyer who drafted a contract on behalf of the former
client; the lawyer would be precluded from seeking to rescind the contract on
17
behalf of a new client. '
As for the present client, Rule 1.7(a) precludes representation of a client
"if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another
client,"' 7' absent appropriate consent. Rule 1.7(b) precludes representation
of "a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the

167.
168.
169.
obvious,

Id. at EC 5-14.
Id. at DR 5-105(A).
Id. at DR 5-105(B). The Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility observes the
that
Current DR 5-105 does not contain [as clear a definition as Canon 6] of the
conduct that is permitted or proscribed under it. It prescribes, instead, a test for
determining whether it is proper for a lawyer to represent a client; this test consists
in effect of the lawyer's analyzing his or her own state of mind regarding whether a
given representation will so affect 'his independent professional judgment' as to
affect or to be likely to affect the interests of another client adversely.
Id. at DR 5-105 note (Textual and Historical Notes). The Annotated Code points out that:
DR 5-105 concerns itself with the adverse effect that competing interests ofmore
than one client have on the attorney's loyalty to and exercise ofprofessional judgment
on behalf of each client (EC 5-14). An attorney should not be placed in a position
in which, even unconsciously, he or she will be tempted to "soft pedal" zealous
representation for one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with another.
Id. at DR 5-105 cmt. (citation omitted).
170. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1995).

171. Id. at Rule 1.9 cmt. 1.
172. Id. at Rule 1.7(a).
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lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests,"' 73 absent appropriate consent.
Comment 3 to Rule 1.7 summarizes the current client rules, from the
perspective of the client in the unrelated matter.
As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to that client without that client's consent.
Paragraph (a) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may
not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other
matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous
representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only
generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require
consent of the respective clients.' 74
The other side of the coin is captured in Comment 4 to Rule 1.7(b).
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in
effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.
Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself
preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that
a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere
with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued
on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given7 to whether the client
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. 1
Rule 1.7(b) only requires the consent of the current client, not the consent
of the client in the unrelated matter. The reasoning behind this consent
requirement is Rule 1.7(b)'s assumption that the lawyer will adhere to the
prohibition of Rule 1.7(a) and the assumption that the lawyer will not do
anything directly adverse to the client in the unrelated matter. Conversely,
Rule 1.7(a) requires consent of both the current client and the client in the
unrelated matter if the lawyer takes on a representation directly adverse to the
client in the unrelated matter. Here, we clearly see the juxtaposition of the
interests of the proposed client and the client in the unrelated matter. The duty
of loyalty precludes the lawyer from being directly adverse to the client in the
unrelated matter and also precludes lawyer from accepting the proposed
representation due to the limited nature of the effectiveness of the proposed

173. Id. at Rule 1.7(b).
174. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
175. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
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representation. According to the Comment representation of the new client
impairs the loyalty to the proposed client because the lawyer "cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because
of the lawyer's [duty to the client in the unrelated matter]."' 76 The Comment
adds that this is not a per se disqualification, but rather a disqualification if
there is a "likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does,... it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should
Rule 1.7(a) applies both to
be pursued on behalf of the client."'7
litigation'78 and nonlitigation matters.'79
In The Law of Lawyering by Hazard and Hodes, there is a discussion of
Model Rule 1.7.180
The prohibition in Rule 1.7(a) against representation of clients whose
interests are "directly" adverse implies that concurrent representation of
clients whose interests are only "indirectly" or "generally" adverse is not
prohibited (at least by [Rule 1.7(a)]).
The question is always whether the same lawyer may serve both clients
loyally. At one end of the continuum of conflict situations are those where
the lawyer may serve the respective clients without their individual consent
because the transactions are quite distinct. At an intermediate point are
situations where the lawyer may represent both clients only with the
consent of each because the legal aspects of the transactions are
substantially related and entail client interests that are adverse. At the other
end of the continuum are situations where concurrent representation is
impermissible even with client consent, because the conflict is so intense
that concurrent representation is impermissible even if client consent could
be obtained. The law deems these situations to be "nonconsentable,"
because the conflict is so intense that an impaired relationship with one or
more of the clients is inevitable, so that the lawyer herself should veto
concurrent representation....
Where, then, should the lines be drawn? Certainly adverse positions in
litigation should be sufficient to make a conflict "direct." A lawyer should
not be allowed to sue an individual client on behalf of another present
client, even if the lawyer represents the first client in a wholly unrelated
matter, such as drafting his will. This follows, because the focus of Rule

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. Rule 1.7 ent. 7.
179. See id. Rule 1.7, cmt. 11.
180. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A

HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.7:100-:300 (2d ed. 1997).
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1.7(a) is on impairment of the client-lawyer relationship, and it is
unreasonable to postulate trusting relationships under those conditions. 8
The Treatise states that the strong presumption against concurrent
representation of clients with direct conflicting interests is warranted due to the
need to avoid two main dangers: "First, that confidential information will
'leak' from one camp to the other; second, that clients and the public at large
will be disturbed by the sight of one lawyer disloyally 'playing both sides of
the street,' earning two fees, and possibly pulling his punches."''
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules allow conflicting representation
under certain circumstances with the consent of both clients. Model Code
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) allows the representation but only if "it is
obvious"'83 that the lawyer "can adequately represent the interest of
each' 84 client and both clients consent after "full disclosure of the possible
effect' " of the representation on the exercise of independent professional
judgment on behalf of each client. Model Rule 1.7(a) allows conflicting
representation to be taken on if the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation "will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client '"'86 and "each client consents after consultation."'8 7
The Model Code defines differing interest as any interest adversely
affecting either the lawyer's judgment or loyalty to a client. The Model Rules
do not define adverse interest, apparently satisfied that the phrase "directly
adverse"'88 is self-explanatory. The Lawyer's Manual on Professional
Conduct points out that the very broad proscription of Model Rule 1.7 is not
as absolute as it seems, however.

181. Id. § 1.7:203, at 232.15-233 (footnotes omitted).
In any event, a per se ban in cases of direct conflict of interest would be in
keeping with the letter of the Code language which Rule 1.7(a) replaces, although the
precise meaning of the Code on this point has never been clear. DR 5-105(C)
permitted a lawyer to undertake concurrent representation when it was "obvious" that
he could "adequately" represent each client's interests. Besides being awkward, this
odd language was hard to apply in practice, for a lawyer sensitive enough to spot the
problem would hardly think it "obvious" that a direct conflict could be made to go
away. In practice, therefore, DR 5-105(C) also contemplated something akin to aper
se rule.
Id. § 1.7:207, at 237.
182. Id. § 1.7:207, at 237.
183. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1979).

184. Id.

185. Id.
186. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995).
187. Id.
188. Id. at Rule 1.7(a).
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The language in the Model Rule refers to representation that is "directly

adverse" to another client. Clearly there is direct adversity where two
clients are in litigation against each other. But moving away from that
bright line example the determination becomes more difficult. The
Comment to the Rule suggests that the other end of the continuum is the
situation where a lawyer represents clients that are "economic enterprises
with generally competing interests" against one another in unrelated matters.
In that situation, the conflict is so diffused and general that client consent
is not even required. In between these extremes are many other possible
situations which must be analyzed individually to see if they present direct
adversity." 9

The Lawyer's Manual on ProfessionalConduct concludes that the duty of
loyalty as well as concern for the vigor of the lawyer's representation of two
adverse clients are the bases for Rule 1.72 The Lawyer's Manual relies on
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.9' and Avacus Partners L.P. v. Brian"rn
to demonstrate the importance of the duty of loyalty. 93 In Cinema 5, the
court held that, where employment is accepted against an existing client,
disqualification is based on the duty of undivided loyalty. 94 The court in
Avacus disqualified a firm under the Model Rules even though simultaneous
conflicting representations were not involved. The Avacus court found it
enough that the representation was directly adverse to the interest of a current
client. 9
Similarly, in Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc.,'96 the court disqualified
the law firm even though no direct conflict existed. The plaintiff in Glueck
sued for breach of an employment contract. The defendant moved to disqualify
the lawyer for plaintiff because the lawyer's firm represented a trade
association that negotiated collective bargaining agreements on behalf of its
members, including the defendant. 97 The Second Circuit found "sufficient
aspects of an attorney-client relationship"' 8 to trigger inquiry into the

189. AMERiCAN BAR ASS'N & THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., LAWYER'S MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT 51:103-:104 (1997).

190. Id.; see also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d
Cir. 1977); Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal. Rep. 373, 376 (Ct App. 1977).
191. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
192. Avacus Partners L.P. v. Brian (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 1990) in 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 247
(1991).
193. AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N & THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., supra note 189, at

51:104-:105.
194. Cinema 5, 528 F.2d at 1386.
195. Avacus, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 252.
196. 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
197. Id. at 748.
198. Id. at 749.
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potential conflict of interest involved in the lawyer's role as plaintiff's counsel
in the case."9
D. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
The American Law Institute has labored for over a decade to "express
clearly and completely the legal rules and doctrines that courts apply [to
lawyers] ...and to explain the basis for those rules and doctrines"' 0 in its
Restatement. Chapter 8 of the Restatement restates the law of conflicts. The
basic rule is that "a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation
would involve a conflict of interest."' 0 ' A conflict exists "if there is a
substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the
lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third
person."2
More specific conflict rules are applications of this basic
rule,0 3 with the exception of the rule precluding suit against an existing
24
client.
As will become evident in the discussion of conflict issues in workouts
and reorganizations, the conflicts sections of the Restatement are instructive.
However, there is an important, unresolved issue. All agree that a lawyer may
not assert a claim against or defend against a claim of a client in an unrelated
matter. This is precluded by section 209(2). However, there is sharp
disagreement as to whether section 209(2) or section 201 should apply to the
bankruptcy case as a whole.
This sharp disagreement may seem odd to some considering that all agree
that a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to a client. However, it is doubtful that it
was ever an absolute duty, and its less than absolute nature is recognized by the
current drafts of the Restatement. The American Law Institute in its Second
Restatement of the Law on Agency concluded that the duty of loyalty is limited
by the scope of the agency." 5 Under this approach a lawyer could be

199. Id.
200. Wolfram, supranote 60, at 196.
201. RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
202. Id.
203. Those of particular relevance to bankruptcy cases are section 206, Lawyer's Personal
Interest Affecting Representation of Client, section 209, Representing Parties With Conflicting
Interests in Civil Litigation, section 211, Multiple Representation in Non-Litigated Matter, § 212,
Conflicts of Interest in Representing Organization, section 213, Representation Adverse to Interest
of Former Client, and section 216, Lawyer With Fiduciary or Other Legal Obligation to Third
Person.
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209(2) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958). 'Unless otherwise agreed, an agent
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adverse to the client as to a matter outside the scope of the representation. But
this common law rule has been altered as a result of the widespread adoption
of the Model Code and Model Rules. The Model Code provides that "[a]
lawyer shall decline proffered employment.., if it would be likely to involve
him in representing differing interests."2 6 The Model Rules preclude
representation of a client "if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client."20 7 Comment 1 to Rule 1.7 implies that the rule
is grounded in the duty of loyalty."
In the current drafts of the Restatement, the duty of loyalty is reaffirmed
but subtly changed. Comment b to section 201 of the Restatementmakes it
clear that underlying the basic conflict rule of the Restatement is the lawyer's
duty of loyalty to the client.
A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust.
Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself. For example,
the principle underlying the prohibition against a lawyer's filing suit against
a present client in an unrelated matter (see § 209 Comment e) may also
extend to situations, not involving litigation, in which significant
impairment of a client's expectation of the lawyer's loyalty would be
similarly likely. Contentious dealings, for example involving charges of
bad faith against the client whom the lawyer represents in another matter
would raise such a concern. So also would negotiating on behalf of one
client when a large proportion of the lawyer's other client's net worth is at
risk.20 9

is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose
interests conflict with those of the principal in matters in which the agent is employed." Id.
206. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105(A) (1979). A differing
interest is defined in the Model Code as an "interest that will adversely affect either the judgment
or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest." Id. at 454, Definition 1. While Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) precludes new employment,
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) provides the same protection against continued multiple employment.
In both situations the problem can be solved by informed consent.
207. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995). Model Rule 1.7(a)
precludes representation of a client directly adverse to another client. Rule 1.7(a) is not limited
to conflicts in litigation.
208. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. 1.
Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An
impermissible conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in
which event the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt
reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to
determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved
and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Id.
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWxrERs § 201 cmt. b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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Section 209 sets forth conflict rules for civil litigation. Section 209 covers
(1) representation of two or more clients as co-clients involved in the same
litigation and (2) representation of a client in asserting or defending a claim
against another client. Again, the comments make it clear that a basis for
Section 209 is the duty of loyalty.
Fundamental conflicts of loyalty and threats to client confidentiality would
be inevitable if a lawyer were to represent clients opposing each other in
the same litigation. Many actions that the lawyer took on behalf of one
client would have the potential for being at the expense of the other.
Furthermore, the public interest in the orderly management of litigation
could be seriously compromised. Thus, the same lawyer may not represent
both plaintiff and defendant in a breach of contract lawsuit, for
example2 1
[T]he lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the client being sued. Moreover, the
client on whose behalf suit is filed might fear that the lawyer would pursue
that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client. Thus,
a lawyer may not sue a current client on behalf of another client, even in
an unrelated matter, unless consent is obtained under the conditions and
limitations of § 202.21
Section 209(2) of the Restatementprovidesthat "a lawyer in civil litigation
may not ... represent one client in asserting or defending a claim against
another client currently represented by the lawyer, even if the matters are not
related." 12 Although the duty of loyalty is absolute as to civil suits
involving clients asserting claims against each other, the duty is not absolute
as to clients adverse to each other in a context other than that of civil litigation.
Section 201 allows a lawyer to represent one client in a transaction with
another client represented in unrelated matters unless there is a substantial risk
that the client represented would not be adequately represented in some
material way. 3
The treatment of the duty of loyalty in section 201 is in sharp contrast to
how the duty is treated in section 209. Section 209 focuses on the duty of
loyalty to the client represented in unrelated matters, while section 201 focuses
on the adequacy of the representation of the client represented. Section 201's
only expression of concern for the client in unrelated matters is the statement
in comment b that some situations may result in a "significant impairment of

210. Id. § 209 cnt. c.
211. Id. § 209 cnt. e.

212. Id. § 209.
213. Id. § 201.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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a client's expectation of the lawyer's loyalty."214

841

If so, counsel is

disqualified from representing the client, not because of the injured feelings or
impairment of the expectation of the lawyer's loyalty to the client in the
unrelated matter, but because the duties to the client in the unrelated matter
may materially and adversely affect the representation of the client. The focus
of the basic conflict rule of section 201 is whether the personal interest of the
lawyer or the lawyer's duties to others will inhibit the representation of the
client. See, for example, comment d, entitiled "Representation of Client."
In yet other situations, the conflict of interest arises because the
circumstances indicate that the confidence that a client reasonably reposes
in the loyalty of a lawyer would be compromised due to the lawyer's
relationship with another client or person whose interests would be
adversely affected by the representation.21 5
Somewhat opaquely comment d refers to the impact on the expectation of
loyalty of the client in the unrelated matter. "The prohibition of conflicts of
interest ordinarily restricts a lawyer's activities only where those activities materially
and adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent a client ' including
such an effect
216
on a client's reasonable expectation of the lawyer's loyalty."
Section 28 of the Restatement lists the duties of a lawyer to a client, but
the black letter rule does not mention the duty of loyalty:
To the extent consistent with the lawyer's other legal duties and subject
to the other provisions of this Restatement, a lawyer must, in matters within
the scope of the representation:
(1) proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance
a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
consultation;
(2) act with reasonable competence and diligence;
(3) comply with obligations concerning the client's
confidences and property, avoid impermissible conflicting interests,
deal honestly with the client, and not employ advantages arising
from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the
client; and
(4) fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client. 1 7

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. § 201 cmt. b.
Id. § 201 cmt. d.
Id.
Id. § 28.
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Comment e to section 28 states that "[t]he responsibilities entailed in promoting
21 8
the objectives of the client may be broadly classified as duties of loyalty.1
The concluding paragraph of comment e states that "[t]he duties of loyalty are
subject to exceptions described elsewhere in this Restatement. Those
exceptions typically protect the concerns of third persons and the public or
satisfy the practical necessities of the legal system. '21 9 The Reporter's Note
to comment e refers to other Reporters' Notes on the duties of loyalty;
however, a review of the references does not reveal any discussion of the duty
of loyalty except for that found in section 111 on confidential information and
in the conflicts chapter.2"
The basic prohibition of conflicts of interest in section 201 not only fails
to mention the duty of loyalty, but it also defines a conflict of interest from the
perspective of the client to be represented: "A conflict of interest is involved
if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the
lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third
person."'" Nonetheless, comment b interprets section 201 as precluding
proposed representation if it would result in a significant impairment of the
expectation of the lawyer's loyalty of the client in unrelated matters. But under
section 201 this is so, only if the duty of loyalty to the client in an unrelated
matter would materially and adversely affect the proposed representation. If
section 201 is intended to state the nonlitigation correlative of the litigation rule
of section 209(b), it could be accomplished better by separate rule. Such a rule
might look like this:
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the
limitations and conditions provided in section 202, a lawyer may not
represent a client if the representation would significantly impair another
client's expectation of the lawyer's loyalty.
A comment to this section would contain the relevant commentary in comment
b to section 201 as follows: "Contentious dealings, for example involving charges
of bad faith against the client whom the lawyer represents in another matter would

218. Id. § 28.
219. Id. § 28 cmt. e.
220. The Reporter'sNote cross-references sections 44, 53, 56-58, 72, 111, 112 and 201-214.
Section 111 defines confidential client information. Comment b thereto states that "[a] client's
approach to a lawyer for legal assistance implies that the client trusts the lawyer to advance and
protect the interests of the client (see § 28(1)). The resulting duty of loyalty is the predicate of
the duty of confidentiality." Id. § 111 cmt. b.
221. Id. § 201.
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raise such a concern. So also would negotiating on behalf of one client when a large
proportion of the lawyer's other client's net worth is at risk. '
Confusion could also be avoided by transferring to this new section the
following commentary from comment c(iii) to section 201:
General antagonism between clients does not necessarily mean that a
lawyer would be engaged in conflicted representations by representing the
clients in separate, unrelated matters. A conflict for a lawyer ordinarily
exists only when there is conflict in the interests of the clients that are
involved in the matters being handled by the lawyer or when unrelated
representations are of such a nature that the lawyer's relationship with one
or both clients likely would be adversely affected. 2
It would also be an improvement if illustration 5 to section 201 were
transferred to an appropriate place in the comments to section 209. Illustration
5 focuses on the right of the client in the unrelated matter to disqualify the
attorney, rather than on disqualification based on any material or adverse
effects on the duty to the client in the unrelated matter.
Comment b to section 209 deals with conflicts among current clients. It
states that four fundamental and sometimes competing values must be
reconciled. One of those is "the client's faith in the lawyer's loyalty." 4
The comment points out that the client's faith in the lawyer's loyalty will be
severely tried whenever the lawyer must be loyal to another client whose
interests are materially adverse.
Comment c to section 209 talks about clients who are aligned in
opposition to each other. It states that "[flundamental conflicts of loyalty and
threats to client confidentiality would be inevitable if a lawyer were to
represent clients opposing each other in the same litigation."'
A lawyer
cannot sue another client because "the lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the client
being sued." 6
Section 211 precludes multiple representation in a nonlitigation setting if
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one or more of the
clients would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to one
or more of the other clients. Comment b to section 211 states that "[a]s in
litigated cases, multiple representation not involving litigation requires the
lawyer to remain loyal to clients."'

222. Id. § 201 cmt. b.

223. Id. § 201 cmt. c(iii).
224. Id. § 209 crnt. b.
225. Id. § 209 cmt. c.
226. Id. § 209 cmt. e.
227. Id. § 211 cmt. b.
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Although the Restatement considers the duty of loyalty as a rationale for
the basic conflict rule, it is fully implemented only in section 209. And the
suggestion in comment b to section 201 that "[c]ontentious dealings, for
example involving charges of bad faith against the client whom the lawyer
represents in another matter would raise such a concern,""2 8 seemingly
requires a significant impairment of a client's expectation of the lawyer's duty
of loyalty. In contrast section 209, in the context of bilateral litigation,
prohibits the representation of one client in asserting or defending a claim
against another client currently represented by the lawyer in an unrelated
matter. 9 However, comment b to section 209 focuses on the loyalty to the
client represented in the litigation, not the client being sued who is represented
in the unrelated matter: "[T]he client's faith in the lawyer's loyalty to the
client's interests will be severely tried whenever the lawyer must be loyal to
another client whose interests are materially adverse."" 0 Although the result
is the same, from the perspective of the client who is being sued, it is hardly
a refreshing commentary on the ethics of the profession to focus on the client
who is suing!
As we have seen, the Restatementtreats the duty of loyalty as absolute in
so far as the litigation rule, but flexible in other contexts. Perhaps the
explanation for this schizophrenic approach is disagreement among the
Reporters. In Suing a Current Client,"' Professor Thomas D. Morgan, the
Associate Reporter responsible for the Conflicts Chapter of the Restatement,
poses the hypothetical situation of a law firm acting as local counsel for a
national manufacturing company. The firm represents the company solely as
to file written protests of local property tax assessments. The firm regularly
represents an individual who periodically sells small amounts of office supplies
to the company. The company has redrafted its purchase order and the local
supplier consults the firm as to the meaning of the terms in the new purchase
. 2 Professor
orderY
Morgan asserts that no conflict exists and that the consent
of the company is not required for the representation of the local client, but he
points out that "some of my colleagues vigorously disagree[]." ' "i Professor
Morgan appears to have prevailed as far as the nonlitigation rule. Section 201
is not a per se disqualification, but rather a disqualification based not on the
breach to the client in unrelated matters, but substantial risk that the duty of
loyalty to the client in the unrelated matters will materially and adversely affect
the representation of the long-time client.

228.
229.
230.
231.
(1996).
232.
233.

Id. § 201 cmt. b.
Id. § 209(2).
Id. § 209 cmt. b.
Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a CurrentClient, I J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETics 87
Id.at 91.

Id.
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Professor Morgan would like to change the litigation rule as well, but
those opposing his opinion have prevailed;
This essay will argue that the rule should stop short of a categorical
prohibition against a lawyer's filing suit against a current client.
A "substantial relation" between the cases should not be required; that
test goes primarily to protection of confidential information and more than
that is at stake in these cases, but I believe a single rule is being used today
to deal with two quite different issues,
First, in the case of the client being sued by "its" lawyer, the question
should be whether a reasonable client in the circumstances of the case
would perceive a breach of loyalty, "loyalty" being understood as more
than exclusively a financial concept.
Second, in the case of the client on whose behalf suit is brought, the
test should be whether there is a credible basis for believing the lawyer may
not represent that client wholeheartedly out of a desire to preserve good
relations with the client being sued.
At minimum, courts should require a showing that the proposed suit
against a current client will have a "material" adverse effect on
representation of one or both current clients before prohibiting or
sanctioning the representation.
The approach suggested here would require an exercise of judgment
that might seem to provide less certainty and predictability than a
categorical prohibition would produce, but I believe that in the case of this
4
rule, the opposite would prove true rs

234. Id. at 94. In Suing a CurrentClient: A Response to ProfessorMorgan, Mr. Brian J.
Redding, loss prevention counsel with Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society ("ALAS"), concurs
with Professor Morgan's criticism of Model Rule 1.7(a), but suggests a different solution.
As Professor Morgan demonstrates in his article, the rule prohibiting suing a
current client evolved over a period of decades. During most of that time, the practice
of law was far different from what it is today. To highlight the problems literal
application of Model Rule 1.7(a) can cause, Professor Morgan hypothecates [sic] a
firm being asked to bring a run-of-the-mill products liability case against a large
corporation for whom others in the firm are doing property tax assessment work. I
have seen even more egregious examples: A client for whom a firm branch office
lawyer is handling a small (often one-shot) matter sues a long-time client of the firm's
main office (on an unrelated matter) and objects to the firm representing its long-time
client Such examples, particularly in the world of large law firms, are a daily
occurrence.
The problem, as Professor Morgan points out, is that literal application of the
absolute prohibition of Rule 1.7(a) can in many instances deprive a litigant of counsel
of her choice, in circumstances where the "other" client of the firm will notbe harmed
by the representation, but refuses to consent for tactical reasons. So far, Professor
Morgan and I are in complete agreement.
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Professor Lawry, in his article entitled The Meaning of Loyalty, explores
the concept of loyalty in the Twentieth Century Rules." After a careful
analysis of the rules and relevant authorities, Professor Lawry concludes that
in a narrow sense loyalty must be independence ofjudgment, not an emotional
commitment of the lawyer to his client. 6 He also concludes that the real
basis for the rule precluding simultaneous representation of clients where one
is suing the other is the concern of confidentiality. 7
Professor Lawry begins his article by quoting Professor Charles Wolfram
to the effect that "[t]he principle of loyalty of lawyer to client is a basic tenet
of the Anglo-American conception of the lawyer-client relationship."'' 8 He
also quotes Professor Kaufman who puzzles over the meaning of the duty of
loyalty: "What we mean when we say a lawyer owes a 'duty of loyalty' to a
client is at the core of our notion of what kind of adversary system we have.
There is no obvious answer."'239

Brian J. Redding, Suing a Current Client: A Response to Professor Morgan, ALAS Loss
PREVENTION J., Sept. 1996, at 2,2. Mr. Redding criticizes Professor Morgan's solution, however.
Professor Morgan suggests, as a solution to these problems, a revised analysis of
the prohibition on representation directly adverse to a current client. He suggests that
if the client being sued will suffer significant harm to its legitimate expectations as a
client, then (and only then) should the law firm be prohibited from suing it. Those
expectations are the "lawyer's sense of mission" and the "client's perception of
loyalty." Examples of such situations would include cases where the firm had
confidential information from a client that could potentially be relevant to the case it
was bringing against that client, or cases where a material adverse effect on the client
would result, for example, because allegations of fraudulent or criminal conduct were
involved, or the stakes were very high (e.g., the "bet the company" case). Thus, in
substance, Professor Morgan suggests a sort of rule of reason analysis so that suing
a current client would be prohibited in big money or potentially "messy" cases, but
not in routine ones. On its face, this seems like a sensible solution to the persistent
conflicts problems many large law firms face on a daily basis. In my view, however,
there are problems with this approach.
Id. at3.
Mr. Redding is not optimistic that the courts will interpret Rule 1.7(a) as Professor Morgan
urges or that Rule 1.7(a) will be changed in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Mr. Redding
suggests a different approach: Dealing with the collateral issues such as "1) who is a current
client; 2) what does 'directly adverse' mean; 3) what is valid consent; and 4) when does a
technical violation of a rule require disqualification, or other judicial sanctions." Id. at 4.
235. Robert P. Lawry, The Meaning of Loyalty, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 1089 (1990).
236. Id. at 1113.
237. Id. at 1115.
238. Id. at 1089 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 7.1.3, at 316
(1986)).
239. Id. at 1089 (quoting ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL
RESPoNsIBiLrrY 38 (3d ed. 1989)).
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As one might observe of the current draft of the Restatement, Professor
Lawry observes of the Twentieth Century Rules that "the concept [of loyalty]
is not defined or explicated" and
the concept is almost exclusively utilized in the setting of discussions about
conflicts of interests. It is referred to in those settings as if the concept
itself were clear, and difficulties only arise when an issue of divided or
conflicting loyalties is present. My premise is that the concept is not clear
at all. When the conflict of interest issues arise, the use of the principle of
loyalty is problematic because we really do not have a firm grasp on the
concept itself. The problem is not dissimilar (and is actually related) to that
of giving conceptual clarity to the infamous phrase "appearance of
impropriety." As Charles Wolfram said: "Use of the phrase [appearance
of impropriety] in decisions has both obscured the process by which courts
formulate their decisions and, in some instances, has lead [sic] to seriously
erroneous results.240

After reviewing the 1908 Canons and the 1969 Code as amended in 1974,
Professor Lawry concludes with a discussion of the 1964 GrievanceCommittee
of the Bar v. Rottneri4 case.242 In Rottner, a law firm sued a client that
it had represented in an unrelated matter.243 The law firm vigorously
defended the propriety of this action in a disciplinary hearing. The Rottner
court concluded that the historic traditions of the bar, captured in the concept
of loyalty to the client, precluded such activity. 2 " A client "is entitled to feel
that, until the business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the
undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his
champion. 245
Professor Lawry is critical of the emotional component of loyalty in the
Rottner decision. He finds this to be "the source of the conceptual
confusion.2 46 "The Rottner case lends support to the idea that 'loyalty'

240. Id. at 1089-90 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 7.1.4, at
319 (1986)).
241. 203 A.2d 82 (1964).
242. Lawry, supra note 235, at 1094-99.
243. Rottner, 203 A.2d at 83.
244. Id. at 84.
245. Id.
246. Lawry, supranote 235, at 1096. Similarly, Professor Moore also criticizes the Model
Code for its failure to "clearly articulate the distinction between.., loyalty and independent
professional judgment... [Tihe essence of loyalty is emotional commitment, while the essence
of independent professional judgment is intellectual detachment. Unfortunately, it is typical of
lawyers to focus almost entirely on loyalty in determining the presence of a conflict of interest."
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts ofInterest in the Simultaneous Representationof Multiple Clients: A
ProposedSolution to the Current Confusion and Controversy,61 TEX. L. REv. 211, 217-218
(1982).She goes on to add that "the danger of this exclusive focus on loyalty is that it ignores the
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means something different from 'independent professionaljudgment.' It also,
of course, emphatically supports the proposition that loyalty entails some
'emotional' component, with the emphasis on the client's feelings of
'
betrayal."247
Professor Lawry also states that regardless of what the rule was
prior to Rottner, "the tradition of not suing a present client seems firmly
24
entrenched today.""
Professor Lawry finds troubling the relationship between deference and
loyalty and states that "[t]he focus cannot simply be on the client's subjective
feeling." 4 9 In support he references the propriety of lawyers "represent[ing]
a wide range of people with varying views""0 and "simultaneously tak[ing]
diametrically opposed positions on the same legal issue for separate
clients. 2... As far as the treatment of loyalty by the Model Rules, Professor
Lawry concludes that the loyalty issue is not eliminated by the language, but
that the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the subjective feelings
of the client are emphasized.
Moreover, Rule 1.7(b) also states that the lawyer may not represent a
client if the representation is "materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibility to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests."
The corresponding comments focus on the lawyer's
"independent professional judgment." Interestingly, Geoffrey Hazard,
principal draftsman of the 1983 Rules, stated that legal issues conflicts

potential contribution of a lawyer's knowledge, experience and objectivity-his independent
professional judgment-in helping the client determine where his best interests lie." Id. at 218.
Professor Moore goes on to give an interesting example of the danger; this example seems
relevant in the bankruptcy context as well:
One common example of this danger is the apparently widespread belief that no
present conflict exists between spouses who have already agreed on the settlement
terms in an uncontested, no-fault divorce. Obviously, a lawyer contemplating multiple
representation in such a case will feel no immediate conflict of loyalties, because an
act furthering the clients' agreement is in accordance with both of their present wishes.
Nevertheless, his ability to render independentprofessionaljudgment on behalfofeach
is immediately affected. Already he is unable to even consider recommending many
alternatives theoretically available to each client; for instance, he cannot pursue a more
favorable property settlement or custody agreement for either one, but rather is forced
to give each a much narrower range of legal advice. Whether or not the client is
permitted to consent to such narrow advice, the immediate impairment of the lawyer's
independent professional judgment is certainly a factor which ought to be recognized
by the lawyer and explained to the client.
Id. at 218-19.
247. Lawry, supranote 235, at 1096.
248. Id. at 1096 n.32. Professor Lawry cites in support of this statement comment 3 to Rule
1.7 of the Model Rules.
249. Id. at 1097.
250. Id.

251. Id.
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"implicate" Rule 1.7(b) and the loyalty concept. Even though the
language of the Rule speaks to "the lawyer's responsibility to another
client," Hazard claims that arguing for a narrowing of the "holder in due
course" rule for a debtor against a bank which is not a client is not
permitted without the consent of the lawyer's several bank clients. Hazard
concedes this requirement gives each of the bank clients "a veto over the
lawyer's choice of new clients" because Rule 1.7(b) requires informed
consent if the operative language, "the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client," is transgressed. He argues that this particular legal issue conflict
is a transgression.' 52

Professor Lawry asserts that Professor Hazard's view is sound
only if the lawyer may do nothing to "harm" a client's interests while
representing that client, including arguing a legal point which the client
would not want argued that way, even if the lawyer is not representing the
client with respect to that issue. On those grounds, however, all legal
issues conflicts would be subject to the first client's veto power. More
importantly, all issues which the first client would perceive as harmful
would have to be argued his or her way. This cannot be right. 3

After completing his analysis of the Twentieth Century Rules, Professor
Lawry tries to bring clarity to the subject and justify the rule precluding
simultaneous representation in unrelated cases. First, as to loyalty, he
concludes that the focus must be on the lawyer and the real issue is
independence of judgment; the feelings of the client are irrelevant. 4
Second, as far as the litigation rule, Professor Lawry concludes that it can be
justified as a prophylactic rule which avoids a situation where independence of
judgment and confidentiality may be compromised."5 Nonetheless, Professor
Lawry would modify the per se rule precluding simultaneous representation "in
the big firm/corporate client context,'1 6 since, given that context, the
traditional concept of loyalty is out of place.257

252. Id. at 1100 (footnotes omitted).

253. Id. at 1100-01.
254. Id. at 1105-06.
255. Id. at 1107-08.
256. Id. at 1108.
257. Id.

I have used Royce's definition of loyalty (devotion to a cause), as a working
definition, tying it specifically to judgment and effort in the lawyering tradition. No
matter the definition, however, the unexamined problem with the loyalty issue is that
it is rooted in an image of the lawyer-client relationship that is both personal (one-onone), and extensive ("client" is not only "interest" or "job," but one half of a real
relationship like the old family doctor had with his patients with multiple encounters
and a history). It also envisions a client who is vulnerable and a lawyer who must
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Professor Lawry concludes that "[a]bsent consent and good rules, the firm
should not be allowed to represent two clients simultaneously if one is suing
258
the other. The reason is not loyalty, but concern about confidentiality.
Professor Lawry concludes that "[ihe IBM kind of problem is actually better
handled by 'limited engagement representations."'259
Chapter 8 of the Restatement dilutes the duty of loyalty in that, with the
exception of parties aligned in opposition in civil litigation, one can be adverse
to an existing client if there is not a substantial risk that the representation
would be materially and adversely affected by the duties to another current
client, one of which duties is the duty of loyalty. This is the approach urged

pay extreme deference to such a client as the act of the strong toward the weak. Of
course it also means the lawyer must sacrifice fees to ensure that the fragile client's
feelings are not hurt.
Id.at 1112.
258.Id.at 1115.
259. Id.In an interesting postscript, Professor Jean Mortland, queries whether "we sometimes
turn the conflict-of-interest rules into full-employment-for-lawyers rules." Jean A. Mortland, The
Meaning of LoyaltOy-The OtherSide of the Coin, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 1117, 1117 (1990). To
illustrate her point, she discusses an accident case where the owner and driver of the automobile
and his two guests sued a bus company whose bus had collided with the car. The bus company
joined the owner and driver as an additional defendant. The same lawyer represented all three
and a verdict was rendered against the bus company and the owner and driver. The trial court
set the judgment aside because of a conflict of interest and the owner-driver and the two guests
appealed. Id. Professor Mortland rather persuasively argues that what appears to be an obvious
conflict was not.
Canon 6 of the 1908 Code states that "a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose." The majority here considered that the lawyer had a
duty to present a case against the individual defendant on behalf of the other two
plaintiffs and to defend that case for the individual defendant. Clearly that would be
within the prohibition of Canon 6. However, if my analysis is correct, that was not
the lawyer's duty. It was simply to present the case for all three against the bus
company and probably to defend the case against the individual defendant. That
would not violate Canon 6.
The 1969 Code prohibits a lawyer from continuing multiple employment if her
independent professional judgment is likely to be affected. Again, if my analysis is
correct, the lawyer's independent professional judgment would not be affected in this
case. The 1974 amendment requires withdrawal if the situation "vould be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests," and defines "differing interests" as
"every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer
to the client." The lawyer in my case would not be representing differing interests,
although differing interests would be present.
The 1983 Model Rules prohibit representation of one client "if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client." Representation of the two
plaintiffs would be directly adverse to representation of the plaintiff-defendant if the
two plaintiffs were asserting an action against the plaintiff-defendant. If they were
not, it would not be directly adverse, if adverse at all.
Id.at 1119-20 (footnotes omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5

58

Smith: Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization C

1997] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONS

851

by most bankruptcy lawyers. The question remains, however, whether this rule
or the absolute bar of the civil litigation rule applies to the bankruptcy case as
a whole.
III. CONFLICTS IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONCASES IDENTIFIED AND
ANALYZED
The following discussion of issues frequently arising in workouts and
bankruptcy reorganization cases assumes that the consent of the client in the
unrelated matter has not been obtained. That consent would be of limited
efficacy in a bankruptcy reorganization case, but most likely would be
dispositive in the context of a workout.
(1) A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of
interest prohibited by § 201 if each affected client or former client gives
informed consent to the lawyer's representation. Informed consent requires
that the client or former client have reasonably adequate information about
the material risks of such representation to that client or former client.
(2) Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client
or former client, a lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the
same litigation; or

(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the
lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or
more of the clients. 26
In a bankruptcy reorganization case, the court must find that counsel has no
adverse interest and is therefore disinterested. Therefore, the waiver
requirement does not come into play in bankruptcy reorganization cases,
although the waiver most likely would avoid disqualification if an
impermissible conflict existed in a workout case.
A. Representing a Debtor in a Workout When a Creditor Is a Client in an
UnrelatedMatter.
A lawyer regularly represents a commercial bank. The commercial bank
is a lender to a company in financial difficulty. The company in financial
difficulty seeks to retain the lawyer to negotiate satisfactory arrangements to
avoid a bankruptcy filing. Is it ethically permissible, absent consent of the
lender, for the lawyer to represent the company or is there a disqualifying

260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (Proposed Final Draft
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conflict because of the representation of the lender in unrelated matters? The
answer is clear at least under the Model Code and Rules.
The lawyer regularly representing a commercial bank could not take on the
representation insofar as it contemplated attempting to negotiate satisfactory
arrangements with the commercial bank, absent the informed consent of both
the ban : and the debtor. Under the Model Code the lawyer would be
representing differing interests. As defined in the Model Code, "'[d]iffering
interests' include every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment
or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent,
diverse, or other interest."26 ' Negotiating with the banker client on behalf of
the debtor client "would be likely to involve [the lawyer] in representing
differing interests"262 precluded by DR 5-105(A). Absent consent, the
representation also would be impermissible under Model Rule 1.7(a) since "the
representation of [the debtor] client will be directly adverse to [the bank]
client."263 These are clear cut, easy to understand rules and the outcome is
certain.
In contrast, section 201 of the Restatement focuses on the impact of the
lender relationship on the representation of the debtor. If there is a substantial
risk that representation of the debtor would be materially and adversely affected
because of the lender relationship, the representation is impermissible absent
the consem of both lender and debtor. The result should be the same, but it
is not as clear cut as under the Model Code and Rules. The key is whether the
effectiveness of the representation of the debtor will be impaired because of the
duty of loyalty to the lender. Using that approach, the representation may be
permissible depending on the facts. If, by way of example, the lawyer asked
to represent the company works for a large law firm with offices around the
country and the lawyer representing the lender is in another city and does not
even know the lawyer who will represent the company or the company's
management or ownership, it is hard to imagine how the representation of the
debtor could be adversely affected.
It is not uncommon for a lender to reach agreement in principle with the
debtor and strongly recommend that the debtor use counsel acceptable to the
lender. Such counsel will often have a longstanding relationship with the
lender and not only represent the lender from time to time but also have one
or more open matters for the lender. So long as these relationships are fully
disclosed and the implications adequately laid out, and counsel believes that it
can adequately represent the debtor and the debtor and the lender consent, the
representation is permissible under the ABA Code and Rules. That would
clearly be so under both the Model Code and the Model Rules so long as, in

261. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Definition 1 (1979).
262. Id. at DR 5-105(A).
263. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5

60

Smith: Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization C
1997] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONS

853

the language of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) the lawyer "can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of
[the attorney's] independent professional judgment on behalf of each," 2' and
under Rule 1.7(a), if "(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client
consents after consultation."2'65 The result is similar under section 202 of the
Restatement; such representation would be allowed if "each affected client...
gives informed consent to the lawyer's representation,"" and it is
"reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate
representation." 67
A recent lawsuit involving an alleged breach of fiduciary duty arose out
of the representation of a lender. The alleged conflict was the simultaneous
representation of the lender to and an unsecured creditor of a debtor. Law firn
represented regular client bank in connection with a secured loan it had made
to manufacturing company.26 A check for conflicts under the manufacturing
company's name and the name of its two owners who had guaranteed payment
of the loan disclosed none.269 Law firm therefore represented bank in
negotiating a workout with manufacturing company prebankruptcy and in
connection with the Chapter 11 case subsequently filed by manufacturing
company.
Several weeks after the filing of the Chapter 11, a supplier to and
substantial unsecured creditor of the manufacturing company discovered that
it was represented by Law Firm in unrelated matters and took the position that
law firm might have a conflict of interest. Law Firm resigned from the only
engagement it had open for the creditor and the creditor sued the law firm and
its bank client.
The undisputed facts established the following:
1. Law Firm conducted a conflict search using the names of the
manufacturing company and related parties but did not request a list of
unsecured creditors from the manufacturing company in order to include
unsecured creditors in the conflict search and none was made under the names

264.

ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RFSPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1979).
265. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995).
266. RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF ThE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202(l) (Proposed Final

Draft No. 1, 1996).
267. Id. § 202(2)(c).
268. Leaf, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
5, Leaf, Inc. v. Continental Bank N.A. (N.D. Ill. 1992) (No. 90-C-3888).
269. Id. at 6.
270. Id. at 9.
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of anyone other than the manufacturing company and its two owners who had
guaranteed payment of the bank loan.2 7'
2. The bank loan was a revolving loan which allowed the bank to go to
a lock box arrangement and it did so. Thus, all payments from manufacturing
account debtors were made into the lock box, the funds were used to pay down
the loan and bank would reloan additional monies in its discretion.272
3. The representation of unsecured creditor by law firm was substantially
limited to intellectual property matters.273
4. The unsecured creditor had been a long-term supplier to manufacturing
company and ended up losing additional money by supplying manufacturing
company during the 1989 Christmas season. 4
In its preliminary statement counsel for the unsecured creditor
characterized the lawsuit as follows:
This lawsuit involves a classic conflict of interest, in which [law firm]
first ignored and then knowingly breached its fiduciary and contractual
duties to its small client-[unsecured creditor]-in favor of a massive
client-[bank].
As [law firm's] undisputed conduct proved, no man can serve two
masters, for [law firm's] legal strategies enriched [bank] with over
$900,000 in assets and proceeds that were bled from [unsecured creditor]
by a scheme concocted by [bank] and masterminded by [law firm]. Once
it was alerted to the conflict, [law firm] belatedly and ineffectively
attempted to cure the conflict by dumping [unsecured creditor] as its client
-after the damage had already been done.
In this summary judgment motion, [unsecured creditor] demonstrates
that, as a matter of law, [law firm] breached the fiduciary duty and duty of
good faith and fair dealing that it owed to [unsecured creditor], its client.
Speaking with stem bluntness, the courts have stressed that a law firm such
as [law firm] owed [unsecured creditor] a duty of "undivided loyalty" and
that [law firm] could not-once the conflict became manifest-attempt to
drop [unsecured creditor] "like a hot potato, especially if it is in order to
keep a far more lucrative client." No protestations by [law firm]-let alone
genuine factual issues-preclude summary judgment in [unsecured
creditor's] favor. 2

Although a number of claims were asserted against law firm by unsecured
creditor, one of the key claims was a breach of fiduciary duty and duty of good
faith and fair dealing as a result of law firm "simultaneously [representing

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
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bank] in a matter directly adverse to the interests of [unsecured creditor], one
of its existing clients."2 '6 In a motion for summary judgment, counsel for the
unsecured creditor relied on the "common law that an attorney owes the client
a fiduciary duty of absolute and undivided loyalty."2"' In addition to the
common law, the motion relied on the Code of Professional Responsibility
which imposed "an absolute duty of undivided loyalty and allegiance to each
client '2
and DR 5-105 which "specifically prohibits an attorney from
simultaneously representing two clients with adverse interests."279
Counsel for the unsecured creditor submitted an affidavit of Professor
Stephen Gillers of New York University.280 Professor Gillers had taught
Regulation of Lawyers and Professional Responsibility at New York University
School of Law since 1978. He had also taught the course as a visiting
professor at Harvard Law School and Cardozo Law School. 8
In his affidavit, Professor Gillers stated the following relevant opinions:
19.
Accordingly, it is my opinion that at the time [law firm] took
on representation of [bank] and at the time [law firm] appeared on behalf
of [bank] in the Superior bankruptcy action, [unsecured creditor] was one
of [law firm's] present clients.
20.
It is my opinion that as one of [law firm's] present clients,
[law firm] owed [unsecured creditor] a fiduciary duty of absolute and
undivided loyalty.
21.
It is my opinion that the fiduciary duty of absolute and
undivided loyalty that [law firm] owed [unsecured creditor] encompassed
a duty to avoid all conflicts of interest with [unsecured creditor].
22.
It is my opinion that, by concurrently representing [unsecured
creditor] and [bank], an entity whose interests were directly adverse to
[unsecured creditor's] regarding the limited pool of Superior assets
available to its creditors-even as [law firm] was advising [bank] on how
to position itself to obtain a preferred claim to this limited pool, and even
as [unsecured creditor] was providing Superior with product that would
enlarge the pool directly to [bank's] benefit and [unsecured creditor's]
loss-[law firm] represented an interest directly adverse to [unsecured
creditor].
23.
It is my opinion that, by taking on the [bank] representation
and appearing on behalf of [bank] in the Superior bankruptcy action

276. Id. at 10.
277. Id. at 11.

278. Id. at 12.
279. Id. at 12-13.
280. Affidavit of Stephen Gillers, submitted by Leaf, Inc. in Support of Its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Leaf, Inc. v. Continental Bank N.A. (N.D. Ill.
1992) (No. 90-C-3888).
281. Id. at 1-2.
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without ever seeking consent from [unsecured creditor], [law firm] breached
its fiduciary duty to [unsecured creditor].
24.
My opinions obtain under the applicable provisions of each of
the Rules of Professional Conduct for the Northern District of Illinois, the
ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Illinois Code of
28 2
Professional Responsibility.
Counsel for Law Firm disagreed. First, although conceding that there is
a duty of loyalty, it was argued that "[t]he duty of undivided loyalty with
regard to a matter is not an unlimited duty as to all matters. 283 Instead,
consistent with the agency rule, "the scope of an agent's duty to its principal
284
...is defined by, and limited to, matters connected with the agency."
Therefore, since law firm had undertaken no work related to the unsecured
creditor's involvement with the manufacturing company, no fiduciary duty was
owed to the unsecured creditor relating to its dealings with the manufacturing
company. In essence, law firm asserted that the duty of loyalty was measured
by the scope of the representation and was not "an unlimited duty as to all
'
matters."285
Second, the law firm argued that the applicable ethical rule was
narrower thai the Model Code in that it provided that "[a] lawyer shall decline
proffered employment if the exercise through his independent professional
judgment inibehalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proffered employment. 286 In contrast, the Model Code
provided that"a lawyer should not undertake a representation 'if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests."'287
Two clients rarely have interests that are entirely identical. If a strict
concept of differing interests were employed, a lawyer might also never be able
to represent two clients without explicit client consent." 288 The unsecured
creditor did not claim that the law firm's judgment on its behalf was actually
or potentially impaired as a result of the representation of the bank; indeed, the
law firm's lawyers working for the unsecured creditor on the unrelated matters
were not even aware of the bank representation as to the particular matter.

282. Id. at 7-8.

283. Memorandum of Law Firm in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Leaf's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 10, Leaf, Inc. v. Continental
Bank N.A. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1992) (No. 90-C-3888).
284. Id. "[A]n agent 'is not.., necessarily prevented from acting in good faith outside his
employment in a matter which injuriously affects his principal's business."' Id. at 10 n. II
(citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 387 cmt b).
285. Memorandum of Law Finn in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Leaf's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 10, Leaf, Inc. v. Continental
Bank N.A. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1992) (No. 90-C-3888).
286. Id. at 12-13.
287. Id. at 13.
288. Id. at 14 n.19.
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Counsel for the law firm characterized the rule asserted by the unsecured
creditor as one that would impose civil liability on a lawyer if it assisted one
client in a course of action that adversely affected the economic interests of
another client for which it had wholly unrelated duties 89
The brief went on to point out that all but two of the cases:
involved the question of disqualification of an attorney where one client of
the attorney was litigating against another client of that attorney. Once two
clients sue each other, courts have been reluctant to allow an attorney to
continue to represent either in the litigation,because it is difficult for the

attorney to demonstrate that his or her professional judgment will not be
impaired by divided loyalty in the fiture conduct of the case9°

How can one reconcile the opinion of Professor Gillers and the position
articulated by counsel for Law Firm? Is Professor Gillers correct that the Law
Firm had in general "a fiduciary duty of absolute and undivided loyalty,"29'
as distinguished from a duty of loyalty as to the particular matter or matters
involved in the representation? Does representation on one or several matters
create an "undivided loyalty that ... encompasse[s] a duty to avoid all
'
conflicts of interest?"292
Was the taking on of the representation of the bank
and appearing on behalf of the bank in the bankruptcy without seeking consent
from the unsecured creditor a breach of the fiduciary duty to the unsecured
creditor, regardless of the lack of knowledge that the other client was a creditor

289. Id. at 14. Counsel for the law firm asserted that there were only a handful of cases even
addressing the far-fetched theory asserted by counsel for the unsecured creditor and that those
involving the matter rejected such a liability.
In Carlsonv. Fredrikson& Byron, P.A., 475 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. App. 1991), the
court affitmed summary judgment against a fiduciary duty claim by a client against
his attorney, where the client claimed the attorney had worked for other clients whose
interests were adverse to the plaintiffs. Examining the claim under Minnesota's
professional ethics standards, the court held that a law firm has no duty to inform a
client about its representation of another client if there is no substantial, relevant
relationship between the two representations.
Similarly, in Steinbach v. Meyer, 412 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa App. 1987), a law firm
represented a farmer at the same time that one of its partners voted (in his capacity
as a member of a bank's board of directors) to terminate the farmer's credit. In
affirming summary judgment, the court found that the firm had not breached its
fiduciary duty to the farmer, because the farmer had never sought legal advice from
the firm concerning the loans. The firm therefore owed him no duty with respect to
those loans.
Id. at 15.
290. Id. at 16.
291. Affidavit of Stephen Gillers, submitted by Leaf, Inc. in Support of Its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 7, Leaf, Inc. v. Continental Bank N.A. (N.D. I11.1992) (No. 90-C-3888).
292. Id.
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of the manufacturing company? If so, would the result be different under the
Restatement?
Under section 201 of the Restatement "[a] conflict of interest is involved
if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the
lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third
person."293 This does not answer the question and it depends on the duty of
loyalty to the client in the unrelated matter. Comment b to the Restatement
suggests that the duty of loyalty is not absolute, and it will depend on the
circumstances as to whether it precludes representation adverse to another
client.
b. Rationale. The prohibition against lawyer conflicts of interest reflects
several competing concerns. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their
lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to
be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. For example, the principle
underlying the prohibition against a lawyer's filing suit against a present
client in an unrelated matter (see § 209, Comment e) may also extend to
situations, not involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a
client's expectation of the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely.
Contentious dealings, for example, involving charges of bad faith against
the client whom the lawyer represents in another matter would raise such
a concern. So also would negotiating on behalf of one client when a large
proportion of the lawyer's other client's net worth is at risk. 94
B. Representing a Debtorin a Workout When a CreditorIs a Former Client.
If we assume that a lawyer represented a commercial bank on a one-time
basis in documenting a loan between the bank and its debtor, the bank is a
former client. Does the prior representation preclude the lawyer from
representing the debtor of the bank in a workout with the bank? The Canons
precluded representation adversely affecting an interest of a client with respect
to which confidence was reposed.295 The Model Code does not have a
specific rule, but such representation is precluded if there were a potential for
a breach of confidence under Canon 4 or an appearance of impropriety under
Canon 9. The Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted the Model Code to

293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
No. 1, 1996).
294. Id. § 201 Cmt. b.
295. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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preclude representation of the borrower in initiating a bankruptcy case.296
Would the result be the same as to a prepetition workout? The Model Rules
preclude representation adverse to a former client if the same or a substantially
related matter is involved and the new client's interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the former client.297 Representation of the borrower might
also be precluded for the additional reason that information obtained from the
prior representation of the lender might be involved. However, assuming no
information from the earlier representation is involved, it is not clear under the
Model Rules that the representation is precluded since the new representation
would involve rewriting the loan, not an attack on the original documentation.
The test and the uncertainty are the same under section 213 of the Restatement
which precludes the representation if the new matter involves the work
performed for the former client or there is a substantial risk that the
representation of the new client would involve the use of confidential
information.298

296. In re Breen, 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992).
297. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1995).
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation.
Id. at Rule 1.9(a). The balance of Rule 1.9 is as follows:
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had
previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present
or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would
permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has
become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
Id. at Rule 1.9(b)-(c).
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 213 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
Unless both the affected present and former clients consent to the representation
under the limitations and conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer who has represented
a client in a matter may not thereafter represent another client in the same or a
substantially related matter in which the interests of the former client are materially
adverse. The current matter is substantially related to the earlier matter if:
(1) the current matter involves the work the lawyer performed for
the former client; or
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C. Representingthe Debtoror Creditorsin Initiatinga Chapter11 Case When
the Lawyer Represents or Representeda Creditorin an UnrelatedMatter.
Can a lawyer who represents a lender, trade creditor, stockholder or
partner, or a party having a contractual relationship with a debtor, initiate a
voluntary bankruptcy case on behalf of the debtor? Since all parties in interest
are affected by the filing of the bankruptcy petition, disciplinary authorities and
the courts may very well conclude that there is a per se disqualification from
filing a voluntary petition if other parties in interest are represented by the
lawyer. That appears to be the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in In re
Neville.2 In that case, Neville, a lawyer admitted to practice in Arizona,
was charged with several violations of the Arizona Rules of Professional
Conduct. The rules in force at the time were based on the Model Code. One
of the charges was a violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) 3 . which
requires a lawyer to decline employment "if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely
30
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment.9 '

Neville had represented Bly in a sale of property from Bly to Cummings.
The deferred balance of the purchase price was secured by the property sold.
There was a default and Bly, through another attorney, foreclosed and obtained
a deficiency judgment in excess of $60,000 against Cummings .3 Neville
had represented Cummings on other matters, was trusted by Cummings, and
Cummings prevailed upon Neville to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case. 33 The Supreme Court found that there was a violation of Disciplinary
Rule 5-105. "As an unsecured judgment creditor, Bly had adverse interests to
Cummings at the time of filing." 3"
But that is not determinative.

(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of the present
client will involve the use of information acquired in the course of
representing the former client, unless that information has become generally
known.
Id. Comment d sets forth the types of former client conflicts which are prohibited. Id. § 213
cmt. d.
299. 708 P.2d 1297 (Ariz. 1985) (en bane).
300. Id. at 1305.
301. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1979).
302. Neville, 708 P.2d 1300.
303. Id. at 1305. Neville telephoned Bly and asked him to consent to Neville representing
Cummings in his bankruptcy case. "Bly gave his consent, but did so 'reluctantly' after being
'pressed' by [Neville] who said that if Bly didn't consent he wouldn't handle the matter but
another attorney certainly would." Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the disciplinary committee
that there was not a knowing and voluntary consent. Id. at 1306. At the time, there was no
requirement in the Model Code that the consent be in writing and no written consent was
obtained. In 1985 the Supreme Court of Arizona abandoned the Model Code and adopted the
Model Rules, which required a writing to achieve full consent under Rule 1.8.
304. Id. at 1305-06.
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Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) requires a finding that "the exercise of [Neville's]
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment,"30 5 or
that it would be likely to involve him in representing different interests. 3 6
Because Neville was representing only Cummings in the bankruptcy case,
the independent professional judgment of Neville in his representation of Bly
could not be adversely affected by the representation of Cummings.
Furthermore, in a Chapter 7 liquidation case, it is up to the trustee to object to
and litigate claims or sue to set aside prepetition transfers. Thus, there was no
action postpetition required of Neville that might be directed at Bly which
could be adversely affected or be likely to involve Neville in representing
different interests. The case did not involve a possible objection to discharge
or the dischargeability of Bly's claim against Cummings.
Unlike Disciplinary Rule 105(A), Model Rule 1.7(a) better supports the
Arizona court's ruling. Rule 1.7(a) precludes representation directly adverse
to a client unless "(1)the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2) each client
3 7
According to comment 3 to Model Rule 1.7,
consents after consultation.""
the rule is based on the duty of loyalty which "prohibits undertaking
representation directly adverse to [a] client without that client's consent."3 8
In In re Breen,3" the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the
disciplinary committee and imposed a two-year suspension for several
violations of the Model Code. Breen had represented clients in negotiating a
loan to Macy. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on thirteen acres of
property. Macy defaulted and the clients, represented by other counsel,
commenced foreclosure proceedings. Nine days before the scheduled trustee's
sale of the Macy property, Breen filed a Chapter 11 case on behalf of Macy to
prevent the sale.3 10 The Supreme Court characterized this as "an action
Breen had neither informed the
directly adverse to his former clients."..
prior clients of his intent to represent Macy nor obtained their consent."'
The Court upheld the Committee's conclusion that Breen violated Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(A) by filing the Chapter 11 case on behalfofMacy. The court did
not distinguish the former client situation in Breen from the present client
situation in Neville. Model Rule 1.9 may require a different holding because
it would preclude the filing by the former attorney only if the bankruptcy case

305. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILrrY

DR. 5-105(A) (1979).

306. Id.
307. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)

(1995).

308. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
309. 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992).

310. Id. at 464.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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were substantially related to the loan transaction giving rise to the claim against
the debtor and the Chapter 11 debtor's interests were materially adverse to the
interests of the former client.
Under the Restatement, assuming that the initiation of a voluntary
bankruptcy case is not considered the assertion of a claim resulting in a per se
disqualification under section 209(2),' the propriety of the representation
will depend on the circumstances. If under section 201 the lawyer's
representation of the debtor in initiating the bankruptcy case would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to the other parties-ininterest who are current clients of the lawyer, then the representation would be
impermissible. However, it is hard to see how the filing of a voluntary petition
could be materially and adversely affected, although defending against a motion
to dismiss the voluntary petition as one filed in bad faith is another matter and
could result in disqualification under both section 209(2) and section 201 if the
debtor's relationships with clients on unrelated matters might be relevant to the
issue of bad faith.
There is a clear distinction between the initiation of voluntary and
involuntary cases. A voluntary petition does not assert a claim against anyone
although it does have consequences for parties in interest. It can, of course, be
viewed as seeking relief against creditors and, depending on the circumstances
of each case, other parties in interest, by bringing into effect the provisions of
the Code, e.g., § 362 (stay), § 365 (executory contracts) and § 1129(b)
(cramdown). In contrast, an involuntary petition directly and immediately
asserts a claim or seeks relief against the debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.
The initiation of a bankruptcy case has consequences for parties to
unperformed contracts with the debtor and creditors of the debtor. Therefore,
if the commencement of the case is the commencement of civil litigation within
the meaning of section 209(2), a lawyer could not, absent consent, represent a
debtor or a trustee if the lawyer represents a creditor of the debtor or a person
who has an unperformed contract with the debtor.
A complicating factor is that at the time of the initiation of an involuntary
case, counsel may not be in a position to identify all parties in interest.
Checking conflicts under the name of the debtor will not disclose the names of
clients in unrelated matters who will be parties in interest in the bankruptcy
case. However, once counsel is aware of a party in interest represented in an
unrelated matter or is in a position to determine who are the parties in interest,
absent appropriate consent, counsel should not initiate a bankruptcy case or
continue as counsel in an involuntary case if § 209(2) applies or section 201
requires it.

313. Infia, Part III(D) and Part IV.
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D. Representing a Debtor-In-Possessionor Trustee When a Party-In-Interest
Is a Client in an UnrelatedMatter.
In determining whether a lawyer can represent a debtor-in-possession or
a trustee, the Bankruptcy Code requires that the lawyer be disinterested and not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate. A basic issue which must
be determined by the court is whether the lawyer has a conflict because of the
representation of a party in interest in unrelated matters. The Bankruptcy Code
makes it clear that there is no per se disqualification because of the
representation of a creditor, but it does not address other representational
interests. Assuming there is no per se disqualification, the issue for the
Bankruptcy Court as to creditors and other parties in interest, should be
whether the representation of the client in the unrelated matter will limit or
otherwise adversely affect the proposed representation. If so, there is an
adverse interest which precludes employment.
The issue of whether representation of creditors in unrelated matters is
disqualifying arose in the Reveco cases." 4 The author was appointed as
examiner and the Noteholder's Committee objected to the appointment on
several grounds, including that the representation of three trade creditors and
two noteholders on unrelated matters was a disqualifying conflict. On behalf
of the Noteholder's Committee, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
("Fried Frank") asserted that the author could not meet the disinterested
standard.'
"Mr. Smith's firm represents: (1) two members of the Unofficial
Committee of Secured Bank Lenders (the "Bank Committee"); (2) three members of
the Official Committee of Unsecured Trade Creditors (the "Trade
Committee")-including its Chair."3 16 "Mr. Smith could not meet the 'disinterested
person' requirement of section 101(13). First, Mr. Smith's firm's representation of
members of two creditor groups, with interests adverse to each other, and with each
adverse to other creditor groups is a classic illustration of an inability to meet section
101(13)(E)'s requirement. 317
Fried Frank also asserted that the author's employment as examiner was
precluded by Model Code Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and by Ethical
Consideration 9-6 which precludes any appearance of impropriety.

314. In re Revco, D.S. Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (Nos. 588-1308 through 588-1321, 5881305, 588-1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
315. Response of Official Committee of Unsecured Noteholders in Opposition to Application
of United States Trustee for Order Appointing Gerald K. Smith, Esq. as Examiner, In re Revco
D.S., Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 17, 1990) (Nos. 588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-

1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
316. Id. at 2.
317. Id. at 16.
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In addition to the rules concerning disinterestedness that are set forth
in section 101(13) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Code of Professional
Responsibility as adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio (the "CPR") also
precludes the acceptance of proffered employment when one has conflicting
interests. Toward this end, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 ("DR 5-105") of the
CPR provides as follows: (A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment
if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, except to the extent permitted under DR-5-105(C).
If Mr. Smith were to accept employment as examiner in this case, the
spirit, if not the letter, of DR 5-105 would plainly be violated. 18
That at least the appearance of impropriety would be present here is
clear. Mr. Smith's firm represents the Two Bank Creditors, potential
targets of the investigation that Mr. Smith has been appointed to undertake.
His firm also represents the Three Trade Committee Members, potential
beneficiaries of such investigation. And though any Revco investigation
would address the desirability of commencing LBO-related fraudulent
conveyance litigation, Mr. Smith is personally prosecuting exactly such an
action. Taken together, these facts demonstrate conclusively apparent, if
not actual, professional improprieties that would mandate the disapproval
of Mr. Smith's appointment in this case.3 19
The author's response was authored by Ms. Freeman and Mr. John P.
Frank&3 It strongly disagreed.
Lewis and Roca represents both trade creditors and bank lenders to
Revco on unrelated matters. The firm's representation of those clients is
not large, but all clients are valued and important.
Essentially, the parties filing objections to Mr. Smith's appointment as
an examiner claim that he may advocate for pursuit of LBO claims because
that would benefit his firm's clients. They overlook the fact that it would
benefit the trade creditors only if his judgment proved right. If Mr. Smith
opined there were valid causes of action to be pursued when they could not
be proved, the estate would be drained of money otherwise available to pay
creditors, by administrative attorneys' fees on a large scale. Concerns for
any creditors could only serve as an impetus for even more careful analysis.
Moreover, in a case this large, virtually every attorney qualified to
serve as an examiner will likely have firm attorneys representing at least
one creditor on unrelated matters. Such representation cannot and does not

318. Id. at 22-23.
319. Id. at 25-26:
320. Mr. Frank, one of Mr. Smith's partners, is an author of 28 U.S.C. § 455 and appeared
at all hearings on it.
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disqualify an attorney from examining matters where those creditors are not
even potential parties.
We recognize that firm clients who are potential targets of causes of
action to be analyzed must waive any conflict arising from that analysis, or
Mr. Smith cannot serve as examiner. When asked for waivers, with an
explanation of the potential consequences, the waivers were given. Two
were later withdrawn, and for that reason the firm has withdrawn. 2'
Even more controversial is whether a lawyer is disqualified from
representing a trustee or debtor-in-possession if a client in an unrelated matter
does not consent but the representation of the client in the unrelated matter will
not adversely impact the representation of the trustee or debtor-in-possession.
This possibility is the subject of a debate among representatives of the Business
Bankruptcy Ethics Committee, the National Bankruptcy Conference
('NBC"),32 the Reporters for the Restatement, and Judge Carolyn D.
King.32
The NBC submitted a memorandum to Professor Wolfram urging greater
flexibility:
The Conference would urge that Chapter 8 of the Restatement be

clarified to make clear that conflict of interest principles designed to
address non-bankruptcy "civil litigation", such as those contained in Section
209, should not automatically be applied to the entirety of a bankruptcy
case. While the conflict of interest principles applicable to civil litigation
may properly be applied to an adversary proceeding or contested matter
where the debtor, trustee or creditors' committee is asserting or defending
against a claim, it should not be presumed that bankruptcy counsel is
materially adverse to individual stakeholders with regard to other matters
in the case. The appropriate section of the Restatement under which such

321. Response to Assertion That Gerald K. Smith Is Not "Disinterested" and Therefore Not
Eligible to Be Examiner at 9-10, In re Revco D.S., Ins. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 22, 1990) (Nos.
588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
322. The National Bankruptcy Conference is a non-profit, voluntary association of about 65
judges, professors and practicing attorneys from all parts of the United States. Its members are
selected for demonstrated professional and technical excellence in the field of bankruptcy law.
The Conference was founded in the middle 1930s to promote the improvement of the bankruptcy
laws and their administration. The Conference, which meets twice a year, has been consistently
active in the legislative process. It assisted and advised Congress in drafting the Chandler Act of
1938 and played major roles in the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and the
amendment process ever since. The NBC has no staff, paid or unpaid, and operates on a budget
of approximately $40,000 per year of cash contributions from members plus various "in kind"
expenditures by members for the NBC's benefit (e.g., plane fares of members, photocopies, etc.).
323. Judge King is a member of The Council of The American Law Institute and a Judge on
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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other matters should be tested is Section 201, 3 24which requires a
determination of the actual risk of material adversity.

Mr. Donald S. Bernstein, a partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell and a
Conferee of the NBC, also expressed a need for greater flexibility and
succinctly set forth an interesting and somewhat novel view equating pre and
post bankruptcy conflict analysis.3" Mr. Bernstein's analysis, if accepted,
would preclude a per se disqualification because of the representation of a party
in interest in an unrelated matter.3 26 Disqualification would occur if there

324. Memorandum from the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the National
Bankruptcy Conference to Professor Charles W. Wolfram 4 (April 18, 1996).
325. Memorandum from Donald S. Bernstein, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, to Professor Charles
W. Wolfram (October 3, 1996) (on file with author).
I have given a great deal of thought to the new version of the commentary to the
Restatement you have proposed regarding the treatment of bankruptcy cases under
Section 209 of the Restatement. I believe the revisions are on the right track, but
some of the distinctions suggested by the revisions may reflect an important gap in
understanding between non-bankruptcy "litigators" and bankruptcy lawyers over the
meaning of bankruptcy proceedings. I thought it might be helpful to elaborate on
where I see this "gap" to be in the hope it might illuminate our further discussion of
the draft commentary.
I do not see the bright line distinction between the pre and post-filing period that
is suggested by the draft. In business reorganization (chapter 11) cases, most of the
disputes between clients will be the same ones that existed prior to bankruptcy in the
context of efforts to restructure out of court: are the claims valid, are the liens good,
how should the company's debt be scaled back, how much equity should the old
equity holders retain. Although after the filing the court will be involved in
determining whether these disputes give rise to a conflict (because the court must
approve retention of counsel by the DIP), from the lawyer's perspective, the potential
disputes have not, in the main, changed.
This leads me to ask why, if the treatment of creditors is still the subject of
negotiation rather than litigation, the ground rules should change by virtue of the fact
that the debtor comes under court supervision by filing a petition. One might take the
view, instead, that if the per se civil litigation rule did not apply to the pre-bankruptcy
situation, the fact of the filing should not change this unless and until the issues
between the parties degenerate into litigated disputes in the case. Prior to that time and in the pre-filing context as well-the general rules stated in Sections 201 and
209(1) should apply. There may well be a conflict, but it is not generated by the
pendency of the bankruptcy case. It is generated, if at all, because the parties are on
opposite sides of the table trying to resolve disputes in a negotiated restructuring.
Maybe we haven't been clear on this point because it is so intuitive to those of
us in bankruptcy practice: most chapter 11 cases are in the eyes of bankruptcy
practitionersa continuationof an out of courtrestructuringtransaction.The fact that
a bankruptcy proceeding has been commenced does not mean, at least to the
bankruptcy lawyer, that all aspects of the relations between the parties have become
the subject of litigation.
Id. at 1-2.
326. For a similar analysis, see Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Director, American Law
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were a substantial risk that the representation of the client would be materially
and adversely affected or when a defense or claim is asserted. On the other
hand, if Judge King's position is accepted and the bankruptcy case as a whole
is treated as a civil lawsuit under section 209(2), counsel for a party in interest
in unrelated matters will be disqualified, absent appropriate consent, from
representing a trustee or debtor-in-possession if the clients are considered to be
aligned in opposition. This will be so because of state ethical rules rather than
the Bankruptcy Code.
But now we are in danger of mixing apples and oranges. The Bankruptcy
Code precludes counsel from holding or representing an adverse interest. That
is the focus of section 201; however, section 201 is the Reporter's formulation
of the state disqualifying rule and can be avoided by consent.327 But the

Institute, to Gerald K. Smith (March 15, 1996) (on file with author).
The black letter refers to conflicts arising from "representing one client in asserting
or defending a claim against another client currently represented by the lawyer..
Key terms are:
-"Asserting" and "defending." The fact that a clientfiles a claim in bankruptcy
does not mean that the claim is being "asserted" in the conflict-of-interest sense. The
same point applies to a client against whom another client files a claim. At the stage
of filing a claim, it is unknown whether the claim will be contested and hence whether
"asserting" or (its correlative) "defending" will eventuate. Rather, as I suggested in
an earlier conversation, it seems to me the key is whether a claim by or against a
client is under court-supervised accounting and negotiation, i.e., bankruptcy without
active litigation, or is being actually contested.
-"Representing [a] client." If the client does the filing the lawyer is not
representing the client. As I understand normal practice, a client-claimant usually
prepares ordinary claims and a client-debtor usually itself receives and initially
processes claims made against it. If the lawyer's representation is defined in terms
of a boundary at that line, then the lawyer does not represent the client until contest
is in prospect.
It seems to me the foregoing analysis applies, at least in general, to Chapter 11
proceedings.
Note also the discussion in the Comment about class suits. It seems to me that
much of this discussion applies as among claimants in a bankruptcy.
Id. at 1-2.
327. Section 201 precludes representation involving a conflict "[u]nless all affected clients and
other necessary persons consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided
in § 202." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). Section 202 of the Restatement provides:
(1) A lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a conflict of interest
prohibited by § 201 if each affected client or former client gives informed consent to
the lawyer's representation. Informed consent requires that the client or former client
have reasonably adequate information about the material risks of such representation
to that client or former client.
(2) Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client,
a lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
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disqualification under the Bankruptcy Code is not cured by consent.
Even if the case as a whole is not considered civil litigation under
section 209(2), the lawyer will be disqualified under section 201 in those
instances where the relationship or connection to the other client is significant.
The In re Amdura28 case is a good illustration of this. In Amdura there was
such a significant client relationship between the Winston & Strawn law firm
and Continental Bank that Winston & Strawn was unwilling to be adverse to
Continental Bank. It was, therefore, not only a disqualifying relationship under
the Bankruptcy Code but also section 201.
The state rules of disqualification, at least from the perspective of
bankruptcy practice, have been progressively stiffened over the last quarter
century. The Canons were not clear even as to civil litigation. The Rottner
case could have gone either way under the old Canons. Canon 6 stated that it
was "unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned."'329 A lawyer represented conflicting interests under Canon
6 "when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another requires him to oppose."33 This definition did not clearly cover
the client in the unrelated matter. The Model Code precludes the representation
of differing interests, and this seems to cover the client in an unrelated matter.
In contrast, the Model Rule is clear on this issue. It precludes
representation "if the representation. . . will be directly adverse to another
client."33' The only possible question in the bankruptcy context is whether
the general representation, for example, of a debtor-in-possession or trustee is
directly adverse to another client in an unrelated matter who is a party in
interest. This is similar to the issue under section 209(2) of the Restatement.
It is only phrased differently, i.e., is the representation directly adverse to a
client in an unrelated matter rather than is a claim or defense asserted against
the client in the unrelated matter.
Judge Alan Shiff, in In re Peck,332 refused to disqualify counsel for the
debtor-in-possession where such counsel formerly represented a creditor in
documenting a loan to the debtor. Judge Shiff looked at the facts, rather than
applying a per se rule as did the Arizona Supreme Court in In re Breen. He
found no basis for disqualification where the integrity and validity of the

(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the same
litigation; or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer
will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients.
Id. § 202.
328. 121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
329. CANONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETmics Canon 6 (1908).
330. Id.
331. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7(a) (1995).
332. 112 B.R 485 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
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documentation could not be challenged although the possibility of a suit to
recover a preference because of improvements to the collateral existed.333
On the other hand, in determining whether a lawyer has a conflict under
the adverse interest standard, the lawyer must consider whether it is likely that
a client in an unrelated matter will initiate a motion to lift stay, a motion to
convert, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to compel the assumption of a
contract. If so, the lawyer for the trustee or debtor-in-possession would be
disqualified from handling the matter since, under section 209(2) of the
Restatement, one client would be represented in asserting or defending a claim
against another client currently represented by the lawyer in an unrelated
matter. This would limit the lawyer's role and, as in Amdura, likely result in
disqualification under the Bankruptcy Code.
E. Representing Multiple Parties-In-Interestin a Chapter 11 Case.
Multiple representation raises significant conflict issues. By way of
example, can you represent secured and unsecured creditors in a reorganization
case? The rights of secured creditors in a reorganization case are adverse to
the rights of unsecured creditors. It is true that secured and unsecured creditors
may be aligned for purposes of reorganization. However, in reaching this goal
many disputes among parties in interest must be negotiated or litigated. For
example, the holder of a secured claim may have received a transfer which is
voidable and the same is often true of unsecured creditors. Some unsecured
creditors may have reclamation rights or the ability to perfect liens postpetition;
to that extent, their rights conflict with the rights of other creditors. Parties
having prepetition contractual relationships with the debtor may not only hold
unsecured claims (and potential offset rights), but may wish to terminate the
contractual relationships. Holders of unsecured, subordinated claims are often
represented by a committee. Positions taken by the committee or individual
holders of subordinated claims will often be directly adverse to the interests of
other unsecured creditors. Even general, unsecured creditors interests differ
since the total of the unsecured claims may affect the amount of the
distribution to unsecured claimants.
Section 209(1) of the Restatementprecludesmultiple representation in civil
litigation "if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one
of the clients would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties
'
to another client in the matter."334
Comment d to section 209(1) makes it
clear that the rule applies to bankruptcy cases.335
333. Id. at 488 n.4.
334. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209(1) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
335. It is assumed that the draftsman of the Commentary to § 209(1) did not use "bankruptcy
proceeding" in a technical sense. If it was used in a technical way, it does not refer to multiple
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Multiple representation is precluded when the clients, although
nominally on the same side of a lawsuit, in fact have such different interests
that representation of one will have a material and adverse effect on the
lawyer's representation of the other. Such conflicts can occur whether the
clients are aligned as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, as well as in complex
and multi-party litigation.336
Not all possibly differing interests of co-clients in complex and multiparty litigation involve material interests creating conflict. Determination
whether a conflict of material interests exists requires careful attention to
the context and other circumstances of the representation . . . . For
example, a lawyer might represent several unsecured creditors in a

bankruptcyproceeding. In addition to general conflict of interest rules that
may apply, a lawyer representing such multiple clients must also comply
with statutory regulations if more stringent. 33
The Restatementterminology is difficult to apply; it requires that one focus on
the adequacy of the representation of one of the clients where the duties to
another client nominally aligned may materially and adversely affect the
representation's quality or extent.
Section 211 of the Restatement covers multiple representation other than
in litigation. It provides that, absent appropriate consent:
[A] lawyer may not represent two or more clients in a matter not
involving litigation if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's
representation of one or more of the clients would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to one or more of the other
clients.33
As made clear in comment a, this section concerns the propriety of the
'
representation of "co-clients."339
The comments to section 209 mention what
may be the most common instance of multiple representation in bankruptcy
cases, the representation of two or more creditors.3 4 But there is no mention
of the important issues of joint administration by one trustee,34 presentation

representation in the case, but rather in a contested proceeding. NORTON BANKRUPTCY RULES
PAMPWHLET, pp. iii-iv (1996-97).
336. RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS § 209 cmt. d (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
337. Id. § 209 cmt. d (iii) (emphasis added).

338. Id. § 211.
339. Id. §211 cmt. a.
340. Id. § 209 cmt. d(iii).
341. BANKR. R. 2009(a), (c), (d). Rule 2009(d) is labelled "potential conflicts" and requires
a showing of prejudice as a result of conflicts before separate trustees will be ordered.
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of creditors' committees, 42 or representation of debtors-in-possession in
related cases.
The approach of sections 209(1) and 211 is a circumstances approach, in
contrast to the per se disqualification of the Model Code. The relevant Ethical
Consideration of the Model Code is as follows:
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with
differing interests; and there are few situations in which he would be
justified in representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially
differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such employment and the interests
did become actually differing, he would have to withdraw from
and for
employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the clients; 343
this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment initially.

The Model Rule Commentary suggests an approach similar to that of the
Restatement.
Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may
conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph
(b) [conflicts caused by material limitations on lawyer's ability to
represent]. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial
discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation
to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different
possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question...
[C]ommon representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the
risk of adverse effect is minimal and [the clients consent]. 3"

The Canons also seem to contain a per se rule precluding multiple
representation, absent appropriate consent.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within
the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose. 45

342. See In re Caldor-NY, 193 B.R. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
343.

ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1979).

344. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 7 (1995).
345. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICS Canon 6 (1908).
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Representation of several creditors in bankruptcy cases was discussed in
an article by Kent Meyers shortly before the enactment of the present
Code. 46
In many instances, the firm will be representing more than one old,
established client. Perhaps, the firm will have accepted representation of
a new client before being aware of a claim by a long-time client. These
circumstances make withdrawal from or refusal of representation difficult
at best.
If a question of the priority of a secured claim or validity of any type
of claim is or could be raised, the differing or conflicting interests become
evident and are the very type of conflicting interests that are anathema to
lawyers and clients alike.
In bankruptcy, it appears to be a rather common practice for a law firm
to represent numerous unsecured creditors. In a "no asset" liquidation or
straight bankruptcy proceeding seemingly, there would be no conflict.
However, where there will be assets to allow the payment of a dividend, the
possibility of conflicting or competing claims arises and hence, the ethical
difficulties. In the representation of secured and unsecured creditors in
straight bankruptcy the conflicts arise because of the possibility of
conflicting claims, preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances.
In rehabilitation proceedings (Chapters X, XI, XII and XI), all of the
conflict problems that exist in the straight bankruptcy setting are again
present, with the additional problems raised by the requirement for the
selection of trustees, management of assets and approval of arrangement or
reorganization plans.347
Mr. Meyers, like the Reporters for the Restatement, considered a
bankruptcy case to be litigation.
Canon 5 deals with the problem of conflicting or differing interests. In
the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, it
is stated that "a lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients
with differing interests." (Emphasis supplied.) The Ethical Considerations,
some text writers and courts state an absolute prohibition against
representing differing interest in litigation. By definition, differing interests
include ". . . every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or

the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent,
diverse, or other interest." Apparently, the latitude gained by full disclosure
and client consent is available only in non-litigation circumstances. If that
is so, the prohibition against multiple creditor representation in litigation

346. Kent Meyers, EthicalConsiderationsinthe RepresentationofMultiple CreditorsAgainst
a Single Debtor, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 19 (1977).

347. Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
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honored more in its breach than in its observance, at least in
may be being
348
bankruptcy.
Mr. Meyers discusses applicable sections of the RestatementofAgency and
a formal opinion of the American Bar Association, which he believes is in
conflict with Ethical Consideration 5-15 which states that "[a] lawyer should
never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests. 349 Mr.
Meyers cautions that the formal opinion and the Restatementprovisions were
written well in advance of the contrary provision of the Model Code.
The authorities are not in harmony concerning what is a conflict, the
effect of it arising in litigation, the efficacy of consent or withdrawal and
the presumptive balance to be struck between the various competing
interests. The effects of an attorney making a wrong decision are becoming
more serious and drawing more attention. In the case of an erroneous
decision by the attorney, there is a discernible trend toward possible
disciplinary action by the applicable Bar Association and, moreover,
financial responsibility to the client for malpractice.350

Because of the resulting uncertainty, Mr. Meyers recommended additional
guidance in the form of a bankruptcy rule. However, he was skeptical that a
national rule could be achieved and therefore recommended a model local
bankruptcy rule.
Inaddition to any requirements of other applicable statutes or rules, any
person representing more than one creditor shall file a signed statement
with the court setting forth that:
(1) The multiple representation has been disclosed to each
such creditor;
(2) The actual or potential conflict of interest has been
discussed with each such creditor;
(3) Each such creditor has agreed to the multiple
representation;
(4) The signor shall advise all such creditors and the court
should any material change take place that disqualifies the signor
from continuing the multiple representation. 35'

The dispute among the representatives of the NBC, Business Bankruptcy
Ethics Committee and Judge King is irrelevant to the type of conflict addressed

348. Id. at 21 (footnotes omitted).
349. ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESsIONAL
350. Meyers, supranote 346, at 25.

RESPONSIBILrrY

EC 5-15 (1979).

351. Id. at 29.
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by Meyers. Multiple representation of this type would be treated the same by
the Restatement whether section 201 or section 209(1) applies.
In a discussion of representation of multiple clients in the same matter,
Professor Nancy J. Moore. 2 compared the then proposed Model Rules with
the Model Code. Professor Moore found both the Model Code and the Model
Rules inadequate. "The current ABA Code states that such multiple
representation can be proper if informed consent is obtained, but only if it is
'obvious' that the representation will be 'adequate.'
Unfortunately, no
disciplinary rule defines 'adequate' and the little guidance provided in the
Code's ethical considerations is, at best, ambiguous. 353
As for the Model Rules, Professor Moore found that the "attempt to clarify
the meaning of 'adequacy' by substituting a rule which asks whether the
'lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely
affected"' 354 only perpetuated the confusion. "Although the exclusive focus
on client interests eliminates any need to consider the potential for apparent
improprieties, the new rule provides no guidance on how to determine the
'adverse' effect of the conflict on the representation. 355 The Association of
Trial Lawyers of America had proposed an alternative which would have
solved the problem, but it abandoned any protection of clients against
potentially unwise decisions. The proposal was that "a client can waive any
conflict of interest after ... full disclosure. '356 After discussing the
inadequacies of the ABA Code, the proposed Model Rules and a proposal of
the American Trial Lawyers Association, Professor Moore recommended "a
new general
standard based upon client capacity for informed and voluntary
35 7
consent."
(A) A conflict of interest exists whenever a lawyer's ability to consider,
recommend, or carry out a course of action on behalf of a client is or may
be adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.
(B) The representation of conflicting interests is impermissible unless:
(1) the lawyer fully explains to each client the implications of
the conflict of interests, including the advantages and risks involved, and
obtains each client's consent in writing; and

352. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple
Clients: A ProposedSolution to the CurrentConfusion and Controversy,61 TEX.L. REV. 211
(1982).
353. Id. at 212-13 (footnotes omitted).
354. Id. at 214 (footnotes omitted).
355. Id.

356. Id. at 215.
357. Id. at 216.
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(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that each client is
capable of giving informed and voluntary consent, taking into
account both the subject matter and the individuals involved.35 8
Section 202 of the Restatement sets forth the rule on client consent to
conflicts of interest. Regardless of consent, an attorney may not represent
opposing parties in the same litigation. Thus, if a bankruptcy case is litigation,
as that term is used in the Restatement, even consent will not allow a lawyer
to represent adversaries aligned in opposition. Comment g(iii) to section 202
discusses the situation of when clients are aligned directly against each other.
In multi-party litigation, a single lawyer might, for example, represent
members of a class in a class action, multiple creditors or debtors in a
bankruptcy proceeding, or multiple interested parties in environmental
clean-up litigation. Joint representation is appropriate following effective
client consent, together with compliance with applicable statutory or rule
court approval of the representation after
requirements, which may require
359
a disclosure of the conflict.
F. RepresentingAffiliates in a Chapter 11 Case.
An organization with more than a single owner-employee is an
aggregation of multiple interests, if only because it is made up of multiple
persons or entities. Persons initially forming an organization are linked by
a common interest that partly transcends their individual interests. The
individuals might have separate lawyers for their other activities and for
negotiating the question of their shares or other forms of control in the
organization. However, a lawyer might be retained for representation
relating to the organization separate from that of any individual associated
with the enterprise. An organization's lawyer thus is said to represent the
entity and not the elements that make it up. A lawyer for an organization
serves whatever lawful interest the organization defines as its interest,
acting through its responsible agents and in accordance with its decisionmaking procedures. 3' 6
The foregoing description from the comments to Restatement section 212
succinctly describes entity representation. The question remains, however,
whether the lawyer representing the entity can also represent owners,
management or related entities. Simultaneous representation in the same matter
is dealt with by section 212(2) which adopts the basic conflict rule and

358. Id. at 287.
359. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 202 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).

360. Id. § 212 cmt. b.
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precludes the lawyer for the entity from representing "a director, officer,
employee, shareholder, owner, partner, member, or other individual or
organization associated with the organization if there is a substantial risk that
the lawyer's representation either would be materially and adversely affected
by the lawyer's duties to the other without appropriate consent. 3 6'
The Model Code would seem to preclude such simultaneous representation
as adverse. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) requires a lawyer to decline
employment "if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf
of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests. 3 62 Under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) the lawyer must
discontinue multiple employment "if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of anther client, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests."363 In both instances,
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) allows the representation if there is informed
consent and "it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of...
[all of the clients]."3 ' The Model Rules are similar; however, Model Rule
1.7(b)(2) adds that "[w]hen representation of multiple clients in a single matter
'
is undertaken,"365
the consultation which precedes consent must include
"explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved."3M
When confronted with a multiple representation situation, bankruptcy
counsel should fully comply with the requirements of the applicable state
ethical rules. The spelling out of the consultation in the required disclosure
under Bankruptcy Rule 2104 will be of assistance to the bankruptcy judge in
determining whether to allow the multiple representation.
Many bankruptcy judges preclude simultaneous representation of the
debtor and an owner, partner, member, director, officer, employee or
shareholder but allow representation of affiliated entities because of the expense
and impracticality of multiple representation. The issue under the adverse
interest standard is straight forward: Will the representation of each client be
materially and adversely affected by the representation of the other? However,
under the disinterested standard there may be a per se disqualification if there
is a claim by or against the affiliate. This arguably makes the trustee a creditor
of the affiliate since the trustee has a duty to assert the claim against the
affiliate. However, the entity still exists, although its assets comprise an estate.

361. Id. § 212.

362.

ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at DR 5-105(B).
Id. at DR 5-105(C).
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule

DR 5-105(A) (1979).

1.7(b)(2) (1995).

Id.
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Even if there is a new entity-the estate-the trustee represents it, however, the
trustee does not become a creditor of the affiliate. Thus, there should be no
per se disqualification.
The same analysis should apply whether the potentially disqualifying basis
is a creditor claim or ownership interest.
An attorney should not seek approval to represent affiliated debtors or
a debtor and its insider unless the attorney has: (1) evaluated the affiliate's
or insider's relationship with the debtor, e.g. intercompany claims, asset
transfers, overlapping creditors, creditor guaranties and subordination
agreements, jointly-owned assets, shared officers, directors and owners; (2)
determined that the interests of both prospective clients are substantially
aligned with respect to the proposed representation, and that there is no
substantial risk that the attorney's representation of each client would be
materially and adversely affected by the attorney's duties to the other; and
(3) obtained the consent of each prospective client to representation by
separate counsel if and when appropriate to handle disputes between them.
Because affiliates and insiders are interested parties -with respect to the
decision on consenting to joint representation, and because of the
Bankruptcy Code's disinterestedness requirements and the fiduciary duties
of debtors in possession to creditors and equity security holders, the
bankruptcy court should be informed of all relevant facts, and determine
whether joint representation and consent to joint representation is
appropriate, upon appropriate notice to creditors and parties in interest. See
§ 202g(ii). 67
G. Representing Parties in Interest with Inconsistent Positions: Positional

Conflict.
If there is one thing certain as far as bankruptcy practice it is that counsel
will assert inconsistent positions on legal issues. For example, since the
Bankruptcy Code does not specify the date of valuation of collateral, counsel
will argue the most beneficial date. Inconsistent positions will be asserted even
if one limits one's practice to representation of secured creditors. The problem
is magnified many fold where one represents creditors-both secured and
unsecured including claims traders-debtors, trustees and committees. In a
large firm, lawyers will undoubtedly be taking contrary legal positions before
the same bankruptcy judge on a number of issues. Is this disqualifying?
Model Rule 1.7 addresses the issue head on:

367. ABA Business Bankruptcy Law Committee, Bankruptcy Ethics Subcommittee,
Restatement of the Law, The Law GoverningLawyers, BankruptcyIssues, Panel Paper Presented
at the American Law Institute Conference in Orlando, Florida 4-5 (1993).
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A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal
question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either
client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to
assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be
improper
to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate
8
36

cour.

A recent formal opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility made it clear that, absent appropriate consent, if
two matters are being litigated in the same jurisdiction the lawyer must avoid
taking inconsistent positions if there "is a substantial risk that the law firm's
representation of one client will create a legal precedent, even if not binding,
which is likely materially to undercut the legal position being urged on behalf
369
of the other client.,
The Restatement devotes two paragraphs in a comment to section 209 to
the problem. The issue is dealt with like other conflicts of interest under
section 201.
A lawyer ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different
courts at different times. While each client is entitled to the lawyer's
effective advocacy of that client's position, if the rule were otherwise law
firms would have to specialize in a single side of legal issues.
However, a conflict is presented when there is a substantial risk that a
lawyer's action in Case A will materially and adversely affect another of
the lawyer's clients in Case B. Factors relevant in determining the risk of
such an effect include whether the issue is before a trial court or an
appellate court; whether the issue is substantive or procedural; the temporal
relationship between the matters; the practical significance of the issue to
the immediate and long-run interests of the clients involved; and the clients'
reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If a conflict of interest
exists, absent informed consent of the affected clients under § 202, the
lawyer must withdraw from one or both of the matters. Informed client
consent is provided for in § 202. On circumstances in which informed
client consent would not allow the lawyer to proceed with representation of
both clients, see § 202(2)(c) and Comment g(iv) thereto 7
In the Revco cases, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of D.S. Partners,
objected to the appointment of the author as examiner on the basis of a conflict

Rule 1.7 cmt. 9 (1995).
369. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 377 (1993)
(discussing positional conflicts).
370. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVEmNG LAWYERS § 209 cmt. f(Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
368. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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arising from Lewis & Roca having taken certain positions in the Kaiser Steel
leveraged buyout litigation.
6. On behalf of Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc ....
Lewis & Roca,
Smith's law firm, has filed three complaints stating numerous causes of
action relating to the 1984 leveraged buyout of Kaiser Steel Corporation.
These complaints seek recovery from, among others, the selling
stockholders of Kaiser Steel, the banks who financed the leveraged buyout
and the board of directors that authorized the transactions.... The Kaiser
Steel complaints and the quoted allegations contain implicit assumptions of
law applicable to fraudulent transfer claims in general. In view of the fact
that Smith and Lewis & Roca are currently and actively prosecuting the
Kaiser Steel litigation, D.S. Partners submits that Smith and Lewis & Roca
will be unable in an objective fashion to investigate and report on the
Revco leveraged buyout and any claims or causes of action related thereto.
7. Necessarily, the
examiner's
investigation,
report
and
recommendations will involve the consideration of numerous complex and
controversial issues and will propose actions to be undertaken in connection
therewith. For example, if all creditors in existence on the date of the
leveraged buyout have been paid in full before Revco's financial difficulties
arose, should the selling stockholders or the entities that lent money to
Revco be liable to creditors who, in effect, assumed the risk associated with
Revco's leveraged buyout? Even the applicability of the fraudulent transfer
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and analogous state law statutes is
subject to considerable doubt.... In light of the positions taken by Lewis
& Roca in the Kaiser Steel litigation and the potential prejudice to such
litigation if Smith publicly recommended against litigating claims arising
out of Revco's leveraged buyout, Smith's ability to objectively evaluate
issues relating to the Revco LBO must be questioned.7

371. Objection of D.S. Partners, L.P. to Appointment of Examiner and Recommendation
Regarding Scope of Examiner's Duties at 5-7, In re Revco D.S., Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 17,
1990) (Nos. 588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, on behalf of the Noteholders Committee, objected on
the same basis.
Mr. Smith has been, to our understanding, the lead prosecutor in the Kaiser Steel
Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation for almost three years. If he is the lawyer we think
him to be, he has devoted a good portion of those last three years to thinking about
new fraudulent conveyance theories to prosecute, and being a zealous advocate for
them.
His duty to his client-in the Kaiser Steel Fraudulent Conveyance Litigationdemands no less. But attitudes developed after years of advocacy on behalf of LBOrelated fraudulent conveyance claims cannot easily be pushed to the side. Nor can any
person push to the side the possibility that decisions as to the merits of fraudulent
conveyance claims in this case may ultimately have precedential value in the case
being litigated elsewhere. While we have no doubt that a person of integrity would
try to push aside such concerns, it is improbable that anyone so trying could really be
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The response argued that the examiner should not be disqualified under
general principles of disqualification law and under the disinterested standard.
This matter can be approached in terms of the Bankruptcy Code or in
terms of general principles of disqualification law. The examiner will be
regarded as a quasi-judicial officer of the court; the citations to various
cases for that proposition in the papers already filed are valid....
It is generally accepted that a judge who has been counsel to a party is
disqualified but only as to those matters where there has been an attorneyclient relationship as to the particular cases which come before him as a
judge; "a judge is not disqualified from hearing a case merely because it
has grown out of a previous case in which he has acted as counsel... or
where the first case involved some of the issues raised in the second. ..
44A C.J.S. Judges, § 114(b), p. 761.
The federal statute (and in this respect the ABA canons of judicial
ethics are the same) carefully disqualify the judge for previous association
only where he had, as a lawyer, "served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy," 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) and the ethics opinions as to a lawyer
who has left the bench are similarly confined; see Op. 59, ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics (1931), where a lawyer as special master decided an
oil rights case in a particular fashion; his firm cannot thereafter seek to

enforce the judgment.
We have endeavored to research the scope of the "disinterestedness"
definition of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). Every single case
we have found in which a person is held "interested" rather than
disinterested" involves the person's connection to the bankruptcy estate
before the court. There is no recorded instance in which anyone has been
found "interested" because of involvement in some other case representing
other parties who have no connection with the bankruptcy case before the
372

CoUrt.

successful. And, even if successful, the appearance of bias could not be overcome.
Response of Official Committee of Unsecured Noteholders in Opposition to Application ofUnited
States Trustee for Order Appointing Gerald K. Smith, Esq. as Examiner at 6, In re Revco D.S.,
Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 17, 1990) (Nos. 588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761
through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
372. Response to Assertion That Gerald K. Smith Is Not "Disinterested" and Therefore Not
Eligible to Be Examiner at 2-6, In re Revco D.S., Ins. (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 22, 1990) (Nos.
588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761 through 588-1812, and 588-1820).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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IV. CONFLICT RULES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The Business Bankruptcy Ethics Committee has been reviewing and
commenting on proposed drafts of the evolving Restatement for some time.
Professor Tom Morgan, the Reporter for the Conflicts Chapter of the
Restatement,was first alerted to the interest of the Business Bankruptcy Ethics
Committee in 1991. Another Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee," 3 under the leadership of its chair, David A. Murdoch, joined the
effort in 1993. The Committees held joint panel discussions in Orlando in
October of 1993 and Washington, D.C. in April of 1994 to review portions of
the Restatementof particular interest to the Subcommittees. Professor Morgan
was informed of the concerns of the Subcommittees through papers prepared
for the Orlando and Washington, D.C. panels on which Professor Morgan
participated.
The Orlando paper set forth specific issues.
The Ethics Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy Committee of the
American Bar Association urges that specific reference be made in the
Restatement to (1) the ability of an attorney to file a bankruptcy petition
when the attorney's law firm presently represents one or more creditors or
equity security holders on unrelated matters; (2) the ability of an attorney
to represent a debtor-in-possession in a bankruptcy reorganization case and
also represent persons and entities affiliated with that debtor; (3) the
circumstances in which an attorney's connections with the debtor result in
material adversity, apart from the disinterestedness rule; (4) the impact of
the fact that a debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary on the fiduciary duties of
counsel for the debtor-in-possession and liability to non-clients; (5) the
impact of the appointment of a trustee on the "control" of the attorneyclient privilege; and (6) whistle blowing in bankruptcy cases. The timing
of seeking any waivers from other clients on the first issue and the ability
374
ofthe affiliates to provide waivers on the second issue should also be addressed.

373. The Subcommittee on Committees, Trust Indentures and Claims Trading ofthe Business
Bankruptcy Committee.
374. ABA Business Bankruptcy Law Committee, Bankruptcy Ethics Subcommittee,
Restatement of the Law, The Law GoverningLawyers, Bankruptcy issues,Panel Paper Presented
at the American Law Institute Conference in Orlando, Florida 2 (1993) (on file with author).
In a bankruptcy context, a distinction should be recognized between (1) objecting
to a creditor's claim or pursuing an adversary proceeding or otherwise taking a
position directly adverse to the unique interest of a creditor client, e.g. with respect
to use of the security for its claim or its contract rights, and (2) taking positions on
matters generally affecting all creditors and parties in interest in a bankruptcy case
adverse to the position a creditor client might take, e.g. with respect to a sale of estate
assets.
Further, guidance should be offered as to when the mere filing of a bankruptcy
petition may materially and adversely affect existing clients ofthe attorney's law firm.
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The Washington paper set forth the joint opposition of the Committees to
section 73 of the Restatement to the American Law Institute at its annual
meeting in 1994.
We would like to bring to the attention of the members of the
American Law Institute an additional concern. Section 73 attempts to
restate the law of duties to non-clients. Paragraph (3) thereof provides that
a lawyer owes the duty to use care to someone other than a client "when
and to the extent that the lawyer knows that a client intends the lawyer's
services to benefit the non-client, and such a duty substantially promotes
enforcement of the lawyer's obligations to the client and would not create
inconsistent duties significantly impairing the lawyer's performance of those
obligations."
We are concerned because of the uncertain nature of the potential
liability of lawyers representing those acting in a fiduciary capacity under
the insolvency and bankruptcy laws as well as those representing financially
distressed entities. We are also troubled by the potentially large number of
claimants. Section 73 contains no discussion of the duty, if any, of a
lawyer representing such fiduciaries or those in control of a financially
distressed entity not involved in a case under the Bankruptcy Code or an
insolvency proceeding. A duty to a non-client may be appropriate if the
fiduciary is a trustee of a common law trust, where the rules are relatively
straight forward and well established. But it is much less certain that there
should be a duty to a non-client on the part of a lawyer representing a
bankruptcy trustee, examiner, creditors committee, or those in control of a
debtor-in-possession. This is compounded by the uncertainty of the
fiduciary duties of those represented. 7 5

The subcommittee proposes that such a determination will turn on the size of the
claim or stake in the bankruptcy case, measured from the perspective of both the
debtor and the creditor, and the intended treatment of the claim or equity stake, if
known.- Thus, the firm's representation of a creditor on an unrelated matter, where
the creditor holds a claim that is relatively small, or representation on an unrelated
matter of the holder of a small percent of the equity interests in a publicly traded
debtor company, or representation on an unrelated matter of a creditor whose rights
the debtor does not intend to impair (e.g. through prompt assumption and continued
performance of the parties' contract) would not preclude representation of the
bankruptcy debtor without obtaining the creditor client's consent.
The attorney undertaking such debtorrepresentation should plan on and seek court
approval for separate counsel to handle litigation of objections to a creditor client's
claim, pursuit of any adversary proceeding, or otherwise seeking to determine any
position directly adverse to the unique interest of a creditor client, should any such
matters arise during the case.
Id. at 3-4.
375. Memorandum from Gerald K. Smith and David A. Murdoch, Chairs of the Ethics
Subcommittee and Subcommittee on Committees, Trust Indentures and Claims Trading of the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5

90

Smith: Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization C
1997] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN WORKOUTS AND REORGANIZATIONS

883

Others found section 73 troublesome as well, including ALAS. The section
was recommitted to the Reporters and eventually resubmitted to the Council
and approved in a less troublesome form. 7
Although the joint opposition primarily concerned section 73, general
concerns about the treatment of a bankruptcy case were also expressed.

Business Bankruptcy Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association, to
Professor Charles W. Wolfram, Reporter for Restatement (Third) of the Law GoverningLawyers
2-3 (May 11, 1994) (on file with author).
376.
For the purposes of liability under § 71, a lawyer owes a duty to
use care within the meaning of § 74:
(1) to a prospective client, as stated in § 27;
(2) to a non-client when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's
acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the non-client
to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other
legal services, and the non-client so relies, and
(b) the non-client is not,under applicable tort
law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection;
(3) to a non-client when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary
objectives of the representation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient; and
(b) such a duty would not significantly
impair the lawyer's performance of obligations to the
client, and the absence of such a duty would make
enforcement of those obligations unlikely;
(4) to a non-client when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor,
or fiduciary acting primarily to perform similar functions for the
non-client;
(b) circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that
appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary with respect to a matter within
the scope of the representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary
duty owed by the client to the non-client, where (i) the breach is a crime or
fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) the non-client is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of
the lawyer's obligations to the client; and
[(5) to a non-client when and to the extent that circumstances
know to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate action by the
lawyer is necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of
the representation to prevent the client from committing a crime
imminently threatening to cause death or serious bodily injury to
an identifiable person who is unaware of the risk and the lawyer's
act has facilitated the crime].
RESTATEmENT (THmD) oF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
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[O]ne fails to find any reference to or analysis of the rules in the context
of an insolvency or bankruptcy case. There is a substantial and rapidly
developing body of law concerning not only trustees, examiners, debtors-inpossession and members of creditors committees, but also counsel for such
persons. This body of law has not been referred to and presumably has not
been considered in the formulation of the rules, comments and illustrations.
Simply by way of example, Section 209 of Tentative Draft No. 3, absent
consent, precludes a lawyer in civil litigation from representing one client
against another client currently represented by the lawyer, whether or not
the matters are related. If the initiation of a bankruptcy case is the
initiation of civil litigation, this rule would preclude a lawyer from filing
the bankruptcy case for a person any one of whose creditors or equity
owners are existing clients of the lawyer. That may very well be the rule,
but there is nothing in the Restatement that suggests that this very
significant issue to those involved in insolvency and bankruptcy practice
has been considered.
For several years the Ethics Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee studied the Bankruptcy Code requirement that counsel for a
debtor-in-possession be disinterested. Disinterestedness is a defined term
under the Bankruptcy Code which came into the bankruptcy law with the
enactment of Chapter X. However, that requirement was not imposed on
counsel for a debtor-in-possession in a Chapter X case. It was the
Subcommittee's conclusion that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
mistakenly imposed such a requirement on counsel for the debtor-inpossession in a Chapter 11 case. As a result of this study and the
recommendation of the Ethics Subcommittee, the American Bar Association'
House of Delegates in 1991 recommended that Congress remove this
requirement from the Bankruptcy Code. Legislation to that effect has not
been introduced and it is doubtful that it will be. Nonetheless, the
disinterestedness requirement raises a variety of concerns, some of which
could be addressed in the commentary and illustrations of the Restatement.
For example, it would be of great help if the reporters could furnish
commentary and illustrations as to the meaning of one of the elements of
disinterestedness, that is, that the lawyer not have or represent a "materially
adverse interest." It would also be helpful if there could be an analysis and
discussion of the similar requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), that those
employed "not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate." That
was a requirement under the Bankruptcy Act which was superseded as to
Chapter X reorganization cases after the effective date of the Chandler Act
Amendments. By way of example, it would be very helpful if the reporters
would study, analyze and comment on permissible and impermissible
representation of affiliated entities in multiple bankruptcy cases. Similarly,
the helpful explanation of what is a conflict in Section 201 could be of
considerable assistance to insolvency and bankruptcy lawyers if comments
and illustrations considered the rules in the context of insolvencies and
bankruptcies.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss4/5
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It once was true that insolvency and bankruptcy were arcane matters
that could be ignored. But that is no longer so. As early as 1973, the
considerable expansion of these matters was recognized in the dissent of
Justice Douglas from the order of the Supreme Court of the United States
promulgating the rules and official bankruptcy forms. "I once knew most
of the referees in the Nation and worked with them on various projects.
But they too flourish under Parkinson's Law; and their power grows like
that of a prince in a medieval kingdom." In this day of reorganizations of
large, publicly held companies like Texaco, Johns-Manville and Continental
Airlines, as well as cross-border insolvencies involving large multinational
companies, it is submitted that insolvency and bankruptcy matters are
sufficiently important and affect and touch a sufficient number of lawyers
to warrant some attention. It is therefore recommended that a group of
lawyers skilled in insolvency and bankruptcy matters be consulted
concerning these issues. Rules appropriate for wills and common law trusts
may be appropriate for insolvencies and bankruptcies, but someone should
so conclude after a thoughtful analysis.
It is respectfully requested that the American Law Institute direct the
reporters to specifically consider the impact of the proposed rules on
insolvency and bankruptcy practice as well as the representation of those
in control of financially distressed entities.377
The Business Bankruptcy Ethics Committee presented a panel discussion
for the Business Section of the American Bar Association at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association in August of 1995. Participants
included Professor Charles W. Wolfram, Reporter for the Restatement, and
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Director of the American Law Institute
and the Reporter for the ABA Model Rules Project. 37 The papers presented
reviewed the current Restatement draft of conflicts rules and questions were
raised as to how these rules applied in reorganization cases. Participants
suggested that bankruptcy did not fit the model of bilateral civil litigation.
Bankruptcy reorganization represents a hybrid of administration and
litigation. Should the civil litigation conflict rules or the non-litigation

377. Memorandum from Gerald K. Smith and David A. Murdoch, Chairs of the Ethics
Subcommittee and Subcommittee on Committees, Trust Indentures and Claims Trading of the
Business Bankruptcy Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association, to
Professor Charles W. Wolfram, Reporter for Restatement (Third) of the Law GoverningLawyers

3-6 (May 11, 1994) (on file with author).
378. The Ethics Subcommittee was represented by its then Reporter, Susan M. Freeman, its
then Vice Chair, Mitchell A. Seider, and one of its members, Jeffrey C. Krause. The papers
prepared for the panel discussion by the members of the Subcommittee dealt with conflicts of
interest, potential liability of counsel for the debtor-in-possession and when it is permissible to
divulge confidential information in bankruptcy cases. Professor Hazard also prepared a paper

outlining the obligations of counsel for a debtor in bankruptcy.
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conflict rules apply to counsel proposing to file a bankruptcy petition?
What is a conflict? The goal of reorganization is better treatment for
creditors and equity holders than would be available upon a liquidation of
assets. The interests of creditors, equity and the debtor are in principle
aligned as to that goal. But the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition hinders
the ability of creditors to collect their debts, and enables the debtor to reject
outstanding contracts and to recapitalize in a manner which may drastically
affect equity security holders. Alliances between debtor management,
creditor and equity may vary issue by issue during the case.379

In 1995, the NBC was heard from. Earlier that year, the chair of the NBC
directed its Ethics Committee to review ethical rules governing lawyers in
bankruptcy cases. In a communication on behalf of the NBC to Professor
Wolfram in October of 1995, concern was expressed as to "whether a lawyer
representing creditors, stockholders or owners of a debtor in unrelated matters
can represent the debtor or other creditors, stockholders or partners in
connection with a bankruptcy case"38 under the conflict provisions of the
Restatement. It was pointed out that the limited discussion of bankruptcy
matters in Chapter 8 of the Restatement suggested that a bankruptcy case is a
variety of civil litigation. If that is so, did the Reporters intend to preclude a
lawyer "from filing a bankruptcy case, assuming no consent, if a creditor,
partner or stockholder of the debtor is a client of the lawyer as to unrelated
matters?"38 '
Professor Wolfram's response of November 21 and his
subsequent letters of November 27 and December 6, 1995 made it clear that
Professor Wolfram viewed the filing of a bankruptcy case as the
commencement of civil litigation.
The NBC held its spring meeting in March of 1996. At that meeting, the
Conference directed its Committee on Professional Responsibility to continue
discussions with the Reporters and Director Hazard and to urge
that Chapter 8 of the Restatement be clarified to make clear that conflict of
interest principles designed to address non-bankruptcy "civil litigation",
such as those contained in Section 209, should not automatically be applied
to the entirety of a bankruptcy case. While the conflict of interest
principles applicable to civil litigation may properly be applied to an
adversary proceeding or contested matter where the debtor, trustee or

379. Geoffirey C.Hazard, Jr. et al., Restatement of the Law Governing(Bankruptcy)LawyersBankruptcy Concerns Raised by the Draft American Law Institute Restatement of the Law
GoverningLawyers,paper presented by the Business Section Panel at the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association (Aug. 1995).
380. Letter from Gerald K. Smith to Professor Charles W. Wolfram I (Oct. 18, 1995) (on file
with author).
381. Id.
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creditors' committee is asserting or defending against a claim, it should not
be presumed that bankruptcy counsel is materially adverse to individual
stakeholders with regard to other matters in the case. The appropriate
section of the Restatement under which such other matters should be tested
is Section 201, which requires a determination of the actual risk of material
adversity?"
Professor Wolfram responded that:

We addressed the bankruptcy issues under § 209 in its Comment d(iii) on
pages 662-63 of Proposed Final Draft No. 1. We there specifically refer
to the fact that the context of multi-party litigation such as bankruptcy must
be examined before assessing whether a conflict exists. That seems to be
the same point made in the position paper. I'm curious to know in what
way the two positions don't agree. The position paper is, of course, far
more elaborate (although it remains at a very high level of generality), but
our effort in the Proposed 3Final
Draft has been to avoid getting into great
83
detail on any practice area.
In a Memorandum of May 2, 1996 NBC Conferee Donald S. Bernstein
suggested additional commentary.
I have looked at comment d(iii) to Section 209 of the Restatement
(referred to by Wolfram in his letter to you). If I understand the comment
d correctly, the whole comment relates only to determining whether there
is a conflict when simultaneously representing in a single litigation multiple
clients "nominally on the same side." It appears to me that the issues we
have raised are really more like the issues raised in comment e ("Suing
present client in unrelated matter.")
Because of the oversimplified "plaintiff vs. defendant' model of "civil
litigation", this comment does not address civil cases which, like
bankruptcy, where parties who are adverse as to some issues are not
materially adverse with respect to numerous others.
Perhaps we should suggest a new comment e(i):
e(i). ProceedingsInvolving Multiple Partiesin Disparate
Controversies. Certain types of civil proceedings, such as
bankruptcy cases, may involve multiple parties and multiple
disputes. While Section 209 (2) addresses the lawyer's role in
asserting or defending against a claim made by one client against

382. Memorandum from the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the National
Bankruptcy Conference to Professor Charles W.Wolfram 4 (Apr. 18, 1996) (on file with author).
383. Letter from Professor Charles W.Wolfram to Gerald K. Smith (Apr. 24, 1996) (on file
with author).
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another in the context of such a proceeding, a lawyer is not
disqualified from representation of a client in such a proceeding
with respect
to other matters where material adversity does not
3 4
exist. 1

At the same time, Susan M. Freeman suggested to Professor Wolfram a
specific amendment to comment d(iii) to section 209 of the Restatement and
the Reporter's Note to Professor Wolfram:
d(ii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all possibly differing
interests of co-clients in complex and multi-party litigation involve material
interests creating conflict. Determination whether a conflict of material
interests exists requires careful attention to the context and other
circumstances of the representation and in general should be based on
whether (1) issues common to the clients' interests predominate, (2)
circumstances such as the size of each client's interest make separate

384. Memorandum from Mr. Bernstein. to Gerald K. Smith (May 2, 1996) (on file with
author). Subsequently, Mr. Bernstein articulated additional reasons why he believed the
bankruptcy case as a whole should not be subject to the bilateral litigation rule:
I do not see the bright line distinction between the pre and post-filing period...
In business reorganization (chapter 11) cases, most of the disputes between clients
will be the same ones that existed prior to bankruptcy in the context of efforts to
restructure out of court: are the claims valid, are the liens good, how should the
company's debt be scaled back, how much equity should the old equity holders retain.
Although after the filing the court will be involved in determining whether these
disputes give rise to a conflict (because the court must approve retention of counsel
by the DIP), from the lawyer's perspective, the potential disputes have not, in the
main, changed.
This leads me to ask why, if the treatment of creditors is still the subject of
negotiation rather than litigation, the ground rules should change by virtue of the fact
that the debtor comes under court supervision by filing a petition. One might take the
view, instead, that if the per se civil litigation rule did not apply to pre-bankruptcy
situation, the fact of the filing should not change this unless and until the issues
between the parties degenerate into litigated disputes in the case. Prior to that
time-and in the pre-filing context as well--the general rules stated in Sections 201
and 209(1) should apply. There may well be a conflict, but it is not generated by the
pendency of the bankruptcy case. It is generated, if at all, because the parties are on
opposite sides of the table trying to resolve disputes in a negotiated restructuring.
Maybe we haven't been clear on this point because it is so intuitive to those of
us in bankruptcy practice: most chapter 11 cases are in the eyes of bankruptcy
practitioners continuationof an out of court restructuringtransaction.The fact that

a bankruptcy proceeding has been commenced does not mean, at least to the
bankruptcy lawyer, that all aspects of the relations between the parties have become
the subject of litigation.
Memorandum from Donald S. Bernstein to Professor Charles Wolfram 1-2 (Oct. 3, 1996) (on file
with author).
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representation impracticable, and (3) the extent of active judicial
supervision of the representation. Further,the fact that one client merely
holds a claim against the other client in a judicial proceeding is not
"assertion" of a claim for conflict purposes. A claim is "asserted" or
"defended" when a dispute concerningthe claim is resolved For example,
a lawyer might represent several unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding. In addition to general conflict of interest rules that may apply,
a lawyer representing such multiple clients must also comply with statutory
regulations if more stringent.
...
[comment continues with discussion of class actions]
REPORTER'S NOTE Comment d(iii). Add a citation to In re Amdura,
121 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) and 139 B.R. 963 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1992) after In re Aircraft
Instrument & Dev., Inc., 151 B.R. 939, 943-44
3
15
1993).
Kan.
D.
(Bankr.
Ms. Freeman's explanation for the proposed changes focused on what she
believed was the Reporter's position:
"[A]sserting" and "defending" a claim for conflict purposes means litigating
over the claim. Merely holding or filing a claim is not deemed "asserting"
it. This matters.
As the Restatement comment properly notes, resolution of conflicts in
bankruptcy depends on the interpretation of bankruptcy statutes and rules
in addition to lawyer code provisions and judicial decisions. The
Bankruptcy Code does not prevent all representation of debtors in
possession and trustees when the lawyer's firm represents a creditor. 11
U.S.C. § 327(c). In some circumstances, the creditor may hold such a
minimal interest that representation of the debtor or trustee would not "be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to [the creditor]
client in the matter," in the words of Restatement § 209. However, if the
mere holding or filing of a claim or interest is considered "asserting" it,
under the Restatement prospective counsel for a debtor or trustee still must
obtain the informed consent of each creditor client before he can take on
the debtor or trustee representation. The same would be true for
representing a defendant in a class action context, where firm clients are
likely class members. This may be extremely impractical in a large case,
especially since Restatement § 202 comment c states that the requirement
of consent generally requires an affirmative response by each client, and
that counsel cannot just assume consent from client acquiescence.
The size of the claim by the creditor client is a factor in determining
whether there is a substantial risk of material adversity in a bankruptcy
case, wholly apart from whether separate representation is impracticable.

385. Draft Accompanying Letter from Susan M. Freeman to Professor Charles W. Wolfram
I (May 3, 1996) (on file with author).
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Thus, the phrase in the comment about the size "mak[ing] separate
representation impracticable" should be deleted. Second, a citation to the
Amdura case would be useful, since it discusses at length the application of
Restatement criteria to a single law firm's representation of a debtor in
possession and a creditor, while the Aircraft Instrument & Development
case cited for that issue concerns an accounting firm instead of a law firm,
and includes a discussion of lawyer restrictions on conflicts being
inapplicable to accountants.
Finally, the reporters' understanding about the meaning of "asserting"
a claim should be expressly set forth, since courts and attorneys could
reasonably understand that a creditor client's invoices or letters demanding
payment or filing of a proof of claim would be "asserting" a claim. If
"assertion" and "defense" of a claim instead means litigation of the claim,
the intent of the Restatement provision would be met in the bankruptcy
context. A law firm could not litigate against a present client in a
courtroom dispute without its informed consent, no matter how small the
claim. Absent claim litigation, however, whether counsel could represent
a debtor in possession or trustee and, on unrelated matters, creditors or
other parties in interest, would depend on whether there was a substantial
risk that representation of one would be materially and adversely affected
by the lawyer's duties to the other in the case.3 86
Professor Wolfram immediately responded with a proposed text for the
first paragraph of Section 209, comment d(iii), based on Ms. Freeman's draft
and earlier suggestions of Professor Wolfram.
d(iii). Complex and multi-party litigation. Not all possibly differing
interests of co-clients in complex and multi-party litigation involve material
interests creating conflict. Determination whether a conflict of material
interests exists requires careful attention to the context and other
circumstances of the representation and in general should be based on
whether (1) issues common to the clients' interests predominate, (2)
circumstances such as the size of each client's interest, and (3) the extent
of active judicial supervision of the representation. For example, in a
bankruptcy proceeding, the fact that one client holds a claim against
another client is not necessarily "assertion" of a claim for conflict
purposes. A claim is "asserted"or "defended" when a dispute concerning
the claim is involved On the other hand, when there is no substantial
likelihoodthat the proceedingwill devolve from administrationof the estate
into contestedproceedings between two or more clients, no adversity is
ordinarilyinvolved as between the clients and hence no conflict of interest
is present. In addition to general conflict of interest rules that may apply,

386. Id. at 1-2.
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a lawyer representing such multiple
clients must also comply with statutory
87
regulations if more stringent
Several drafting matters were then considered, along with a substantive
point raised by Mr. Bernstein.38 A final draft of agreed amendments to the
Commentary to section 209 was achieved on May 9, 1996:
Amendment No. 1-§ 209, Comment c
(1) Change the heading of present Comment c (Proposed Final Draft,
page 659) to read as follows: c(i) Clients aligned in opposition to each
other-in general.
(2) Add a new Comment c(i) at the end of the present Comment c
(Proposed Final Draft, page 660), to read as follows:
c(ii). Opposing client in multi-party litigation. Certain
types of civil proceedings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve
multiple parties and multiple disputes. The fact that one client
holds a monetary claim against another client in a bankruptcy
proceeding is not necessarily "assertion" of a claim for purposes of
this Section. A claim is "asserted" or "defended" when a dispute
concerning the claim is involved. When there is no substantial
likelihood that the proceeding will devolve from administration of
the estate into contested proceedings between two or more clients,
no conflict of interest under this Section is ordinarily present as
between the clients. Further, a discrete conflict between two
clients, such as a dispute over the validity of a claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding, may not disqualify a lawyer from

387. Letter from Professor Charles W. Wolfram to Susan M. Freeman (May 3, 1996) (on file
with author). The suggested language "when there is no substantial likelihood that the proceeding
will devolve from administration of the estate into contested proceedings between two or more
clients, no adversity is ordinarily involved as between the clients and hence no conflict of interest
is present," came from Director Hazard. See Letter from Professor Charles W. Wolfram to Gerald
K. Smith (May 3, 1996) (on file with author).
388. See Memorandum from Susan M. Freeman to Professor Charles W. Wolfram (May 6,
1996) (on file with author).
I sent Don Bernstein your Friday letter to me for his review. He appropriately
points out that in bankruptcy cases, courts may allow counsel to represent a debtor in
possession even when there is a known conflict with an existing creditor client. The
court may simply have other special counsel (authorized under § 327(e)) or committee
counsel handle that portion of the case. The Amdura case I referred you to addresses
a proposal to do precisely that. The court held in that case that the creditor client's
role in the case was so pervasive and critical that special counsel wouldn't work. In
other cases, it will work. E.g. In re Blinder,Robinson & Co., 131 B.R. 872, 880 (D.
Colo. 1991); In re Lee Way Holding Co., 102 B.R. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1988). The court
will lookto the materiality of the conflict from the perspective of the case as a whole.
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representing one client with respect to aspects of the case not
involving the dispute between the clients. In addition to general
conflict rules that may apply, a lawyer must also comply with
statutory regulations if more stringent, such as provisions of the
bankruptcy code.
Amendment No. 2-§ 209, Comment d(ii)
Amend the first paragraph of § 209, Comment d(ii) (Proposed Final Draft,
page 662) to read as follows:
d(iiO. Complex and multi-partylitigation. Not all possibly
differing interests of co-client in complex and multi-party litigation
involve material interests creating conflict. Determination whether
a conflict of material interests exists requires careful attention to the
context and other circumstances of the representation and in general
should be based on whether (1) issues common to the clients'
interests predominate, (2) circumstances such as the size of each
client's interest, and (3) the extent of active judicial supervision of
the representation. Among other considerations, assessment of the
existence of a conflict should take into account the requirements of
materiality (see § 201 & Comment c(ii) thereof) and substantial
risk (see id & Comment c(iii) thereto) of conflict. In addition to
general conflict of interest rules that may apply, a lawyer
representing such multiple clients must also comply with statutory
regulations if more stringent. 8 9
Unanticipated opposition to the proposed amendments was voiced by
Judge Caroline D. King at the annual meeting of The American Law
Institute.?"0
Judge Carolyn Dineen King (Tex.): Yes. I think, if I understand this
correctly, that I do object. You will note that § 209 is broken down into
Subsection (1) and Subsection (2), Subsection (1) precluding the
representation where you "represent two or more clients ... if there is a
substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one of the clients would
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to another
client" and Subsection (2) dealing with representing "one client in asserting
or defending a claim against another client.., represented by the lawyer."

389. Proposed Text of Amendments Accompanying Memorandum from Professor Charles
Wolfram to Gerald K. Smith, Susan M. Freeman, and Donald S.Bernstein (May 9, 1996) (on file
with author).
390. A member of the American Law Institute's Council and Judge on the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and next in line to be the Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit.
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Now, if you take a look at the language that is proposed in this
amendment, it starts out as if it were addressing Subsection (2). It says
"The fact that one client holds a monetary claim against another client in
a bankruptcy proceeding is not necessarily 'assertion' of a claim .... "
And then it says, "A claim is 'asserted' or 'defended' when a dispute
concerning the claim is involved," and that looks as if it is addressing the
second part of this § 209. But then it goes on to say where "there is no
substantial likelihood that the proceeding will devolve from administration
of the estate into contested proceedings between two or more clients, no
conflict of interest under this Section is ordinarily presented," which of
course takes Subsection (1) out of play also. So I am not altogether sure
that was intended, but that is the effect of it. I know that the bankruptcy
lawyers have assiduously pursued the proposition that they would like to be
carved out of this Restatement, and we have, I think quite properly, resisted
that, and I hope we will to our dying day. But I believe that, with the way
this has been drafted, they have been carved out.
And the next sentence doesn't give me any more comfort because it
says, "a discrete conflict between two clients, such as a dispute over the
validity of a claim. . . ,may not disqualify a lawyer from representing one
client with respect to aspects of the case not involving the dispute between
the clients."
I would like to make the point here that there is a fundamental problem
with what we are doing here, and that is there are two ways in which a
claim can be adversely affected in a bankruptcy proceeding. One is at the
end of the day, so to speak, when we will adjudicate, most often at the end
of the day, whether it is valid, whether it is secured, whether it is
subordinated, and so on, all right, and you can be killed if you are a
claimant at the end of the day. But you can be equally as dead by virtue
of the way that claim is treated under the plan. And you draw a distinction
in your language here between the administration of the case, which sounds
like sort of bookkeeping but is in fact where the heavy lifting is done in a
bankruptcy case. So my suggestion is that it is naive, I think it looks naive,
to buy into this distinction.39'
The following colloquy then took place between Professor Hazard and
Judge King:
Director Hazard: Well, I mean if you say once bankruptcy is filed,
then you have to treat it as though all claimant positions are hostile in a
disqualifying sense to the debtor.
Judge King: Right.

391. Transcript of Debate over Amendments to Section 209 of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, in 73 A.L.I.
PROc. 389 (1996).
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Director Hazard: Is that the position you would take? So that, if you
represent anybody who is a claimant, you cannot represent the debtor?
Judge King: I think that that isDirector Hazard: That is the crunch that they are worried about.
Judge King: I know. I know that is the crunch. Let me say that is
the crunch they are in today, all right.
Director Hazard: I understand.
Judge King: So we have now what I think the bankruptcy lawyers
view as an opportunity to get out of the crunch that they are currently in,
and I would say let's be very careful about that.
Director Hazard: Well, I agree with that, but I have to say the word
"administration" was my word, and I take responsibility for it. I had in
mind that there are lots of bankruptcies where it is to a large extent a
bookkeeping matter, . . . but the question is, is there a way you can
describe a stage prior to, how shall we say, a prelitigation or a precrunched
stage where you would feel more comfortable saying, "Well, you can go
that far but you've got to stop." I am questioning do we have any words
that can describe the boundary?
Judge King: I don't at this point. I think the thing needs to be
rethought. I mean, I really think it needs to be recommitted. The problem
is that in many prepacks all of this stuff gets worked out ahead of time, but
those present their own problems, too. I think that may be what you are
392
talking about.
Professor Wolfram joined in.
Professor Wolfram: Judge, at least as I understand it - but I will let
the bankruptcy people, if there are any here, speak for themselves, - it was
a sub (2) problem, their problem. They simply didn't want to be in the
position of being tagged with the sub (2) disqualification, even though they
were clean under sub (1), just because bankruptcy is thought to be
adjudication, and that was the point of treating it as administration
devolving into dispute.
Professor Wolfram: But as I understand it, your problem is that when
you prepackage things, for example, the negotiation that goes into that is
where the hostility is.
Judge King: That's right.
Professor Wolfram: The fact that it is all sweetness and light by the
time it comes to court doesn't mean there was never a conflict.
Judge King: That's right.

392. Id. at 391.
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Professor Wolfram: I quite agree with that, but I wonder whether that
isn't a sub (1) problem and adequately covered by sub (1).
Judge King: I am really not sure, because when you have a claim in
one of these proceedings, the question that you have is it plays out in such
ways that you can't see vis-a-vis the way in which the debtor is
administered, the way in which the plan is confected ....
Professor Wolfram: Well, I see the problem, and I think I take your
point, that it might be well if we went back to possibly a larger group in
which you would be included - if I may suggest that - to negotiate this
further. But I think that, under sub (1), the kind of problem that you are
worrying about could be dealt with. Possibly it can't be dealt with in a
way that judges would want it dealt with, that is to say, to have bright-line
rules disqualifying. It is really a rule that permits the unwinding of the
representation later with inspection into whether it in fact has been
appropriate in terms of adverse impact on the lawyer's representation, and
it could be that simply referring, for example, as the Comment does in the
last sentence here, to superadded requirements under the bankruptcy statute
that might require a heightened duty, also has to be observed as insufficient.
Judge King: May I respond to that? I mean in my court, if someone
asks you a question from up there, you get to respond; I don't know if that
is how it works here. (Laughter) Even when the red light is on, you get
to answer the question, and they generally say, "But only one sentence."
You have in here this reference to complying with more stringent
statutory requirements, but you understand, of course, that the statute
operates in significant part, not exclusively but in significant part, by
incorporating the state conflict-of-interest rules. So when you do this, when
you do whatever you do here, you need to understand that it will de facto
amend the bankruptcy law. Okay?
Ms. Susan M. Freeman (Ariz.):
The Bankruptcy Code in § 327(c) says that you are not disqualified from
representing the debtor because your firm represents a creditor. That is not per
se a disqualification, and the Bankruptcy Code specifically authorizes special
counsel to come in and handle matters in a case that the attorney for the trustee
or the attorney for the debtor cannot handle. This provision is intended to deal,
you are correct, Professor Wolfram, with Subsection (2), in saying that the mere
fact that a client in your office has a claim is not enough to disqualify you from
representing the debtor or the trustee. The question is, is there going to be a
dispute involving that claim, whether it is a dispute over the validity of the claim
or a dispute over treatment of the claim under the plan, but those kinds of
disputes you could not handle on behalf of the debtor.
And then you get to the question of, well, can you still represent the
debtor if there are other claimants out there, if there is a possibility of a
dispute with an existing client of your office? And then it comes down to
the fact that you can depending on other rules, the Subsection (1) rules,
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§ 201, where there is not a likelihood that there is going to be a significant
contest, thenMr. Sheldon H. Elsen (N.Y.): I think the Director has put his finger
on it. This ought to go back for more work. I speak as a nonbankruptcy
lawyer who has been involved in these situations, and I think that Geoff
alluded to the fact that there are institutional problems that this is intended
to solve. In a large city like New York, with giant bankruptcies involving
big-board companies, a situation where law firms that represent creditors,
such as the major banks, would be barred from representing debtors-inpossession would be bad public policy, because these firms accumulate a
high degree of expertise and skill in dealing with the problems of public
companies and complex accounting and other financial problems and
society, would simply be harmed if their skills could not be made available
to debtors because they represent the banks.
On the other hand, these firms have, in the better situations, when the
actual litigation has arisen, referred the case to special counsel. I think
what Judge King is pointing to in the Leslie Fay case is a situation where
that firm would have probably done better to have done some referrals
earlier in the game, but I know the firm in question has solved that in other
situations. It is immensely complex, and I do think the Director is right.
It ought to go back for some further working, but I don't think you ought
to throw the baby out with the bath water. The institutional solution here
is socially desirable.
Mr. Brian Redding (Il.): 'I have great sympathy with the practical
problems that Ms. Freeman articulated and also with Judge King's
comments. Having wrestled with this a bit, one of the things I might
suggest that the Reporters might think about if, as seems likely, they are
going to do more work on it, is the consent problem. When I talk to
bankruptcy lawyers one of the enormous problems here is the practical
problem of getting consent from a huge number of clients of your law firm
who are representing creditors, and, in the short run, sometimes in some
courts the bankruptcy judge can be of assistance on that. I think maybe,
as you discourse with the bankruptcy folks, maybe you ought to think about
whether there isn't a way to help solve the problem by relaxing consent in
terms of doing consent through the court rather than the kind of consent
that we are all used to, individualized consent with individualized contact
back and forth through a client list that may include 75 or 100 or 200
creditors in a given bankruptcy.
Vice President Traynor: Do the Reporters wish to respond briefly?
Professor Wolfram: I think I am sympathetic to the motion, which I
understand to be a motion to recommit for further consideration, but I don't
wish to withdraw the matter from the floor. We are on the tipping point
of a vote which I think is inevitable in any event.
Vice President Traynor: Judge King, do you wish to take a minute
to respond?
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Judge Carolyn Dineen King (Tex.): I think recommitting this is the
thing to do. I am very sympathetic to the problem, and I want very badly
to see this problem taken hold of by the horns and fixed. I think Mr.
Redding's comments go right to it, but I don't want to see something like
this. I would rather see us tackle the whole thing head on instead of trying
to do something like this, so I think recommitting it is what I would
espouse 93
Judge King's opposition doomed the proposed amendments and resulted in the
recommittal of section 209.
As a result of discussions and correspondence among those concerned,
including Judge King, Council Draft No. 13 reflects changes to the commentary
to section 209.
c(). Opposing clients in multi-party litigation. Certain types of civil
proceedings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve multiple parties and
disputes. There is substantial disagreement whether various bankruptcy
proceedings should be considered under Subsection (2). Tribunals must
resolve such questions in light of a body of decisions developed in the
specific context of bankruptcy, and often the issues are controlled by
statute. The context involves transformation of a business relationship into
one that is at least in part controlled by different principles and rules, some
of them of a fiduciary nature. The Restatement takes no position on the
applicability of Subsection (2) in the many situations that may arise in
bankruptcy. However, "asserting or defending a claim" within the meaning
of the Subsection refers to a dispute about the claim and not merely holding
or filing a claim as to which there is no reasonable likelihood of dispute.
In all such situations the lawyer must comply with Subsection (1) and
Section 201 generally, both before and after the filing of a formal
proceeding. For example, two or more present clients of a lawyer or law
firm may be involved in contentious negotiations about such issues as the
validity, amount, or priority of claims, the voidability of a pre-bankruptcy
transfer, or the nature of a claim as secured or unsecured. Whether a
conflict exists in such multiple representations must be analyzed under
Subsection (1) (see also § 211). In addition to general conflict rules that
may apply, a lawyer must also comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements if more stringent, such as applicable provisions of the
bankruptcy code.
A dispute between two clients-either before or after filing of a
bankruptcy proceeding-may not disqualify a lawyer from representing one
client with respect to aspects of the matter not involving that dispute. For
example, as may be true in other contexts as well, a separable disputed

393. Id. at 391-95.
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matter may be handled by one or more special counsel not affiliated with
the lawyer or law firm in question (see § 203). 9
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has an innovative way of
dealing with the work of the Commission. The Commission has obtained the
assistance of an outstanding lawyer and two outstanding law professors, 9
This has enabled the Commission to create working groups to intensively
review specific areas of concern to the Commission. One of the working
groups is the Working Group on Ethics. 96 The participants in the Working
Group have met several times"' and have recommended (1) that the standard
for employment of professionals by the debtor-in-possession should be the
predominant state rule as restated in the current draft of section 201 of the
Restatement and (2) those admitted to practice in any bankruptcy can appear
in cases in other bankruptcy courts. 9

394. Restatement (Third)of the Law GoverningLawyers (Council Draft No. 13, 1996), pp.
36-38. The Reporter's Memorandum accompanying Council Draft No. 13 stated that, after
extensive discussion and correspondence it was decided not to deal explicitly with bankruptcy.
"That field is characterized both by specific statutory limits that, at least as frequently interpreted,
apply conflict rules more exacting than those normally imposed on lawyers and that are the
subject of study for possible legislative modification." Id. at xxiii. The Memorandum went on
to summarize the substance of the revisions to Comment c(iO and c(ii) as follows:
Comment c(i). The text of the Comment is the old Comment c,
relettered, with the addition of the final two sentences. Those sentences note
that the rule of Subsection (2) applies even if the litigations are unrelated and
notes that the rule applies without the situation-specific inquiry that
Subsection (1) may in other contexts require.
Comment c(ii). The Comment is a substantially reworked version
of the amendment that was debated last May. The text has been extensively
reviewed and reworked in light of comments from several Members and a
helpful interested Council member. As will be seen, the Restatement takes
no position on the specifics of bankruptcy conflicts for the reasons indicated
above.
Id. at xxiii.
395. Reporter Elizabeth F. Warren, a Professor at Harvard University, and two senior
Advisers, Professor Lawrence P. King of New York University School of Law and Stephen H.
Case of White & Case.
396. It consists ofCommissioners Ginsberg and Butler and SeniorAdviserProfessor Lawrence
P. King. The member of the staff assigned to the Working Group is Elizabeth Holland, Esq.
397. Meetings were held July 18-19, 1996, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1996, Santa Fe,
NM, December 17, 1996, Washington, D.C., and January 22-23, 1997, Washington, D.C.
Participants included Don Bernstein, Michael Bloom, Susan M. Freeman, Bernard Shapiro and
Gerald K. Smith.
398. Memorandum from Professor Lawrence P. King and Elizabeth I. Holland to the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission (Feb. 13, 1997).
Admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of being admitted to
practice in the relevant United States District Court, should entitle an attorney, on
presentation of a certificate of admission and good standing in another district court,
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The decision to recommend the elimination of the disinterestedness
standard as to professionals employed by the debtor-in-possession was
unanimous and reached early on. And it naturally followed from this
recommendation that guidance be furnished as to disqualifying conflicts. The
definition in section 201 of the Restatement has received general acceptance
and those involved believed it should be adopted as a statutory definition of
adverse interest.
Another issue considered by the Working Group was whether the
Bankruptcy Code should adopt its own rules of professional conduct governing
lawyers appearing in bankruptcy courts which preempt state rules. The
Working Group tentatively concluded that the Bankruptcy Code should not do
so. The result would be a continued lack of uniformity. A national practice
will not be regulated by uniform, national rules as far as the important matter
of disqualifying conflicts."'
Although perhaps not constitutionally
mandated,"e the lack of uniformity is genuinely troublesome. Unfortunately,
because of the opposition of one of the members of the Commission, Judge
Jones, it appears that the Commission will not make any significant or useful
recommendations concerning conflicts.40'

to appear in the other bankruptcy court without the need for any other admission
procedure. The proposal will not affect requirements (if any) to associate with local
counsel. Similarly, the proposal will not change the requirements under state law
governing the practice of law and the maintenance of an office for the practice of law.
The proposal will only amend the local bankruptcy rule or practice requirements
governing special admission of attorneys to the bankruptcy court who are otherwise
not admitted to the bar of the district court in the district where the bankruptcy court
is located.
Id. at 1-2.
399. Also troublesome is the preliminary indication that the Commission will recommend a
national admission policy, but will not recommend that local rules requiring local counsel are
unfavorable. Although it is often essential to have local counsel, it should not be mandated.
There are many situations where local counsel is unnecessary.
400. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
enact "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id.
401. The following are excerpts from the hearing of the Commission in Detroit, Michigan,
the morning of June 19, 1997.
Hon. Hollan-Jones: All right. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I would like to restate what I think came out at our plenary discussion in May,
but I'll try to be brief.
I've written [sic] a memo on this on April 21st. I was pleased to see I got a little
bit of support at least from a letter from the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustees for
which I am grateful.
Disinterestedness is a concept that's been in the Bankruptcy Code for 60 years.
I think anybody who would seek to change it and to reflect what I consider is a
lessening or watering-down of the ethical standards for practice in the Bankruptcy
Court. At this time in our history, it bears a very heavy burden of proof and in my
view the reasons advanced for changing this standard do not bear that burden.
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I think we can all agree that there are just a few discreet problems to which this
concept of disinterestedness applies a legitimate context. One of them would seem to
be and most of these problems are taken from the August memo prepared by Professor
King and Ms. Holland.
One of those problems is that of the attorney who is also a pre-petition creditor
or perhaps a shareholder or perhaps a has some other particular role in the debtor
company. A second is the attorney who represents a small Chapter 11 company in
which the interest of the proprietor and the debtor company are basically one and it
is wholly impractical to apply strict disinterestedness and say that two different
lawyers have to be retained in that representation.
We can solve the first one without problem easily, and I've circulated a letter on
that subject, without changing the disinterestedness requirement. We would simply
modify 1107(b) to say that an attorney shall not,per se, be disqualified because he
holds or represents as nominal or insubstantial or small pre-petition unsecured debtor
equity interest in the debtor.
The second problem, that of the attorney who represents both the proprietor and
the small business is a lot tougher nut to crackand to be honest I have not found an
outright solution that yet.
What I will say about this proposal is that in doing away with the
disinterestedness standard and going with the material adverse standardwe are using
a sledge hammer to swat the fly which consists of these discreet problems. And,
indeed, the impact of doing away with disinterestedness is going to be much broader
and I do believe that the major impact of that will be to protect and assist larger firms
in the bankruptcy area who regularly represent creditors on one floor of their
operation, debtors on another floor and vulture lenders somewhere way up at the top
of the building.
There is very little justification for that permitting such dual representation to
occur. And that if you go to the material adverse interest standardit is certainly a
possibility.
The proposal defines-redefines conflicts in bankruptcy to accord with standards
set by the ALI and the ABA for transactional attorney representation. Heretofore, at
least in bankruptcy lore, attorney ethical standards have been governed by the
litigation model of ethics which says that if you represent one party to a controversy
which is in a lawsuit, you may not represent a competing party. The argument in
favor of the proposal is that, well, in bankruptcy what we really have is transactions
and people are basically doing deals to effectuate a reorganization.
The counter argument which I think is much more powerful consists of several
parts. First of all you have a debtor in possession who is a self-interested party by
definition. Not as much a fiduciary for the creditors' rights as the old Trustee under
Chapter IX] was. You need to have some party ethically mindful of the fact that this
is-the debtor in possession is a fiduciary for the creditors and not simply self-interest
for the debtor's equity and management.
Second, there is more of a litigation than a transactional cast to this kind of
representation because you have parties who are friendly--copacetic when the
bankruptcy proceeding starts out,but bankruptcy being a multi-party transaction or
dispute or whatever, their interests as one gets closer to the date of formulating a plan,
are going to come into focus more clearly and quite often will be opposed to each
other.
Well suppose you have a firm that has persuaded some judge that it can represent
the debtor on one floor and it's going to represent this creditor on the other floor, can
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The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules had considered the ABA
House

of Delegate Resolution and materials

prepared by the Ethics

Subcommittee of the Business Bankruptcy Committee and concluded that
substantive changes were proposed which were outside the authority of the
Committee. Nothing further happened until the Spring of 1995, when Judge
Paul Mannes, the then Chair of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules,
created a Subcommittee on Ethics and Disclosure. 2 The name of the

anyone really say that that firm is going to be single-minded pursuing the interest of
either client throughout the bankruptcy? I think the answer suggests itself. Leslie Fay
I think is the perfect example of where perhaps good intentions were totally awry.
Where the debtors' counsel thought they could represent two of these accountants who
were being investigated in a separate matter, and guess what, it didn't work and they
ended up concealing material information from the creditors and potentially depriving
their client of some valuable claims.
So I really don't think that watering-down disinterestedness when it leads to this
kind of possibility is a very good think to do. I think it's highly imprudent to suggest
it to Congress when lawyers and the ethics we practice are currently under attack
generally speaking. And on the other hand,I do think of narrower proposal, at least
solves one of the major problems and I'm open for discussion about solving the other
problem. Perhaps through the context of our small business bankruptcy proposal.
Prof. King: I just want to add that just focusing on the disinterestedness proposal
itself, it really does not change or is meant to change 60 years of practice. Because
under the former act, if we look at Chapter [XI], there was no disinterestedness
requirement for an attorney for a debtor in possession. Under Chapter IX] where
disinterestedness was as requirement because you had a disinterested Trustee that was
required and therefore you had a disinterested attorney that was required,
nevertheless,if you had a Chapter [X[ case in which the debtor was retained in
possession, there was no Trustee, the attorney for the debtor in possession did not
have to be disinterested.
Hon. Hollan-Jones: But I'm saying, under the current law, that would be -- if you
are a prepetition creditor, you are supposed to be disqualified. Now some ofthe cases
have opened up some territory in that area. But you are supposed to be disqualified
under a disinterestedness standard.
And all I'm saying is just 1107, the first sentence there, Ijust modeled it after the
first half of the sentence. You're not disqualified solely because you were previously
employed.
So now all I'm saying is I'm opening it up a little more. I'm saying you're not
disqualifies solely because you're the holder of, you know, I don't care what you call
it. You can call it a twinkie's unsecured claim. As long as we define it in some term
that's not wholly open-ended.
I thought about the word "immaterial" or "small" or, you know,"picayune",
"nugatory".
402. The members of the Subcommittee included the author, Honorable Alice M. Batchelder,
Honorable Donald E. Cordova, Honorable Robert J. Kressel, Kenneth N. Klee, Esq. and Leonard
Rosen, Esq.
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subcommittee was later changed to the Subcommittee on Rule 2014 Disclosure
Requirements.
After several meetings, the subcommittee, with the assistance of Professor
Alan N. Resnick, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules approved a preliminary redraft of Rule 2014 which (1) revised the
required disclosures, (2) required the professionals to state under penalty of
perjury that the professional is eligible for employment under the Bankruptcy
Code, (3) provided for an interim order of employment when necessary and (4)
required a supplemental verified statement to be filed when a person employed
learns or discovers additional matters of the type required to be disclosed. The
proposed rule is an improvement over the present rule, but it is still in
preliminary form. It will be considered at the September 1997 meeting of the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
The possibility of bankruptcy rules of professional conduct is alive.
The Disclosure Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
will explore this possibility with the assistance of Professor Coquillette, the
Reporter for the Standing Committee.
There is considerable uncertainty as to conflicts of interest in
bankruptcy cases. Although the focus of this article has been on reorganization
cases, the uncertainty extends to bankruptcy cases under other chapters as well.
Sound, clear rules are needed.
Clear rules were provided by the
disinterestedness standard in Chapter X cases, but changes are needed in the
wake of Congressional abandonment of the disinterested trustee. The
disinterestedness standard is appropriate if a disinterested trustee is appointed,
but it is not for professionals employed by a debtor-in-possession. Particularly
troublesome is the idea that disinterested counsel for the debtor-in-possession
can somehow fill the vacuum created by the abandonment of the disinterested
trustee.
The disinterestedness standard has been imposed by the courts on counsel
for the debtor in possession as a result of the inept draftsmanship of the 1978
Code. The elimination of this standard of employment of professionals by the
debtor-in-possession is long overdue. Use of the definition of conflict
developed in the Restatementwill be of help to the bench and bar by focusing
on the correct issue, the adequacy of the proposed representation. It should
eliminate the troublesome concepts of potential conflicts and appearance of
impropriety. Instead, the bankruptcy judge will determine whether the
representation will be adversely affected. In making that determination, the
court should consider the entirety of interests of counsel, both personal and
representational.
There is also a need in bankruptcy cases for clear, uniform rules relating
to the other side of the coin. The recommendations of the Commission may
act as a catalyst, but unless Congress or the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules adopts federal rules, meaningful change must come at the
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state level. 3 Since the American Law Institute has concluded that it will not
attempt the task, this probably will occur only if the American Bar Association
creates a cross-sectional task force to address conflicts in bankruptcy cases.
If the American Bar Association does take on this task, it should look to
the twenty-first century, not the twentieth century. The task force should
explore bright line tests and means of immediately resolving conflict issues.
Clear treatment of the duty of loyalty, its meaning and scope is essential.
Even though there is not one client versus another client in a contested
proceeding as in an adversary proceeding, there often is direct adversity in the
sense that representation of the trustee or debtor-in-possession will require
counsel to initiate contested proceedings adversely affecting other clients. An
example is negotiating and confirming a plan of reorganization that adversely
affects the claims of another client. Even though the other client might choose
not to be directly involved in the negotiations or contested proceeding, it is
nonetheless affected.
Agreements as to conflicts should be encouraged. Sophisticated clients
should be able to contract as to the duty of loyalty if there is adequate
disclosure and a clear warning.
The twenty-first century is nearly upon us. In the absence of reform the
twenty-first century will see a significant increase in claims against
professionals arising out of representation of debtors-in-possession, trustees and
other parties in interest in workouts and reorganization cases. These will be
based on breach of fiduciary duty and the presence of disqualifying conflicts
rather than negligence.
The Bankruptcy Code is important national legislation. Congress has left
its administration to the federal judiciary. When things go wrong it reflects
badly on the federal judiciary. It is important that we have clear and certain
rules regulating the conduct of those involved. Uniform rules would be of
considerable aid as well. Conflict rules are important in this regard and how
they apply to bankruptcy cases deserves thoughtful consideration.

403. As suggested in note 72 supra, the Office of the U.S. Trustee is a possible source of
rules. However, it has opposed the reform efforts of the Working Group on Ethics and opted for
the status quo.
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